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ABSTRACT 
People often fail to use base-rate information appropriately in decision-making. This is 
evident in the inverse base-rate effect, a phenomenon in which people tend to predict a rare 
outcome for a new and ambiguous combination of cues. Previous attempts to account for 
this effect have appealed to either learned attention biases or inferential reasoning strategies. 
Yet, questions still remain about the processes involved. This thesis therefore examined the 
psychological factors responsible for the inverse base-rate effect. Chapter 3 investigated the 
parameters of the effect in order to characterise inferential strategies that could potentially 
produce the rare outcome bias. These experiments showed that rare outcome choice is not 
based on transfer trial novelty, and that a combination of both relative trial and global 
outcome frequency differences are important for the development of rare outcome biases. 
However, there was no strong evidence for widespread use of a single reasoning strategy. 
Instead, Chapter 4 found that two prominent models of attention in learning, EXIT and 
Mackintosh, could reasonably account for these effects. Despite being based on the same 
theoretical principles, these models made clearly diverging predictions for relative levels of 
attention paid to cues during learning. Chapter 5 tested these predictions by measuring 
changes in cue associability, and fixation time to cues. Overall the results demonstrated a 
greater attentional benefit for rare predictors than common predictors, which appears to be 
moderated by learning about the context. These results are most consistent with the 
predictions of the EXIT model than those of the Mackintosh model. Chapter 6 showed that 
the effect is more reliably observed in a discrete outcome choice test phase than in a 
continuous outcome rating test phase, a result that highlights differences in the sensitivity of 
these measures in observing learning effects, particularly on ambiguous test trials. I will 
discuss the implications of these results for both the prominent explanations of the effect, 
and for theories of learning and decision-making more generally. 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Introduction 
“When you hear hoof beats behind you, don’t expect to see a zebra” 
- Imperato, 1979 
Many of our daily decisions involve at least some guesswork. Most cues we encounter 
are not fully predictive of the outcomes with which they are associated, and most 
situations to which we want to generalize our knowledge of the world are not exactly 
the same as what we have experienced in the past. Consequently, people are often 
required to make decisions based on ambiguous information. For instance, doctors 
make diagnoses based on symptoms that are associated with several different 
conditions. In these cases, the base-rates, or relative frequencies, of events provide an 
important source of information when making decisions. Yet, several studies have 
suggested that people often fail to show adequate sensitivity to base-rates. Base-rate 
neglect is a phenomenon in which base-rate information is underweighted in favour of 
more specific information about the individual case (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Bar-Hillel & 
Fischhoff, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). There are of course situations in which 
favouring specific local information and neglecting base-rates is beneficial for 
judgements. However when local information is ambiguous or uninformative, 
neglecting base-rates may lead to irrational decision-making. For example, in the classic 
lawyer-engineer problem, groups of participants were presented with written 
personality descriptions and were asked to judge the likelihood that the person 
described was a lawyer or an engineer (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Participants were 
either instructed that the description was randomly drawn from a population of 70 
lawyers and 30 engineers, or from a population of 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. 
Participants’ judgements of whether each description referred to a lawyer or engineer 
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were more likely to be based on the stereotypical personality characteristics described 
than the base-rates of each profession within the sample. Even when given ambiguous, 
uninformative descriptions, when base-rates should be most informative, participants 
underweighted this information, predicting a 50% probability of either profession. 
These examples of base-rate neglect tend to be observed in explicit decision-making 
tasks, where base-rate information is provided in a summary statistic. Yet, insensitivity 
to base-rates appears to be dependent on task conditions (see Koehler, 1996, for a 
review). Several studies have shown that decisions are more likely to be consistent with 
base-rates when they are acquired through trial-by-trial experience (Christensen-
Szalanski & Beach, 1982; Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Manis, Dovalina, 
Avis & Cardoze, 1980; Butt, 1988). This kind of direct experience is assumed to make 
the base-rates more salient, and therefore more likely to be used. Thus, Medin and 
colleagues suggest that the use of base-rate summaries in these text-based tasks fails to 
consider the influence of learning processes that may allow base-rate information to be 
incorporated implicitly (Medin & Edelson, 1988; Medin & Bettger 1991). The inverse 
base-rate effect is therefore particularly noteworthy, as it not only demonstrates a choice 
bias that goes against the underlying base-rates when faced with ambiguous 
information, but also demonstrates a failure to use base-rates despite acquisition through 
experience (Medin & Edelson, 1988).  
1.1. The inverse base-rate effect 
 To illustrate the inverse base-rate effect, imagine a doctor learning to diagnose 
diseases on the basis of exhibited symptoms. Over time, they learn that all patients with 
the symptoms headache and nausea have the common disease, “midosis”, and all 
patients with the symptoms headache and fever have the rare disease “coralgia”. A new 
patient then presents with nausea and fever. Which disease should be diagnosed? Here, 
	 3	
both nausea and fever are equally predictive of their respective diseases, and therefore 
the specific symptoms do not provide evidence in favour of one disease over the other. 
However, midosis occurs much more frequently than coralgia, and thus a rational 
response considering the base-rates would be to predict midosis. Yet, given this 
combination of conflicting cues, most people tend to predict the rare disease. This 
choice demonstrates a preference for the less frequent outcome, and is therefore termed 
the inverse base-rate effect.  
This effect was first reported by Medin & Edelson (1988; see also Binder & 
Estes, 1966) in a contingency learning task where participants played the hypothetical 
role of a doctor, like the scenario described above. In their task, participants learned 
symptom-disease contingencies on a trial-by-trial basis. All patients with symptom A 
and symptom B had disease 1 (AB-O1), while all patients with symptom A and 
symptom C had disease 2 (AC-O2). Instances of O1 occurred three times as often as 
instances of O2. Symptom A is therefore an imperfect predictor, as it is paired with both 
diseases. Symptom B is a perfect predictor of the common disease, O1 (hereafter the 
common predictor), and symptom C is a perfect predictor of the rare disease, O2 
(hereafter the rare predictor).1 After learning these contingencies, participants 
completed a transfer phase including several new combinations of the trained symptom 
cues. On trials that presented the imperfect predictor, A, alone, participants tended to 
diagnose the common disease. Although symptom A is associated with both diseases, 
and is therefore an ambiguous cue, this response is consistent with the base-rates of the 
two outcomes. Participants also diagnosed the common disease when presented with 
combined symptoms, ABC. However, when presented with the conflicting symptoms,  																																																								
1 Note that where there are multiple instantiations of the design, letters A–C will refer to all cues of the 
same type. That is, A refers to imperfect predictors, B to perfect predictors of common outcomes, and C 
to perfect predictors of rare outcomes.  	
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Table 1.1 
Basic inverse base-rate task design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A – C represent different symptom cues, O1 – O2 represent different disease 
outcomes. AB – O1 for example, indicates that symptom A and symptom B predicted 
disease O1. Cues in bold indicate perfect predictors of common outcomes, underlined 
cues indicate perfect predictors of rare outcomes. The base-rate column refers to the 
relative number of presentations of each trial type during training, such that AB-O1 
occurs three times as often as AC-O2. “?” indicates trials on which participants make a 
response without feedback.  
BC, participants diagnosed the rare disease. While studies that investigate the effect 
measure responses to all three of these transfer trials, the inverse base-rate effect is 
specific to responses on the conflicting BC trials. The basic design of this task is shown 
in Table 1.1, where letters represent individual cues and O1, O2, etc. represent 
individual outcomes. In the original Medin and Edelson (1988) task, there were three 
repetitions of this design, with different cues and outcomes for each repetition. 
1.2 Why is the inverse base-rate effect important? 
The inverse base-rate effect is generally considered an irrational choice bias. 
This kind of inappropriate base-rate use can have important real-world consequences. 
For example, base-rate neglect has been shown to result in an overestimation of disease 
likelihood in medical professionals (e.g. Casscells, Schoenberger & Graboy, 1978). 
Given the potential implications for misuse of base-rate information, it is important to 
understand why the inverse base-rate effect occurs, and the processes that are 
responsible for these kinds of biases. Research on the inverse base-rate effect is 
valuable not only because of what it can tell us about the information people tend to rely 
on when faced with conflicting or ambiguous information, but also what it can reveal 
 Training Phase  Transfer Phase 
Base-rate Trials  Type Trials 
3 AB – O1  Imperfect Predictors A? 
1 AC – O2  Conflicting transfer BC? 
   Combined transfer ABC? 
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about fundamental learning processes. Seemingly irrational biases often arise as a 
product of generally adaptive processes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Investigating the 
mechanisms underlying these effects can therefore inform our understanding of the 
processes that drive human learning and decision-making more generally.  
One reason the effect was initially considered striking is because it was not 
predicted by existing exemplar-based models of category learning, such as Medin and 
Schaffer’s (1978) context theory, which anticipates consistent use of base-rates, and 
other connectionist models using the delta rule (formally similar to the learning rule in 
the Rescorla-Wagner model outlined below; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Shanks, 1992). 
While research on the effect was most prominent between the late-1980s and early-
2000s, it has recently received renewed interest (e.g., Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & 
Surrey, 2014; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George & Wills, 2016; O’Bryan, Worthy, 
Livesey & Davis, 2017). Specifically, the inverse base-rate effect has been highlighted 
as an important phenomenon because it may discriminate between different attention-
based models of learning. Further, the effect provides a useful opportunity to examine 
how higher-order reasoning processes may interact with lower-level processes in 
learning and decision-making. The remainder of this chapter will summarise the 
theoretical background of the inverse base-rate effect, before outlining the research 
questions addressed in this thesis. 
1.3 Theoretical accounts of the inverse base-rate effect 
1.3.1 A novelty effect  
 Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive explanation for rare outcome biases is 
in terms of a relative novelty effect (Binder & Estes, 1966), which combines the idea 
that novel or striking events are more memorable (Rhetorica ad Herennium, c.85BC) 
with the availability heuristic, which states that events more easily remembered are 
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judged to be more probable (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). The availability heuristic is 
in essence an associative principle. That is, the stronger the association between a cue 
and an outcome, the greater the ease with which a cue will “bring to mind” an outcome 
(Hamilton, 1981). However, imperfect (A) and combined (ABC) trials tend to elicit 
responses consistent with the underlying base-rates, thus disconfirming a novelty 
explanation in its simplest form (Medin & Edelson, 1988).   
1.3.2 Associative learning and cue competition  
According to associative learning theories, contingency learning results from the 
formation and strengthening of associations between cues and outcomes. Support for 
associative accounts of human learning came from findings that contingency 
judgements show selective learning effects typically found in animal conditioning, in 
which simultaneously presented cues compete for a limited amount of associative 
strength with the outcome (Dickinson, Shanks & Evenden, 1984). One well-known 
example of cue competition is the blocking effect. In blocking, judgements about a cue-
outcome relationship are weaker if that cue is presented simultaneously with a second 
cue that is already established as a good predictor of the outcome (Kamin, 1969). That 
is, if cue X is repeatedly paired with an outcome (X+) followed by compound cues XY 
paired with the same outcome (XY+), then outcome recall or judgements about the 
relationship between Y and the outcome are reduced in comparison to a control cue 
(e.g. Z), which has been trained in compound with another cue that has not been pre-
trained. Some theories attribute blocking to a deficit in learning, such that little will be 
learned about the relationship between Y and the outcome. In other words, learning 
about Y is “blocked” by prior learning about the X+ association.  The blocking effect 
demonstrates that learning about a cue interacts with learning about other cues present, 
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in such a way that cues that are better predictors of an outcome will compete more 
effectively with other cues for associative strength with the outcome. 
Most cue competition effects like blocking are well explained by prediction 
error models of learning. That is, learning only occurs to the extent to which an outcome 
is surprising, or unexpected (Kamin, 1969). This idea was formalised in an influential 
model by Rescorla and Wagner (1972; hereafter the Rescorla-Wagner model).2 In this 
model, changes in associative strength are based on the discrepancy between the 
expected outcome, and the actual outcome that occurs on a given trial, according to the 
equation:  
 ∆V! =  α!β(λ−  ΣV) 1.1 
Where ΔVA is the change in associative strength of stimulus A on a given trial, ΣV is the 
total associative strength for all present stimuli, α is a learning rate parameter based on 
the salience of the cue, β is a learning rate parameter based on the salience of the 
outcome, and λ is the maximum amount of learning supported by the outcome. The 
summed error term, λ−  ΣV , refers to the discrepancy between the actual and 
expected outcome, or prediction error. Thus, greater prediction error results in a greater 
change in associative strength on any given trial. 
In inverse base-rate tasks, predictive cues are trained in compound with an 
imperfect predictor. It is therefore possible that differential competition amongst cues in 
common and rare compounds may result in differences in learning about predictive 
cues. Because cue A is a better predictor of O1 than O2, it should compete more 
effectively with cue B than with cue C for associative strength with their respective 
outcomes. This would then result in a weaker association between B and O1 than 
																																																								
2 In fact, explaining cue competition effects was a key motivation for the development of the Rescorla-
Wagner model, as well as other influential models that followed, such as the Mackintosh model 
(Mackintosh, 1975).  
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between C and O2, such that C controls responding on BC trials. Indeed, some authors 
have noted negative correlations between responding for A and responding for BC trials 
at test (Medin & Edelson, 1988; Shanks, 1992). That is, the more strongly A is 
associated with O1, the more C appears to dominate responding on BC trials. However, 
several authors have demonstrated that Rescorla-Wagner is unable to account for the 
inverse base-rate effect (Gluck & Bower, 1988; Markman, 1989). As cue A is an 
imperfect predictor, it eventually loses associative strength3, while predictive cues B 
and C gain all associative strength with their respective outcomes. Learning about AB 
also reaches asymptote more quickly than learning about AC, due to the difference in 
presentation frequency, and therefore prior to asymptote, B will always be more 
strongly associated with O1 than C is with O2. Consequently, if BC is tested at 
asymptote, Rescorla-Wagner predicts no bias in choice, whereas if BC is tested early in 
training, the model predicts a common outcome bias. Thus there is no point at which the 
model predicts a rare bias for BC trials. 
Several authors have proposed additional model assumptions that may allow 
Rescorla-Wagner to account for the effect. For example, Markman (1989) suggested 
that if the activation of absent cues is coded as -1, rather than zero, the model could 
predict an inverse base-rate effect. However, as Shanks (1992) pointed out, it is difficult 
to determine which of all possible encountered cues should be considered absent, and so 
this assumption may prove problematic in practice (but see Dickinson & Burke, 1996; 
Larkin, Aitken & Dickinson, 1998; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994, for potential 
solutions). Gluck (1992) proposed that incorporating distributed cue representations 
could account for the effect, but this only predicted a small preference for the rare 
																																																								
3 Shanks (1992) notes that A will be a better predictor of the outcomes than a neutral cue, and therefore 
should not lose all associative strength.  
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outcome on BC trials, and a small preference for the common outcome on A and ABC 
trials. In practice, the biases on BC and A trials are much more substantial.  
1.3.3 Attention accounts 
Attention refers to the mechanisms responsible for prioritising certain stimuli or 
events for further processing. Attention-based theories of associative learning (e.g., 
Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke, 2001; Pearce and Hall, 1980) posit that attention is 
flexible and is influenced not only by cue salience but also by previous experience of 
the relationship between cues and outcomes. According to these theories, processes of 
learning and attention interact. That is, learning about the relationship between a cue 
and an outcome determines the amount of attention allocated to a cue, and the amount 
of attention allocated to a cue influences the rate of learning about that cue in future 
associations. It is widely established that cues that are reliable predictors of outcomes 
attract preferential attention, with extensive evidence in animal learning (Mackintosh, 
1975; Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971) and human learning (see Le Pelley et al., 2016 
for a review). 
In perhaps the most widely accepted account of the inverse base-rate effect, 
choice of the rare outcome on conflicting BC trials is explained as the result of 
increased attention to cue C during learning (Kruschke, 1996; 2001b). This explanation 
assumes that AB-O1 trials are learned well and learned early, because they occur 
relatively frequently. As a result, both A and B become moderately associated with the 
common outcome. Consequently, the presence of A on AC trials elicits an erroneous 
prediction of O1. To reduce subsequent error, and to preserve learning about AB trials, 
attention rapidly shifts away from the ambiguous cue A towards the more predictive 
cue, C. This attention bias to C results in a stronger association between C and O2 than 
the association between B and O1, such that C tends to control responding on BC trials 
	 10	
at test. This account has been formalised in the ADIT model, which was later extended 
to allow attention distributions to be learned in the EXIT model (Kruschke, 1996; 
Kruschke, 2001b). These models have been successful in predicting the inverse base-
rate effect and related highlighting effects4 (Kruschke, 2001a; Kruschke 2003).  The 
EXIT model is a connectionist model of associative learning that incorporates rapid 
attention shifting in response to prediction error. That is, after making an outcome 
prediction, and subsequently observing the actual outcome, attention shifts to the cue 
most likely to reduce subsequent prediction error. After attention shifts within a trial, 
the distribution of attention to each cue is updated and learned, such that the same 
attention distribution can be applied on similar trials in the future. In EXIT, attention 
moderates the influence of cues on both responding and learning, such that cues that are 
attended will have greater control over responding within a trial, and will be learned 
about more readily. Thus, according to EXIT, attention is shifted towards C on AC 
trials, due to the prediction error driven by the ambiguous cue A. On BC trials, greater 
attention is then paid to cue C, and/or C has a stronger association with O2, resulting in 
greater O2 responses.  
1.3.3.1 Evidence for attention accounts. Several studies have provided 
evidence in support of the role of attention in producing the rare outcome bias on 
conflicting trials.  
The importance of the imperfect predictor. The necessity of a shared cue (e.g., 
cue A is present in both the common and rare compounds) provides particularly 
compelling evidence for accounts of the effect that are mediated by prediction error, 
such as the attentional account described above. Several studies have shown that the 																																																								4	In	highlighting,	AB-O1	trials	are	presented	in	a	pre-training	phase,	prior	to	the	presentation	of	both	AB-O1	and	AC-O2	trials	in	a	second	training	phase.	This	phased	training	of	the	contingencies	also	leads	to	a	preference	for	O2	on	BC	trials	in	a	transfer	phase	(Kruschke,	1996).	This	was	taken	as	evidence	that	early	learning	about	AB	trials	is	important	for	the	inverse	base-rate	effect.		
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inverse base-rate effect does not occur for conflicting DE trials if D and E are trained in 
non-overlapping compounds where FD-O1 is trained more frequently than GE-O2 
(Kruschke, 2001a; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Wills et al., 2014). In the absence of a 
shared cue, there would be no prediction error on GE trials to drive attention toward the 
predictive cue, E. Wills et al. (2014) measured event related potentials (ERPs) 
associated with visual attention in response to predictive cues after training with a 
shared cue (AB vs. AC) and after training in the absence of a shared cue (FD vs. GE). 
This included differential ERP effects, Selection Negativity and Selection Positivity, 
which indicate the difference in ERPs for the target and unattended stimuli, and are 
elicited by attention to features. When cues were presented individually at test, there 
were significantly greater posterior Selection Negativity and concurrent anterior 
Selection Positivity for C compared to B. However, there was no significant difference 
in these ERPs for E compared to D, which had not been trained with a shared cue.  
Asymmetric representation. Kruschke (2001a) suggests that attention shifts 
during learning result in an asymmetric representation of cue-outcome relationships. 
Cue A receives more attention on AB trials than AC trials, such that both A and B 
predict O1, but only C predicts O2. In category learning terms, O1 is represented by 
both A and B, and O2 is represented by C alone. On BC transfer trials, the absence of 
cue A means that BC is more similar to the representation for O2 than the representation 
for O1 (e.g., Nosofsky, 1984; 1986). Johansen, Fouquet and Shanks (2007) trained 
participants in a “disjoint cue structure” that mirrors this asymmetric structure, where 
AB-O1 was presented three times as often as C-O2. This resulted in greater O2 choice 
on BC trials. Given that participants did not show a choice bias when given a summary 
of the base-rates in an explicit decision-making task, they concluded that both 
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asymmetric association and base-rate neglect were individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient to produce the inverse base-rate effect.   
Attention transfer. As previously mentioned, most models based on 
predictiveness principles (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Kruschke, 2001b; Mackintosh, 1975; 
Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010) assume that participants attend to cues according to their 
predictive history, and that learning about cues is proportional to the attention allocated 
to them. Attention to cues influences their associability, or the rate at which they are 
learned about. That is, the more attention paid to a cue, the faster that cue will be 
learned about in future novel associations. After initial base-rate training, Kruschke 
(2005) gave participants a secondary training phase with several new combinations of 
either AB or AC trials, paired with novel outcomes. In this phase, A was now predictive 
of the novel outcome, while B and C were non-predictive (see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed explanation of this design). Kruschke found that AC trials were learned more 
slowly than AB trials.  This negative transfer in learning rate can be accounted for by 
greater continued attention to the previously rare predictor C on AC trials than the 
previously common predictor B on AB trials, which then impairs new learning about A.  
Salience effects. More salient stimuli also attract greater attention (Denton & 
Kruschke, 2006). Cue salience can be determined not only by the physical properties of 
the cue, but also training history (Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). In a medical diagnosis 
task, Bohil, Markman and Maddox (2005) tested the hypothesis that cue C gains greater 
salience and attention throughout training by manipulating the perceived salience of 
cues, while training AB-O1 and AC-O2 trials in equal base-rates. They found that if cue 
C was presented as a serious symptom (e.g., paralysis), and cue B was presented as a 
mild symptom (e.g., stuffy nose), participants showed a preference for O2 on BC trials. 
They also found that when AB-O1 and AC-O2 were trained in a 3:1 base-rate, the 
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inverse base-rate effect could be removed if cue B was presented as a more serious 
symptom than cue C. If similar processes also govern the inverse base-rate effect, these 
results imply the rare predictor develops greater salience as a result of training, and 
therefore receives greater attention.  
Overt attention. Eye gaze is often used as a measure of overt attention. While it 
is possible to make covert shifts of attention without accompanying eye movements, 
attention and gaze are generally closely related (Posner, 1980). Kruschke, Kappenman 
& Hetrick (2005) trained participants in a highlighting design, while measuring fixation 
time (the length of time spent fixating on each cue). They found greater fixation time to 
C on AC trials than to B on AB trials. They also found greater fixation time to C than to 
B on BC trials in the test phase. However, a recent fMRI study has shown potentially 
conflicting evidence that there may be greater processing of B at test (O’Bryan et al., 
2017). This study will be explained in greater depth later in this chapter.  
1.3.3.2 A potential problem for attention-based explanations. These studies 
suggest that the rare predictor in particular benefits from prioritised attention, which 
will result in stronger learning about the association between the C and the rare 
outcome. Yet, Wills et al. (2014) noted that, despite greater attention to C than B, 
common outcome responses to cue B alone were greater than rare outcome responses to 
cue C alone at test. This suggests that the inverse base-rate effect occurred even though 
there was a greater association between B and O1 than between C and O2 (this trend is 
also evident in several other cases, e.g., Bohil, Markman, & Maddox, 2005; Kruschke, 
1996; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Medin & Bettger, 1991; Shanks, 1992; Winman, 
Wennerholm, Juslin, & Shanks, 2005; see Winman, Wennerholm & Juslin, 2003, for 
further discussion of this issue). This finding may be problematic for attention-based 
theories of the inverse base-rate effect, or at least suggests that there may be 
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dissociations between attention and response accuracy (Wills et al., 2014; Winman, et 
al., 2003; Le Pelley et al., 2016).  
1.3.3.3 The inverse base-rate effect and models of attention. The EXIT model 
is the model most commonly applied to the inverse base-rate effect. However, it is not 
the only attention-based model of learning that is relevant to the effect. EXIT is based 
on the theoretical principle that greater attention is allocated to cues that reduce 
subsequent prediction error, and is therefore conceptually very similar to the 
Mackintosh (1975) model. Mackintosh has been applied extensively in animal and 
human learning literature, and has been critical in explaining related biases in learning, 
such as the learned predictiveness effect (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003, Le Pelley et 
al., 2016). Although these models are theoretically similar, there have been recent 
questions about the ability of the Mackintosh model to account for some characteristics 
of the inverse base-rate effect, particularly the presence of an inverse base-rate effect 
when accuracy for B alone is greater than accuracy for C alone (Wills et al., 2014). This 
discrepancy is also problematic for a simple model of attention proposed by Le Pelley et 
al. (2016), in which attention is assumed to be proportional to associative strength. 
Here, attention would be directed towards cues that are good predictors of an outcome, 
and away from cues that may weakly predict multiple outcomes. The authors state that 
this model can account for most learned predictiveness effects on attention, with the 
exception of the inverse base-rate effect. They instead suggest the inverse base-rate 
effect is more consistent with models in which the allocation of attention on any given 
trial is based on comparisons of the relative predictiveness of the cues presented, like 
that in EXIT and Mackintosh.  
Wills et al. (2014) notes that a feature of EXIT that may account for the 
discrepancy between attention and responding to predictive cues is that attention is 
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normalised before influencing responding. That is, when cues are placed in direct 
competition (as in a compound trial), attention will influence the relative control of 
those cues over responding. When a cue is presented individually, that cue has complete 
control over responding, and attention will have little influence on responding. Thus 
responding on trials where B and C are presented individually may not be a good 
indication of the attention they receive when they are presented in compound. Attention 
in EXIT is also exemplar-mediated, such that the model can learn to direct attention 
away from A on AC trials, but maintain attention to A on AB trials. As EXIT distributes 
attention based on the similarity between cue compounds and learned exemplars, the 
similarity of BC trials to AC trials may mean that C will also receive prioritised 
attention on BC trials, which could account for rare choice on BC trials when 
associative strength for B may be higher than that for C.  
One potential way to reconcile these results with each of the models described 
above is to assume a role of context learning. That is, the context may act as a cue that 
becomes associated with the outcomes, and subsequently influences responding on test 
trials. Because of the base-rates, the context will be more strongly associated with the 
common outcome. Therefore on B alone trials, both the cue and the context would 
facilitate prediction of the common outcome, whereas on C alone trials, context 
associations might weaken rare outcome predictions, even if C-O2 associations are 
stronger than B-O1 associations.  
In the EXIT model, context learning is captured by associations between the 
outcome and a “bias node”, which may vary in salience. Initially EXIT was shown to 
predict higher accuracy for C alone trials than B alone trials in an overall fit of the data 
(Kruschke, 2001a). Yet, when EXIT was refit to the data with heavy weighting of the 
difference in B and C trial responses, it was able to predict a rare bias on BC trials when 
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accuracy for B exceeded that for C (Kruschke, 2003). Notably, the salience of the bias 
node in this reweighted fit was high (bias salience = .938) in comparison to the initial 
fit.5  However, the inverse base-rate effect in this reweighted fit was reduced in 
magnitude compared to human choice, and the overall RMSE was poorer than in the 
initial, unweighted fit. The role of context learning in the inverse base-rate effect, and 
the influence of context learning on attention to predictive cues, is therefore a focus of 
Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
In summary, the inverse base-rate effect has been an important phenomenon for 
the development and subsequent defence of attention-based associative learning theories 
(e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2016), yet it may also allow us to discriminate between different 
models of attention. More research is needed to identify systematic properties of this 
rare choice bias, and to identify how the predictions of different attention-based models 
can be differentiated and tested empirically.  
1.3.4 Inferential accounts 
Some researchers have proposed that, rather than a learning effect, the inverse 
base-rate effect is a rational decision based on inferential processes at test (Juslin, 
Wennerholm & Winman, 2001; Winman et al., 2005; the dominant inference-based 
account will be described in detail in section 1.3.4.1). According to this account, 
selective attention and selective learning are not necessary to explain rare outcome 
choice.  
This view is reminiscent of inferential theories of associative learning, which 
state that human learning phenomena are the result of conscious, controlled reasoning 
processes (Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009; De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer, 																																																								5 The value of .938	is based on a fit to the data from Experiment 1 in Kruschke (1996). Kruschke (2003) 
states the bias salience in the initial, unweighted fit was .010, yet the bias salience reported in Kruschke 
(2001a) for the data from Experiment 1 of Kruschke (1996) is actually .401. A bias salience value of .00 
is instead reported for a fit to the data from Experiment 2 in Kruschke (2001a). 	
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Beckers & Vandorpe, 2005). The rise in popularity of the propositional approach to 
associative learning in recent years highlights the need to re-examine inferential 
explanations of the inverse base-rate effect. Several researchers have acknowledged a 
potential role for higher-order reasoning in the effect (Kruschke, 2003; Kruschke, 2005; 
Johansen, Fouquet & Shanks. 2007; Winman, Wennerholm & Juslin, 2003). Winman, 
Wennerholm, Juslin and Shanks (2005) report several findings in support of this view. 
First, they compared the effect between adults and children, with the assumption that 
children would be more likely to rely on simple associative processes than high-level 
reasoning. While adults showed a clear bias towards choosing the rare outcome on 
conflicting trials, children showed no bias in outcome choice.6 This difference in 
response patterns between groups was not attributable to differences in learning 
efficiency, indicating the result was not simply due to differences in learned 
associations or selective attention. Second, they classified participants as rule-based or 
feature-based, according to generalisation performance in a separate patterning task 
(Shanks & Darby, 1998), in which rule-transfer is associated with higher working-
memory capacity (Wills, Barrasin & McLaren, 2011), greater cognitive reflection, and 
more strategic "model-based" choice in reinforcement learning (Don, Goldwater, Otto, 
& Livesey, 2016). Several studies in category learning have suggested that individual 
differences in the tendency to rely on exemplar versus rule-based processes are 
relatively stable across tasks (McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2014; Little & 
McDaniel, 2015). Only those participants who were able to extract and apply an abstract 
rule in the patterning task exhibited an inverse base-rate effect, suggesting that the 
effect may rely on the use of higher-order processing. Such results are not readily 																																																								6	In a similar vein, Fagot, Kruschke, Depy and Vauclair (1998) compared the effect in humans and 
baboons. While humans showed a rare bias on conflicting trials, baboons showed ambivalent responding 
on both conflicting and imperfect test trials. However, Fagot et al. argued that this was due to a difference 
in rapid attention shifting, rather than reasoning capacity.  
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explained by attention theories and, taken together, suggest at the very least that 
inferential processes play a role in the effect.   
Furthermore, Johansen et al. (2007) demonstrated an inverse base-rate effect 
when cue-outcome contingencies were presented simultaneously in written listed 
format, suggesting that trial-by-trial learning is not necessary for the effect. Although 
the rare choice bias was present when each trial was listed in text form, the effect was 
negated when an explicit summary of the base-rates was provided, suggesting the 
choice bias is not simply based on higher-order processes applied at test.  
Yet, there have also been arguments against the contribution of higher order 
processes. Recently, Burling & Yoshida (2016) found highlighting effects in young 
children, in contrast to the results of Winman et al. (2005). Lamberts and Kent (2007) 
also argued that there is no evidence for rule-based processes in the inverse base-rate 
effect. In their study, participants were tested in four different within-subjects 
conditions, three of which were designed to tax working memory capacity, and 
therefore interfere with effortful, cognitively demanding reasoning processes. In a 
control condition, participants responded to test trials under standard, unspeeded 
conditions. In a dual-task condition, participants were required to simultaneously count 
backwards in multiples of three, and in two speeded conditions, participants were 
required to respond to test trials within either 500 or 300ms. An inverse base-rate effect 
was obtained in all four conditions. The authors therefore argued that the inverse base-
rate effect cannot be a result of inferential processes at the time of test.  
Some aspects of Lamberts & Kent’s (2007) analysis make it difficult to draw a 
firm conclusion that these conditions have no influence on the strength of the effect. For 
instance, differences in the strength of the effect under dual-task or speeded conditions, 
compared to no load conditions, were not reported. Indeed, the effect appears 
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numerically weaker under speeded conditions. Further, the particular analyses used for 
this study are potentially problematic, as the inverse base-rate effect was determined by 
comparing choice on A and BC trials. Due to this comparison, a significant inverse 
base-rate effect was reported when the proportion of rare choice on BC trials was only 
.43 in the 300ms condition (issues surrounding appropriate analysis of the inverse base-
rate effect will be addressed further in Chapter 2). This result could instead be 
interpreted as showing no evidence for an effect under highly speeded conditions.  
Further, the cognitive load manipulations were applied during the test phase 
only. The assumption is that inferential rules in the inverse base-rate effect are formed 
during the test phase, because this is where the relevant trials are presented. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that rules or inferences are formed throughout training, and 
these inferences may then be applied during the test phase with little cognitive demand. 
Indeed, Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren & Rolland (2011) found that use of rule-based 
processes in a patterning task were affected by cognitive load during training, but not 
during test. Rule-use in the patterning task is also based on responses to new 
combinations of trained cues, in a similar way as the inverse base-rate effect. Thus, 
Lamberts and Kent’s (2007) results do not rule out the possibility that some form of 
inferential reasoning could contribute to the effect.  
1.3.4.1 Eliminative inference and its limitations. Currently, the sole inferential 
account of the inverse base-rate effect is the eliminative inference hypothesis, 
formalised in the elimination model (ELMO; Juslin et al., 2001). Informally, 
eliminative inference states that, given an ambiguous cue combination that deviates 
from the learned contingency rules, the well-known common outcome is eliminated, 
and the rare outcome is chosen.  
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More formally, ELMO assumes that participants form a number of inference 
rules about the relationship between cues and outcomes (e.g., AB → O1) during 
training. On any given trial during the test phase, some of these learned rules will form 
part of an active set in working memory. The remaining inference rules will be part of a 
guessing set. The probability of an inference rule being part of the active set is 
proportional to its base-rate, so that frequent inference rules (e.g., AB → O1) are more 
likely to be active in memory than infrequent inference rules (e.g., AC → O2). At test, 
ELMO determines whether a particular transfer item will elicit a process of induction or 
elimination according to the similarity between the learned inference rules and the 
transfer items. Transfer items with at most one deviating feature to the active rules will 
elicit induction. In this case, inference rules that share similarity with the transfer item 
are activated, and an active outcome is then chosen at a probability proportional to its 
similarity to the transfer item. For example, A and ABC transfer trials have one 
dissimilar feature to the active rules (missing one perfect predictor, or one too many 
perfect predictors, respectively), and therefore lead to induction. Because the common 
inference rule is more likely to be part of the active set, O1 is typically chosen for these 
trials. Transfer items with two or more deviating features will instead elicit elimination. 
In elimination, the active inference rules are eliminated, and participants guess amongst 
the remaining inactive outcomes in the guessing set, which is more likely to contain rare 
outcome rules. The conflicting BC trial deviates from AB → O1 with two features (one 
missing imperfect predictor, and one extra perfect predictor), and so the active O1 
outcome is eliminated, and participants guess the rare O2 outcome. 
Eliminative inference is often interpreted as a novelty effect (Juslin et al., 2001; 
Kruschke, 2001a; Johansen et al., 2007). That is, participants assume that a novel or 
ambiguous cue combination requires a novel response. The rare outcome is more 
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“novel” than the common outcome, so this is chosen on conflicting trials. Although in 
many circumstances it is practical to consider this novelty-matching inference and 
elimination as being equivalent, it is worth noting that these two inferences are distinct 
in form and function. Perhaps the most salient difference is that rather than eliminating 
an unlikely response and guessing amongst the remaining options, novelty-matching 
involves selecting the most novel outcome given a novel cue combination.  
Initial support for eliminative inference came from novel cue effects (Juslin et 
al., 2001). According to eliminative inference, a novel cue should elicit elimination, due 
to its dissimilarity to rules learned in training. Since the rules that are active in memory 
are more likely to involve a common outcome, the participant is more likely to guess a 
rare outcome. In accordance, they found greater rare outcome responses for a single 
novel cue during transfer, similar to that for conflicting transfer trials. This result has 
since been replicated in a simple text-based decision-making version of the task 
(Johansen et al., 2007). 
A recent fMRI study used multivoxel pattern analysis to determine which 
perceptual objects participants were attending to during the inverse base-rate task. 
Faces, objects and scenes were used as cues, as these categories have well-defined 
regions of representation in the cortex. For example, imperfect predictors were always 
faces, but common and rare predictors were either objects or scenes, balanced within 
subjects. Prior to training, regions of sensitivity to these categories were determined for 
each participant, which was then compared to patterns of activation on conflicting test 
trials. They found neural activity indicative of greater attention to cue B than to cue C 
on conflicting trials where the rare outcome was chosen (O’Bryan et al., 2017). In 
addition, response times were also slower on conflicting trials when rare choices were 
made, but were faster when the neural activity indicated the common outcome was 
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processed to a greater extent. That is, participants were faster to respond with the rare 
outcome if they attended more to the common cue B. Taken together these results 
suggest that choosing the rare outcome is a deliberative response that is facilitated by 
processing the common predictor, which the authors interpreted as evidence of 
elimination of the common outcome. 
ELMO fails to account for several characteristics of the effect, including the 
necessity of a shared cue during training (the model should predict elimination even in 
cases where there is no shared cue), and differences in the strength of responding to 
imperfect and combined transfer items (typically stronger common responses to A than 
ABC, even though induction should occur for both; Kruschke, 2001; Wills et al., 2014). 
As such, many researchers no longer consider it a plausible model of the effect. 
1.3.4.2 Problems with discounting inferential contributions. The limitations 
of one particular formalisation of the eliminative inference certainly do not rule out the 
involvement of inference entirely. Nor does it prohibit the involvement of outcome 
elimination or novelty-matching in some general form, albeit in a way that may be 
different from that specified by ELMO. Indeed, demonstrated rare biases for novel cues 
may rely on such explanations (Juslin et al., 2001; Johansen et al., 2007). Winman et 
al.’s (2005) results do not specifically support ELMO, but rather suggest the 
involvement of high-level processes of some kind, and it seems likely that participants 
reason about decisions in an experiment, particularly when faced with ambiguous 
information.  
It is not the intention of this thesis to argue that the inverse base-rate effect can 
be completely explained by either attention or inference alone. Dual-process theories 
assume that associative learning processes may be influenced by, or interact with, 
higher-order inferential processes (McLaren et al., 2014; Thorwart & Livesey, 2016).  
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Inferential accounts remain important potential explanations of other cue-competition 
effects, such as blocking (Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009), and there is 
evidence that both associative learning and inference contribute to the strength of the 
learned-predictiveness effect (Don & Livesey, 2015). Thus, it appears premature to 
reject the possibility that some form of inference could play a role in the inverse base-
rate effect. Despite this view, there has been little attempt to characterise the kinds of 
inferential reasoning that may plausibly be involved in the effect, outside of ELMO.  
1.4 The generality of the inverse base-rate effect 
Biases in learning and decision-making are often of interest to researchers 
because they are a reflection of processes that occur in everyday life. It is therefore 
important to establish how generalisable the inverse base-rate effect is. The effect is 
seen across a variety of human contingency learning tasks in adults (see Chapter 2 for a 
review of previously used methods). Yet, there has only been one animal study on the 
related highlighting effect, which failed to find an effect (Fagot et al., 1998), and there 
have been mixed results regarding the presence of rare biases in children (Winman et 
al., 2005; Burling & Yoshida, 2016). One aspect of prior research that may limit the 
generalizability of the effect is that, unlike other cue competition effects, the inverse 
base-rate effect has always been measured using the same kind of discrete choice test 
phase. Thus, one question addressed in this thesis is whether the inverse base-rate effect 
is also observed in other measures that are assumed to tap into the same processes 
involved in producing rare outcome choice.   
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1.5 Aims of the current thesis 
The general aim of this thesis is to understand the mechanisms involved in the 
inverse base-rate effect. This thesis specifically addresses the following research 
questions:  
1. What role do inferential processes play in the inverse base-rate effect?   
Given the limitations of ELMO, inferential contributions have been largely 
discounted in relation to the inverse base-rate effect. Yet, there are several empirical 
findings in favour of the contribution of higher-order processes. It remains unclear what 
form these reasoning processes might take. Thus, one aim of this thesis was to 
characterise the inferential processes that may lead to rare outcome choice.  
Inferential processes may not only involve a reasoning strategy arising at test, 
but inferences that form throughout training, which may then influence outcome choice 
at test. Such inferences may arise through particular training conditions, for example, 
noticing that some outcomes are more novel than others, or that some cues are more 
novel than others.  
2. What can the effect tell us about the way in which attention processes operate in 
learning about predictive cues? 
The finding that choice accuracy for B alone is greater than choice accuracy for 
C alone at test has been highlighted as a testing ground for attention theories of the 
inverse base-rate effect (Le Pelley et al., 2016). Yet, context associations with the 
common outcome may be able to account for the dissociation between attention and 
responding. Thus, this thesis also investigates the role of context learning in the inverse 
base-rate effect, how this influences attention to predictive cues, and how it affects the 
strength of the inverse base-rate effect. Given that the EXIT model is not the only 
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attention model relevant for the effect, this thesis also aims to compare how well EXIT 
and Mackintosh models can account for some of the key results in this thesis.    
3. Is the inverse base-rate effect only a choice effect?  
  While several other cue competition effects, such as blocking, have been shown 
across different kinds of test phases, the inverse base-rate effect has only ever been 
measured using discrete outcome choice at test, where participants are asked to select 
the most likely outcome.  If the inverse base-rate effect is a result of similar 
mechanisms to other cue competition effects, then we might expect it to occur under the 
same test conditions. Yet, there is also reason to expect that participants might respond 
more rationally if given the opportunity to rate the likelihood of each outcome 
individually. While a more rational response to conflicting trials would be to predict the 
common outcome, another perfectly rational response would be to predict that both 
outcomes are equally likely. This kind of response is not available in a discrete choice 
test phase, however it is available in a continuous rating test phase, where participants 
rate the likelihood of each outcome. This thesis therefore aimed to determine whether 
the effect is specific to discrete choice by comparing the traditional choice test phase 
with a continuous rating test phases. 
1.6 Chapter summary 
Chapter 2 provides a brief review and comparison of the methods and statistical 
analyses previously used to study the inverse base-rate effect, and those used throughout 
this thesis. This chapter also includes a General Method section, which describes the 
tasks, procedures and data analyses.  
Chapter 3 presents a series of experiments with two purposes. The first was to 
further establish the parameters of the inverse base-rate effect. Understanding the 
conditions in which the effect does and does not occur is critical in determining which 
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processes contribute to the effect. The second was to provide a test of the kinds of 
inferences that could plausibly lead to rare outcome choice on conflicting trials. That is, 
by manipulating the training conditions under which certain inferential strategies may 
arise, we may be able to characterise the reasoning processes that lead to the inverse 
base-rate effect. This included manipulating the relative novelty of transfer trials, the 
relative novelty of outcomes throughout training, and relative novelty of predictive cue 
trials throughout training. The results from this chapter reveal that inferential processes 
can lead to rare choice on conflicting trials in some cases. They also show that trial 
frequency and outcome frequency differences both have a significant impact on the 
effect, but in a way that is not consistent with a systematic or widely used inferential 
process across all participants. 
Chapter 4 aims to compare how well the EXIT model and Mackintosh model 
can account for the data presented in Chapter 3. Although these two models are based 
on similar theoretical principles, there has been no formal comparison of their 
predictions in relation to the inverse base-rate effect. This chapter therefore presents the 
quantitative fits of EXIT and a modified Mackintosh model to the data from Chapter 3, 
as well as a discussion of the similarities and differences between the models’ 
predictions.  
Chapter 5 tests the conflicting predictions regarding attention to cues produced 
by EXIT and Mackintosh in the previous chapter. Specifically, this chapter replicated 
the finding of outcome frequency effects reported in Chapter 3 in an allergist paradigm. 
The subsequent experiments used attention transfer designs to measure changes in cue 
associability, and eye tracking to measure fixation time to cues both across training and 
during the test phase.  
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Chapter 6 aims to determine whether the inverse base-rate effect is also 
observed when measured with a continuous rating test phase, compared to the 
traditional discrete choice test phase. The results of these chapters, their implications 
and limitations, are discussed in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 2 
General Methods and Data Analysis 
This chapter provides a comparison of the methods and statistical analyses that 
have previously been used to study the inverse base-rate effect, and those used in this 
thesis. The effect is remarkably persistent under various conditions, including 
differences in trial base-rates, task scenarios, and task design. However, differences in 
approaches to the methodology and statistical analysis in previous studies requires that 
some consideration is given to past practices before summarising the approach that I 
have taken in this thesis.  
2.1 Base-rates 
In a typical inverse base-rate effect task, AB-O1 trials are presented more 
frequently than AC-O2 trials. This basic design is often repeated multiple times with 
different cues and outcomes, including two (Bohil, Markman & Maddox, 2005; 
Kruschke, 1996; Kalish, 2001; Lamberts & Kent; Wood, 2009; Wood & Blair, 2011), 
three (Medin & Edelson, 1988; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005) or four 
(Medin and Bettger, 1991; Juslin, Wennerholm, & Winman, 2001) repetitions. 
Although most tasks have used a 3:1 base-rate of common to rare trials in training, the 
effect has also been demonstrated with a more extreme 7:1 base-rate (Shanks, 1992; 
Juslin, Wennerholm & Winman, 2001; Lamberts & Kent, 2007). Some evidence 
suggests that the 7:1 base-rate leads to a stronger effect than a 3:1 base-rate when 
trained within-subjects (Shanks, 1992). However, the effect is also observed with a 
smaller 2:1 base-rate (Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey, 2014). The effect also 
persists when the relative base-rates of common and rare trials are changed at different 
stages throughout training, with a choice bias for the early rare outcome on BC trials 
(Medin & Bettger, 1991; Kruschke, 2009). Based on these findings, Kruschke (1996; 
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2009) has suggested that learning the common contingencies before the rare 
contingencies is critical for the effect. Indeed, training AB-O1 trials prior to the 
introduction of AC-O2 trials also leads to a preference for O2 on BC trials in the 
highlighting effect (Kruschke, 1996). The experiments in this thesis used a 3:1 base-rate 
as it appears to be sufficient for producing the effect, and allows the rare trials to be 
learned reasonably well without inflating the number of trials required for the task 
unnecessarily. 
2.2 Task scenarios 
Studies of the inverse base-rate effect have traditionally used a medical 
diagnosis task, where participants assume the role of a doctor learning to diagnose 
fictitious diseases from experience with several patients (e.g., Medin & Edelson, 1988; 
Medin & Bettger, 1991; Kruschke, 1996; Juslin et al., 2001; Johansen, Fouquet & 
Shanks, 2007). For ease of comparison with these studies, the experiments in Chapter 3 
and one experiment in Chapter 6 also use this cover story. Nevertheless, the effect also 
appears to be robust under a variety of task scenarios and stimuli, including random 
word associations (Dennis & Kruschke, 1998; Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005), 
abstract shapes and coloured squares (Fagot, Kruschke, Dépy, & Vauclair, 1998), line 
stimuli (Kalish & Kruschke, 2000; Johansen, Fouquet & Shanks, 2010), features of cell 
images and viruses (Lamberts & Kent, 2007), abstract shapes representing “cell bodies” 
and diseases (Wills et al., 2014), graphs of “blood proteins” and native Australian 
animal species (Kalish, 2001), as well as personality traits and group membership 
(Sherman et al., 2009).  
As the experiments in Chapter 4 are directly concerned with attention processes, 
these instead employ an allergist task, which has been used frequently in human 
contingency learning studies (e.g., Larkin, Aitken & Dickinson, 1998; Le Pelley & 
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McLaren, 2001; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992) and 
has proven useful for studying attention transfer in the learned predictiveness effect 
(Don & Livesey, 2015; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 2015). 
In the allergist task, participants assume the role of a doctor whose task is to determine 
which foods are causing which allergic reaction in their fictitious patient. One of the 
differences between this task and the medical diagnosis task is that each trial indicates 
an event occurring for the same patient, rather than a different patient on each trial. The 
allergist task is therefore beneficial for studying attention transfer as it allows a change 
in context between training phases by simply changing the patient and the allergic 
reaction outcomes. For example, in initial training, foods can be described as eaten by 
“Mr X”, who suffers from either headache or nausea. In a second training phase, the 
same foods can be described as eaten by “Miss Y”, who suffers from either fever or 
rash. There is no reason to believe the same foods would necessarily cause allergies in 
two different patients, and therefore any differences in learning about food-allergy 
associations for Miss Y can be attributed to prior learning in the initial phase. This 
scenario was also used in two experiments in Chapter 6. Further details of the tasks used 
in this thesis are described in the General Method section below.  
2.3 Test measures 
With the exception of one study that used a cued-recall paradigm (Dennis & 
Kruschke, 1991), the inverse base-rate effect is typically measured using a discrete 
outcome choice measure.7 That is, participants are asked to choose which outcome they 
think is most likely, given the presented cues. This measure is used in Chapters 3 and 4 
with an additional confidence rating. Comparing confidence for choice on conflicting 
																																																								
7 An unpublished study by Wedell and Kruschke (2001, as cited by Kruschke, 2009) measured likeability 
ratings in a task where participants used personality traits to predict group membership. 
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trials compared to other transfer trials, as well as comparing confidence for rare choices 
compared to common choices, may prove useful for understanding the processes 
underlying the inverse base-rate effect. Chapter 6 aimed to determine whether the 
inverse base-rate effect is also observed in an outcome ratings test phase. Here, 
participants were asked to rate the likelihood of each outcome on a continuous scale. 	
2.4 Test trials 
Although the critical test of the inverse base-rate effect is a mean of the 
responses to conflicting (BC) trials, studies of the effect typically report responses for a 
series of different transfer trials, including imperfect (A) and combined (ABC) trials8. 
Throughout this thesis, these trials will be referred to as the critical transfer trials. All 
three of these trials are ambiguous, and were designed to test the use of base-rate 
information, yet tend to elicit different response biases (Medin & Edelson, 1988).  
The conflicting (BC) compound trials are composed of a perfect common 
outcome predictor (B) and a perfect rare outcome predictor (C) that shared a cue during 
training (A). The inverse base-rate effect is indicated by greater choice of the associated 
rare outcome on these trials. Several studies have also included between-compound 
conflicting cues, which pair a common and rare predictor that did not share a cue during 
training. These trials also typically lead to a preference for the rare outcome, but this is 
sometimes slightly numerically weaker (Kruschke, 1996; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; 
Kalish, 2001; Bohil et al., 2005). Thus, the experiments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 only 
include within-compound conflicting trials, that is, those that shared a cue during 
training. The experiments in Chapter 6 included both within- and between-compound 
conflicting trials.  
																																																								
8 The descriptive (e.g., conflicting) and abstract (e.g., BC) labels for these transfer trials will be used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
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The imperfect cue A is associated with both the common and the rare outcome, 
but typically elicits greater common outcome responses, consistent with base-rate use. 
These trials are useful to assess normative base-rate use, and the strength of the 
association between the imperfect cue and the common outcome. As addressed in 
Chapter 1, it is theoretically interesting that the strength of rare choices on BC trials 
tends to be negatively associated with common responses to A trials (Medin & Edelson, 
1988; Shanks, 1992).  
Combined (ABC) trials are a combination of the first two transfer trials. These 
trials also tend to show a bias towards the common outcome, but often to a lesser extent 
than that on imperfect trials (e.g., Kruschke, 1996; 2001; Johansen et al., 2010; Medin 
& Edelson, 1988; Wood & Blair, 2011; Shanks, 1992; Winman et al., 2005). These 
trials also sometimes show no bias, or a slight rare bias (e.g., Kruschke, 2001; Wood, 
2009; Lamberts & Kent, 2007; Bohil et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2009). The combined 
trials have been included in the following experiments, but because these trials appear 
to be less reliable, I do not place much weight on them.  
Other transfer trials of interest are the perfect predictors, which were only 
associated with one outcome during training. Comparing accuracy on perfect common 
(B) and perfect rare (C) predictor trials at test has been previously highlighted as 
important for attention-based cue competition accounts of the effect (Wills et al., 2014; 
Le Pelley et al., 2016) and therefore the following chapters include analyses of these 
test trials.  
Trained compounds are also included in the test phase, but are of less theoretical 
interest. Throughout this thesis, the proportions of all choice responses for all test trials 
are presented in tables. It is worth noting that these tables report the proportion of 
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outcome choice out of all possible outcome choices, however, analysis of outcome 
choice is based on a sightly different measure, which is described later in this chapter.  
2.5 Statistical analysis 
There is little consensus about the most appropriate way to statistically analyse 
the inverse base-rate effect. Many have adopted the approach of using simple paired t-
tests comparing choice of common and rare outcomes directly, even though the 
underlying distributions of choice probability may deviate from normality. Several 
others have used chi-square tests, yet typically each participant contributes more than 
one response for each trial type (there are several variants of BC trials), which 
constitutes a violation of the assumption of independence required for Chi-Square tests. 
Dennis & Kruschke (1998) addressed this issue stating the chi-square values they 
obtained were large enough that conservative adjustments would still lead to the same 
conclusions, however this may not always be the case with weaker effects. 
Consistent with the analyses just described, most studies assume (either tacitly 
or explicitly) that a meaningful inverse base-rate effect is identified relative to a point of 
impartiality, where participants favour neither the rare nor the common outcome over 
the other. One study used Chi Square tests to compare choice on BC trials to choice on 
A trials (Lamberts & Kent, 2007). The imperfect predictor may provide an appropriate 
comparison for rational base-rate use, as the frequency with which A is paired with each 
outcome is equivalent to the overall base-rate of each outcome.9 However, while one 
rational response to BC trials would be to predict the common outcome, another 
perfectly rational response would be to show no choice bias, as the probability of O2 
given C is equivalent to the probability of O1 given B. Thus, this statistical approach 																																																								9	In several experiments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the frequency with which A is paired with each 
outcome is not equivalent to the overall base-rates, and is therefore not an appropriate comparison in 
these cases. 	
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may lend itself to showing a significant inverse base-rate effect when choice of the 
common and rare outcome on BC trials do not differ, but there is a common bias on A 
trials. Indeed, Lamberts and Kent (2007) reported a significant effect when the 
proportion of rare choice was only .43 on conflicting trials. The analyses used in this 
thesis are detailed below.  
2.6 General Method 
This section describes the general methods and statistical analyses used in the 
following experiments. Any deviations in methodological details, such as differences in 
amounts of training, or trial base-rates, will be reported in the method section for each 
experiment.  
2.6.1 Participants 
 All participants were undergraduate students at the University of Sydney, who 
participated in return for partial course credit, monetary compensation, or as part of a 
tutorial exercise. I aimed to have a minimum sample size of 24 per group in each 
experiment, but sometimes had larger sample sizes for convenience, for example when 
participants completed the experiment as part of a tutorial exercise (Experiment 8).  
2.6.2 Task scenarios and stimuli 
2.6.2.1 Medical diagnosis task. Participants were instructed to assume the role 
of a doctor whose task was to learn to make medical diagnoses from experience with 
patients exhibiting various symptoms. Each trial represented a new patient. The cues 
were symptoms, e.g., dizziness, presented in blue text, arranged vertically, on the upper 
half of the screen. Outcomes were different fictitious disease names, e.g., Midosis, 
presented in boxes on the lower half of the screen (See Figure 2.1). Symptom cues and 
disease outcomes were randomly allocated to the various functional roles (e.g., A, B, C  
		
35	
 
Figure 2.1. Example screenshots of a) the training phase, and b) the test phase of a four-
outcome version of the medical diagnosis task. On viewing the symptoms (cues) 
presented for a given trial, participants selected from the available fictitious disease 
(outcome) choices, followed by corrective feedback (training only) or a confidence 
rating (test phase only). 
 
etc. for cues, O1, O2 etc. for outcomes) for each participant. Specific symptom and 
disease names will be reported for each experiment. 
2.6.2.2 Allergist task. Participants were instructed to assume the role of a doctor 
whose task was to determine which foods were causing which allergic reactions in their 
fictitious patient. Cues were 300 x 300 pixel images of food, e.g., cheese, with 
accompanying labels in blue text beneath. Outcomes were different allergic reactions, 
e.g., nausea (See Figure 2.2). Each trial represented a different meal eaten by the same 
patient; either Mr X or Miss Y. Food cues and allergic reaction outcomes were 
a) Training phase
b) Test phase
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randomly allocated for each participant. Specific food and allergic reaction stimuli will 
be specified for each experiment. 
2.6.3 Apparatus 
All experiments were programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Kleiner, 
Brainard & Pelli, 2007) and were presented using Apple Mac Mini computers attached 
to 17 inch displays, with the exception of Experiment 4.3 which was run on a Windows 
PC using a Tobii 23 inch display. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Example screenshots of a) the training phase, and b) the test phase of a two-
outcome version of the allergist task. On viewing the foods (cues) presented for a given 
trial, participants selected from the available allergic reaction (outcome) choices, 
followed by corrective feedback (training only) or a confidence rating (transfer phase 
only). 
 
a) Training phase
b) Test phase
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2.6.4 Procedure 
2.6.4.1 Training phase. On each training trial, two cues appeared on the upper 
half of the screen. After 500ms, the outcome options were presented in boxes on the 
lower half of the screen, and participants used the mouse to make an outcome 
prediction. Once an outcome was selected, the selected box turned blue. The outcomes 
then disappeared and corrective feedback was provided for two seconds. The correct 
outcome was shown, accompanied by the word “correct” in green, or “incorrect” in red, 
depending on the accuracy of the prediction. Participants were instructed that at first 
they would have to guess, but using the feedback provided, their accuracy should 
improve over time.  
The position of cues on screen was counterbalanced within each block, and the 
position of outcomes was randomised for each participant, but then stayed consistent for 
the entirety of the experiment. Except in cases where trial base-rates or training length 
were explicitly manipulated, there were seven blocks of training with a 3:1 base-rate; 
each block contained six presentations of each common compound and two 
presentations of each rare compound. Unless otherwise specified, there were four 
repetitions of the basic design, each with different cues. 	In most experiments, each 
outcome was usually used in two repetitions of the basic design, and sometimes in four 
repetitions of the basic design, such that there were either four outcomes (as in Figure 
2.1) or two outcomes (as in Figure 2.2). 
2.6.4.2 Transfer phase. In the transfer phase, participants were instructed to use 
the knowledge that they had gained so far to respond to trials without feedback. 
Transfer trials proceeded in a similar manner to training. On each trial, one, two, or 
three cues appeared on the upper half of the screen. In all experiments except for the 
rating conditions in Chapter 6, participants selected the outcome they thought was most 
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likely by clicking an outcome, which then turned blue. After selecting an outcome, a 
linear analogue scale appeared beneath the outcome options, accompanied by the 
question “How confident are you that this is the correct choice?” Participants rated their 
confidence on the scale, which ranged from “not at all confident” to “very confident”. 
Responding was self-paced, and participants were able to modify both responses before 
pressing the space bar to move to the next trial. Each transfer trial was presented once 
and in random order. The position of cues on screen was randomised for each trial.   
2.6.5 Data analysis 
Analysis of results focus primarily on responding in the test phase, however 
accuracy in training is also reported and analysed with an overall omnibus Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA). Follow-up analyses are included only where they are of relevance. 
In experiments that have greater than two possible outcomes, responses at test can either 
be outcomes that were associated with the presented cues during training (relevant 
choices), or outcomes that were not associated with the presented cues during training 
(irrelevant choices).10 Following Medin & Edelson (1988), choice bias for critical 
transfer trials was determined by calculating the number of times the relevant rare 
outcome was chosen as a proportion of all relevant outcome choices for each 
participant:  
𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒)  =  # 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠# 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 + # 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 
 This measure has the benefit of being comparable to an absolute value of .5 that reflects 
equal choice of the relevant common and rare outcome. I will refer to the .5 value as 
‘unbiased’ since it reflects no preference for either relevant outcome. Choice 
proportions favouring the rare outcome will be referred to as ‘rare-biased’, and choice 
proportions favouring the common outcome will be referred to as ‘common-biased’. 																																																								10	Except in experiments where there are only two outcomes.	
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These choice proportions were analysed with t-tests (or where appropriate, other null 
hypothesis tests), which allow me to determine whether the observed proportion differs 
significantly from .5, or whether there are group differences. In cases where variances 
of groups being compared are unequal, the Welch-Satterthwaite equation will be used to 
estimate degrees of freedom. We will also use participants’ choices in Bayesian tests, 
which do not rely on the same assumptions as traditional parametric null-hypothesis 
tests.  
A full description of these BF tests can be found in Appendix A. In brief, BF 
tests of the inverse base-rate effect for individual groups compared the null hypothesis 
that relevant outcome choices were unbiased (equally likely to be common or rare) to 
the alternative hypothesis that relevant outcome choices are biased towards the rare over 
the common outcome. Thus a BF firmly in favour of the alternative indicates evidence 
for an effect. BF tests of group differences tested whether the key experimental 
manipulation weakened the effect. Thus they compared a null hypothesis that this bias 
was equal in each group to a directional alternative hypothesis that less bias was present 
in the experimental group than the relevant control.  
To ensure participants had adequately learned the cue-outcome contingencies, a 
learning criterion of 60% accuracy in the final three blocks of training was set and 
applied across all experiments. The learning criterion of 60% is an arbitrary criterion 
widely used in literature on other cue competition effects, such as the learned 
predictiveness effect (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003, Don & Livesey, 2016). This 
criterion was adopted as there does not appear to be a common learning criterion 
standard in the inverse base-rate effect. While some studies have a fairly strict criterion 
(e.g., Winman et al., 2005; Juslin et al., 2001), others do not apply any learning criterion 
(e.g., Johansen et al., 2007; Johansen et al., 2010; Wills et al., 2014). A criterion of 60% 
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accuracy allows exclusion of particularly poor performers, but also allows inclusion of a 
broader range of participants, rather than only those performing at the high end of the 
range.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Novelty and inference in the inverse base-rate effect 
While the inverse base-rate effect is often explained by attention biases 
established during learning, inferential strategies at test may also contribute 
substantially to choice of the rare outcome on conflicting trials. Currently, the sole 
inferential account of the inverse base-rate effect is eliminative inference, formalized in 
the elimination model (ELMO; Juslin, Wennerholm, & Winman, 2001). According to 
eliminative inference, participants learn inference rules about the relationship between 
cues and outcomes during training. Due to its higher base-rate, the inference rule for the 
common outcome will be encoded more strongly in memory than the inference rule for 
the rare outcome. When participants encounter a transfer trial that does not match the 
well-known common inference rule, the common outcome is eliminated, and 
participants then guess from the remaining outcomes, such that the rare outcome is 
more likely to be chosen.  
Perhaps the best evidence for this kind of outcome elimination is the tendency to 
predict the rare outcome when given a novel cue in the transfer phase (Juslin et al., 
2001; Johansen et al., 2007). As the novel cue is dissimilar to the learned inference 
rules, it should elicit elimination. Attention based theories (e.g., Kruschke, 2001a; 
Mackintosh, 1975), on the other hand, should predict choice of the common outcome, 
due to the base-rate bias associated with the context.  Yet, Juslin et al. (2001) found 
similar rates of rare responses on these novel trials as there were on conflicting trials.  
Eliminative inference is often referred to as a novelty matching inference, yet in 
novelty matching, rather than guessing amongst inactive outcomes, participants tend to 
choose the most novel outcome when they encounter a novel cue or cue combination. A 
simple novelty explanation is discounted by common responses to A and ABC trials 
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(Medin & Edelson, 1988). However novelty matching may also be based on the degree 
of similarity between trained and transfer trials	and thus it may still be plausible for 
such an account to predict novelty selection for BC trials and not for A or ABC trials, 
for similar reasons to those assumed for eliminative inference.  
Several researchers have discounted eliminative inference as a viable account of 
the effect, as the ELMO model fails to predict the necessity of a shared cue during 
training, and differences in the strength of common biases for imperfect and combined 
trials (Kruschke, 2001a; Wills, Lavric, Hemmings, & Surrey, 2014). Lamberts and Kent 
(2007) have suggested there is no role for higher-order processes in the effect, due to 
the continuation of the effect under cognitive load at test. Yet, as discussed in the 
Chapter 1, their results do not necessarily provide strong support for this conclusion. 
There is a dearth of further research into the contribution of inferential processes to the 
effect, and few inferential hypotheses beyond ELMO have been seriously entertained in 
the literature. This is somewhat surprising, given the importance of dual-process 
explanations for other cue competition effects, such as blocking (De Houwer, Beckers, 
& Glautier, 2002; Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, & Frohardt, 2003; Blanco, 
Baeyens & Beckers, 2014), and learned predictiveness (Mitchell, Griffiths, Seeto & 
Lovibond, 2012; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 2015; Don & Livesey, 2015). The dual-
process view assumes associations and inferences are both important for human 
learning. Yet, perhaps the absence of research into inferences in the inverse base-rate 
effect is due to a lack of understanding of what form inferences in the effect may take. 
The kinds of reasoning processes that may result in blocking and learned predictiveness 
are widely endorsed and relatively easy to articulate, for example, reasoning that the 
blocked cue does not cause the outcome (Lovibond et al., 2003), or assuming that 
predictive cues will continue to be useful (Mitchell et al., 2012), and these kinds of 
	 43	
inferences are readily testable. With the evidence against ELMO, it is less clear what 
sort of reasoning process might lead to rare choice on conflicting trials, and it is 
therefore difficult to formulate empirical tests of these processes. That is, in order to test 
an inferential process, researchers would need to know what the inference is, and be 
reasonably confident that the majority of participants would at least endorse them as 
rational if it were explicitly suggested to them. The results from Winman et al. (2005), 
where adults are more likely to show the effect than children, and rule learners are more 
likely to show the effect than exemplar learners, simply suggest that higher order 
processes may be involved in the effect, but they do not suggest what the characteristics 
of these processes might be.  
Although the particular formalisation of eliminative inference in ELMO is 
limited, it is still possible that the general principles of elimination could contribute to 
the effect. In addition to rare biases for novel trials, O’Bryan et al. (2017) found greater 
processing of the common predictor when the rare outcome was chosen, which was 
interpreted as evidence of elimination of the common outcome. Thus elimination or 
novelty matching may still contribute in some general form, in a way that may be 
different from the specifications of ELMO. Furthermore, these inferences may not 
merely develop at the moment that they are necessary when BC trials are shown at test, 
but may form throughout training as a result of particular task conditions. For example, 
noticing what happens when a novel cue is encountered, or when a novel outcome is 
encountered may lead to the development of rules based on novelty or exceptions to the 
norm. These inferences may then transfer to responses at test. Eliminative inference and 
novelty matching, in their general form, rely on assumptions of cue and outcome 
novelty that are readily testable. In this chapter, we were primarily interested in testing 
whether conditions that should affect these assumptions are critical for the inverse base-
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rate effect. Granted, there may be an entirely different reasoning process that leads to 
rare outcome choice, and so the final experiment in this series included a questionnaire 
to assess self-reported explanations for outcome choice on conflicting trials.  
This series of experiments manipulated experimental parameters in the Medin & 
Edelson (1988) task in order to fulfil two aims. First, to extend our understanding of the 
critical boundary conditions of the effect, and second, to provide a test of the kinds of 
inferences that could plausibly lead to rare outcome choice on conflicting trials. These 
manipulations included the relative novelty of transfer trials (Experiments 1-3), the 
relative frequency of outcomes across training (Experiment 2), and the relative 
frequencies of predictive cues across training (Experiment 3). The importance of these 
conditions will be explained in further detail in the following experiments. Experiment 
4 introduced a post-experimental questionnaire to gauge participants’ self-reported use 
of reasoning strategies during the test phase. These experiments were not intended to 
differentiate directly between associative and inferential accounts, but rather to test key 
assumptions on which inferential strategies could be based. The experiments involve 
manipulations of the relative novelty and familiarity of cues and outcomes, and thus 
may be quite amenable to an associative explanation (indeed, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 4, they may be informative for distinguishing between associative 
explanations). This will be discussed further in the discussion section of this chapter. 
3.1 Experiment 1  
 
Experiment 1 was a preliminary experiment with two important purposes. First, 
it introduced a novel cue transfer test used in the following set of experiments. Evidence 
for rare responses to novel cues indicate that participants may still engage in outcome 
elimination or novelty-matching of some form, wherein they favour novel outcomes on 
ambiguous trials. This provides a clear starting point to characterise potential reasoning 
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processes. Any form of elimination or novelty-matching assumes that, all else being 
equal, the similarity between trained and test trials should be related to the probability 
of choosing the rare over the common outcome; when cue similarity is lower, the 
probability of choosing the rare outcome is higher. Rare outcome biases have only been 
demonstrated for a single novel cue in the absence of a rare bias for conflicting cues 
(Juslin et al., 2001; Johansen et al., 2007). It is plausible that a completely novel cue 
could elicit a different response strategy to that used on conflicting transfer trials, which 
are novel combinations of previously experienced cues. Therefore, the novel transfer in 
the current study consisted of an imperfect predictor paired with a novel cue (e.g., AW).  
An account based on simple generalization of learned associations predicts that 
participants would respond to AW in much the same way as they respond to A. 
However, if participants eliminate a familiar outcome or select the most novel outcome 
according to the similarity of transfer trials, then responding should be different for A 
and AW.	Test trial A differs from AB and AC in the omission of just one predictive cue, 
and is thus similar enough to the learned conditions to make choices consistent with the 
base-rates. By comparison, BC differs from AB and AC in the omission of the 
imperfect predictor A and the addition of a perfect predictor, and so according to the 
eliminative inferential logic, is sufficiently dissimilar to warrant rare choice. It is 
reasonable to assume that addition or omission of a predictive cue is more salient than 
the addition or omission of a nonpredictive cue because it is well known that more 
attention is paid to predictive cues (Le Pelley et al., 2016). But there is also good reason 
to believe that novel cues are relatively salient. Thus AW differs from each of the 
trained compounds AB/AC by the (salient) omission of a predictive cue and the 
(presumably salient) addition of a novel cue, and is likely to be even less similar than 
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BC to the trained compounds. AW should therefore result in rare outcome choice at 
least as frequently as BC.  
The second aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether the effect was weakened 
when each outcome was predicted by multiple cues. In typical inverse base-rate effect 
experiments, there are different outcomes for each repetition of the design, such that 
each outcome is exclusively paired with only one cue-compound (e.g., O1 only occurs 
in AB–O1). To the best of our knowledge, only one previous study has demonstrated 
the inverse base-rate effect in a task where multiple cue-compounds were paired with 
the same outcome (Wills et al., 2014). However, these conditions have never been 
directly compared. Subsequent experiments in the current study require the same 
outcome to be paired with multiple cue-compounds, therefore Experiment 1 aimed to 
confirm that this would not reduce the strength of the effect. Table 3.1 shows the full 
experimental design. In a shared-outcome condition, four outcomes were each paired 
with two separate and non-overlapping cue-compounds. This was compared to two 
groups that had exclusive outcome pairings, matched to the shared-outcome group in 
either the number of cue-compounds (cue-matched) or number of outcomes (outcome-
matched).  
3.1.1 Method 
 
3.1.1.1 Participants 
Seventy-eight undergraduates participated in return for partial course credit (62 
female, mean age = 20.55, SD = 3.88). Participants were randomly allocated to three 
groups (n = 26).  
3.1.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli 
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The experiment was programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Kleiner, 
Brainard & Pelli, 2007) and was presented using Apple Mac Mini computers attached to 
17 inch displays. Experimental stimuli included 16 symptom names: sneezing, 
dizziness, headache, fever, rash, nausea, earache, coughing, hair loss, fatigue, 
twitching, blurred vision, wheezing, swelling, back pain, and fainting. Disease outcomes 
included buragamo, coralgia, midosis, terrigitis, namitis, burlosis, althrax, gouphosis. 
For each participant, symptoms and diseases were randomly allocated to cues A-L and 
W-Z and outcomes 1-8, respectively.  
Table 3.1  
Design of Experiment 1 
TRAINING      
Group Base-rate Trials    
      
Shared-outcome 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JL – O3 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JK – O4 
      
Cue-matched 3 AB – O1 DE – O3 GH – O5 JL – O7 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O4 GI – O6 JK – O8 
      
Outcome-matched 3 AB – O1 DE – O3   
 1 AC – O2 DF – O4   
      
TEST      
Trial type  Trials    
Imperfect  A D G J 
Conflicting  BC EF HI KL 
Combined   ABC DEF GHI JKL 
Novel  AW DX GY JZ 
Common predictor  B E H K 
Rare predictor  C F I L 
Trained common  AB DE GH JK 
Trained rare  AC DF GI JL 
      
Note: A – L and W-Z represent different symptom cues, O1 – O8 represent different 
disease outcomes. Participants in the outcome-matched condition received only the first 
two trials of each transfer type (bold). Base-rate refers to the relative number of 
presentations of each trial type during training, such that AB, DE, GH and JK are 
common compounds, and AC, DF, GI and JL are rare compounds.  
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3.1.1.3 Design 
 Trial contingencies are presented in Table 3.1. In the shared-outcome group, the 
basic design was repeated four times, with different symptom cues for each 
instantiation. Common cue-compounds (e.g., AB) were presented three times as often as 
rare cue-compounds (e.g., AC). Each cue-compound was paired with one of two 
common outcomes (O1 or O3) or one of two rare outcomes (O2 or O4), such that two 
different cue-compounds predicted the same outcome. The cue-matched condition had 
identical cue-compounds, but each was paired with one of eight unique outcomes (four 
common, four rare). The outcome-matched group had identical outcomes as the shared-
outcome group, with only two instantiations of the design. In both cue-matched and 
outcome-matched conditions, only one cue-compound predicted each outcome.  
3.1.1.4 Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted as outlined in the General Method section in 
Chapter 2, with the standard seven blocks of training followed by test. Each trial type in 
Table 3.1 was presented in random order within each block, in the base-rates indicated. 
In total, there were 224 training trials and 32 test trials in the shared-outcome and cue-
matched conditions, and 112 training trials and 16 test trials in the outcome-matched 
condition.  
3.1.1.5 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis proceeded as described in Chapter 2. A full description of the BF 
tests used in this Chapter can be found in Appendix A. In summary, BF tests of the 
inverse base-rate effect for individual groups compared the null hypothesis that relevant 
outcome choices were unbiased (equally likely to be common or rare) to the alternative 
hypothesis that relevant outcome choices would be biased towards the rare over the 
common outcome. An inverse base-rate effect is therefore indicated by a BF in favour 
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of the alternative. BF tests of group differences tested whether the key experimental 
manipulation weakened the effect by comparing a null hypothesis that this bias was 
equal in each group to a directional alternative that there was a weaker bias in the 
experimental group than the control group.  
3.1.2 Results 
 
All participants in Experiment 1 met the training criterion described in Chapter 
2, and remained in the following analyses. Average accuracy across the final three 
blocks was high (96%). 
3.1.2.1 Training 
Average accuracy across the course of training for each trial type for each group 
is shown in Figure 3.1. As the chance level of performance differed for the cue-matched 
group, this group was analysed separately. A mixed measures analysis of variance  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Mean accuracy for common and rare trials across the course of training in 
Experiment 1. Solid lines represent common trial types, dashed lines represent rare trial 
types. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (SEM). 
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(ANOVA) with group (shared-outcome vs. outcome-matched) as the between subjects 
factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within subjects factors 
revealed a significant main effect of block, F(6,300) = 118.27 , p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .703, and 
of trial type, F(1,50) = 31.32, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .385. A significant block x trial type 
interaction indicates common trials were learned faster than rare trials, F(6,300) = 2.77, 
p = .012, 𝜂!! = .053. There was also a significant main effect of group, F(1,50) = 12.64, 
p = .001, 𝜂!! = .202, and a significant block x group interaction F(6,300) = 14.17, p < 
.001, 𝜂!! = .221, suggesting the outcome-matched group learned significantly faster than 
the shared-outcome group. This is not surprising given that the outcome-matched group 
received half the number of trial types in each block as the shared-outcome group.  
Separate analysis of the cue-matched group similarly showed a significant effect 
of block, F(6,150) = 112.35, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .818, trial type, F(1,25) = 18.08, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .420, and a block x trial type interaction, F(6,150) = 2.90, p = .011, 𝜂!! = .104. 
Importantly, all groups showed high accuracy for both trial types by the end of training, 
all scoring above 93.75%, and there was no interaction between group and trial type in 
the final block, F < 1 
3.1.2.2 Transfer 
Choice. Figure 3.2 shows the average proportion of rare choice for each of the 
critical transfer trials, and Table 3.2 shows choice proportions for all transfer trials. The 
first result of interest was whether the inverse base-rate effect was reduced in the 
shared-outcome group compared to the remaining groups. Importantly, choice on 
conflicting trials was significantly rare-biased in all three groups, indicating a 
significant inverse base-rate effect, lowest t(25) = 2.50, p = .019, d = 0.49, lowest BF10 
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= 4.39 (cue-matched group). There were also no significant group differences for any of 
the critical transfer trials, with results ranging between F(2,77) = 0.142, p = .868, 𝜂!! = 
.004 for novel trials and F(2,77) = 2.74, p = .071, 𝜂!! = .068 for conflicting trials. Group 
difference BFs favoured the null comparing the shared-outcome and cue-matched 
groups (BF01 = 4.65), but were more ambiguous comparing the shared-outcome and 
outcome-matched groups (BF01 = 2.56). Choice on imperfect predictor trials was 
significantly common-biased in each group, lowest t(25) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 0.87. 
Choice for the combined transfer was unbiased, highest t(25) = 1.41, p = .17, d = 0.28.  
The second result of interest was whether participants would show a bias for the 
rare outcome on novel transfer trials, and whether this differed from choice on 
imperfect and conflicting trials. On novel trials, choice was significantly common 
biased in all groups, lowest t(25) = 3.93, p = .001, d = 0.77. This bias was compared to 
choice on a) the imperfect trials (A vs. AW tests the effect of adding a novel cue) and b)  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean proportion of relevant rare outcome choice for the critical transfer 
items in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (SEM). 
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the conflicting trials (BC vs. AW tests the effect of similarity on rare bias) in two 
separate (2) x 3 mixed measures ANOVAs, including group as a between subjects 
factor. There were significantly more rare responses to novel trials than imperfect trials, 
F(1,75) = 4.11, p = .046, 𝜂!! = .052, but rare choice was significantly lower on novel 
trials than on conflicting trials, F(1,75) = 89.06, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .543. There were no 
significant interactions with group, highest F(2,75) = 1.58, p = .212, 𝜂!! = .040.  To 
compare choice accuracy for predictive cues, the proportion of relevant rare outcome 
choices was reverse scored for common predictor trials. A 3 x (2) mixed measures 
ANOVA was run with group as a between subjects factor, and trial type (common 
predictor vs. rare predictor) as a within subjects factor. There was no difference in 
accuracy for common predictors (M = .99, SD = .04) and rare predictors (M = .98, SD = 
.09), F(1,75) = 2.02, p = .159, 𝜂!! = .026, and no main effect of group, F < 1, or 
interaction with group, F(2,75) = 2.51, p = .088, 𝜂!! = .063.  
Confidence. Confidence ratings for all trials are shown in Table 3.2. There were 
no significant group differences in confidence ratings for any trial type, highest F(2,75) 
= 2.75, p = .07. Post-hoc orthogonal contrasts revealed that novel transfer trials received 
significantly lower confidence ratings than imperfect trials, F(1,75) = 28.45, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .275. Confidence ratings on conflicting trials were also significantly higher than 
imperfect and novel trials on average, F(1,75) = 27.57, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .269. 
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Table 3.2 
Outcome choice proportions and mean confidence ratings for all transfer trials in 
Experiment 1.  
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Other   Confidence 
Imperfect Shared-outcome .798 .173 0.029 64.03 
A, D, G, J Cue-matched .673 .260 0.067 57.46 
 
Outcome-matched .846 .115 0.038 63.79 
Conflicting Shared-outcome .231 .740 0.029 70.81 
BC, EF, HI, KL Cue-matched .365 .596 0.038 60.42 
 
Outcome-matched .212 .769 0.019 70.00 
Combined Shared-outcome .413 .577 0.01 70.59 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Cue-matched .510 .471 0.019 62.43 
 
Outcome-matched .404 .596 0 68.73 
Novel Shared-outcome .702 .221 0.077 49.58 
AW, DX, GY, JZ Cue-matched .654 .260 0.086 49.02 
 
Outcome-matched .673 .231 0.096 58.14 
Common predictor Shared-outcome .933 0 0.067 73.04 
B, E, H, K Cue-matched .913 .019 0.067 69.02 
 
Outcome-matched .981 0 0.019 74.11 
Rare predictor Shared-outcome .029 .933 0.038 82.11 
C, F, I, L Cue-matched 0 .942 0.058 71.83 
 
Outcome-matched .038 .962 0 81.17 
Trained Common Shared-outcome .971 .010 0.02 93.33 
AB, DE, GH, JK Cue-matched .981 .010 0.01 91.11 
 
Outcome-matched .981 0 0.019 94.54 
Trained Rare Shared-outcome .048 .923 0.029 87.49 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Cue-matched .048 .933 0.019 86.40 
  Outcome-matched .038 .962 0 89.34 
 
3.1.3 Discussion 
 
There was a significant bias towards predicting the rare outcome on conflicting 
trials, irrespective of whether this outcome was uniquely paired with one cue-
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compound, or was a shared outcome for multiple cue-compounds. The effect does 
appear to be slightly weaker in the cue-matched group, however this difference was not 
significant and, in any case, is difficult to interpret in isolation. In any theoretical 
account that involves an element of guessing, it is possible that guessing the relevant 
rare outcome is more probable when there are fewer outcome options, which is the case 
in the shared-outcome and outcome-matched conditions. Yet it is also possible that the 
cue-matched condition is simply more difficult than the other conditions, given the 
greater number of outcomes to learn. Most importantly for the experiments to come, the 
effect in the shared-outcome group was not substantially weaker than in either control 
group. We thus used this shared-outcome condition as the control for the following 
experiments, which teased apart the contributions of general outcome frequency and 
specific trial frequency to the effect. Interestingly, this experiment did not replicate the 
difference in choice accuracy between common and rare predictors shown by Wills et 
al. (2014), although accuracy was close to ceiling for both trial types. 
According to an inference based on outcome elimination or novelty-matching, 
the dissimilarity between learned contingencies and novel transfer trials should result in 
a rare outcome choice bias. Instead, there was a significant bias in predicting the 
common outcome. Critically, the proportion of rare outcome choice on novel trials was 
significantly lower than on conflicting trials. Although it is possible that outcome 
choice was controlled entirely by the imperfect predictor in these novel compounds, rare 
responses on novel trials were significantly higher than on imperfect trials, which 
suggests that the presence of a novel cue influenced rare responding to some extent. 
While this could indicate some influence of novelty-matching, it is also consistent with 
an associative generalisation decrement; studies have shown reduced predictive ratings 
for trained cues paired with a novel stimulus, compared to ratings for the trained cue 
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alone (Lotz & Lachnit, 2009; Karazinov & Boakes, 2004). Nevertheless the results 
clearly demonstrate that transfer trial similarity is inadequate as a determinant of the 
choice of common or rare outcomes. If inference does indeed occur in this context, it is 
clear that the decision to choose the rare outcome hinges on factors other than just trial 
similarity. 
3.2 Experiment 2  
 
By design, these tasks involve differences in the frequencies of trial types such 
that some are relatively common (AB–O1) and some are relatively rare (AC–O2). 
Naturally, the base-rates of the outcomes themselves differ accordingly, irrespective of 
the cues with which they are paired. We will refer to this property of the design as 
global outcome frequency to distinguish it from the local frequency of an outcome 
within a set of overlapping contingencies such as AB–O1/AC–O2. A global outcome 
frequency difference may be a critical condition for the effect. In other words, it may be 
important that some outcomes are experienced at a greater rate than others during the 
experiment, so that the outcomes paired with rare cues are clearly more unusual than 
those paired with common cues at test. This is particularly true of novelty-matching 
accounts, in which the rare outcome may be chosen specifically for its novelty. 
Experiment 2 therefore tested whether the effect is substantially weakened when there 
are no differences in global outcome frequency.  
 The inverse base-rate effect and related highlighting effects have previously 
been demonstrated with equal cue-outcome base-rates. Medin and Bettger (1991) 
trained participants on a subset of cues in a 3:1 base-rate, followed by training in a 1:3 
base-rate, such that each cue-outcome contingency had been experienced equally. In 
Kruschke’s (2009) highlighting design, AB–O1 trials were trained prior to AC–O2 
trials, however the frequency of each trial type changed across the course of the 
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experiment, so that there were equal base-rates by the end of the experiment. In both 
studies, participants demonstrated a preference for the early-rare outcome over the 
early-common outcome on conflicting trials, suggesting the importance of early relative 
frequencies for the effect.  
 Although matching cue-outcome contingencies necessarily matches the global 
frequency of outcomes, these designs did so by changing the relative frequencies of the 
trial types across the course of training. This means that for any given block of trials in 
training, there were still strong global outcome frequency differences. If participants 
exhibit a primacy effect, that is, stronger learning for events occurring early in training, 
then one might still expect to see an inverse base-rate effect specifically because 
judgements of the novelty of the outcomes also reflect this early learning. This 
possibility means that these designs are relatively uninformative about the role played 
by outcome and trial frequencies, and they do not rule out any particular explanation of 
the effect.  
This experiment therefore manipulated the overall frequency of the outcomes in 
a different way. Global outcome frequency was manipulated between groups while 
maintaining relative frequency differences between common and rare trials using a 
consistent 3:1 base-rate throughout training (see Table 3.3). Both groups experienced 
identical presentations of cue-compounds, however the outcome with which each cue-
compound was paired differed between groups. This manipulation relies on the same 
outcome being paired with multiple compounds. The standard condition was identical 
to the shared-outcome condition in Experiment 1. In this condition, for example, O1 
was always paired with the common compounds, AB and DE, and O2 was always 
paired with the rare compounds, AC and DF. The same was true for O3 and O4 with the 
remaining compounds. Thus, O1 and O3 were experienced three times as often as O2 
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and O4. This was compared to a balanced outcome condition. Here, each outcome was 
paired with both a common and rare cue-compound, such that all outcomes were 
experienced with equal frequency over the course of the experiment. For example, O1 
was paired with the common AB and the rare DF, while O2 was paired with the rare AC 
and the common DE. In this way, the local base-rate difference within each overlapping 
set (e.g., O1 was the common outcome within overlapping AB and AC trials, and O2 
was the common outcome within DE and DF trials) is maintained, but there is no global 
difference in the frequency of each outcome. Importantly, at any point in the 
experiment, all outcomes will have been experienced at an equal rate, eliminating the 
potential influence of early learning biases. If outcome novelty is important for the 
effect, then we would expect the preference for the rare outcome on conflicting trials to 
be much stronger in the standard group than in the balanced group. 
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Table 3.3 
Design of Experiment 2.  
TRAINING      
Group Base-rate Trials    
      
Standard 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JL – O3 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JK – O4 
      
Balanced 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O3 JL – O4 
 1 AC  – O2 DF – O1 GI – O4 JK – O3 
      
TEST      
Trial type  Trials    
      
Imperfect  A D G J 
Conflicting  BC EF HI KL 
Combined   ABC DEF GHI JKL 
Novel  AW DX GY JZ 
Common predictor  B E H K 
Rare predictor  C F I L 
Trained common  AB DE GH JK 
Trained rare  AC DF GI JL 
      
Note: A – L and W-Z represent different symptom cues, O1 – O4 represent different 
disease outcomes. Base-rate refers to the relative number of presentations of each trial 
type during training.  
 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Eighty-three students participated in return for partial course credit or monetary 
compensation. Four participants were excluded for failing to meet the training criterion. 
Seventy-nine participants (56 female, mean age = 21.28, SD = 4.09) remained, 
randomly allocated to standard (n = 39), and balanced (n = 40) conditions.  
3.2.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli 
The apparatus and symptom cues were identical to Experiment 1. The four 
disease outcomes included buragamo, coralgia, midosis and terrigitis.  
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3.2.1.3 Design 
The design is shown in Table 3.3. The only difference between the standard and 
balanced groups was the overall frequency of each outcome during training. The 
standard group was identical to the shared-outcome group in Experiment 1. In the 
balanced group, each of the four outcomes was paired with one common and one rare 
cue-compound, such that all outcomes were experienced at an equal rate throughout the 
experiment.  
3.2.1.4 Procedure 
Training and transfer phases were completed in an identical manner to 
Experiment 1, with 224 training trials and 32 test trials. 
3.2.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 Training 
Accuracy across training for each trial type is shown in Figure 3.3. A 2 x (2) x (7) 
ANOVA with group (standard vs. balanced) as the between groups factor, and trial type 
(common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within subjects factors, revealed a significant main 
effect of block, F(6,462) = 340.18, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .815 . There was a significant main 
effect of trial type, F(1,77) = 214.76, p = <.001, 𝜂!! = .736, and a significant interaction 
between block and trial type, indicating that common cues were learned more quickly 
than rare cues, F(6,462) = 27.14, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .261. There was a marginal main effect 
of group, F(1,77) = 4.014, p = .049, 𝜂!! = .05. However, there was a significant group x 
block interaction, which suggests the standard group learned faster than the balanced 
group, F(6,462) = 4.78, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .058, as well as a significant group x trial type 
interaction, indicating a greater difference between common and rare trial types in the 
balanced than standard group, F(1,77) = 14.73, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .161. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean accuracy (±SEM) for common and rare trials across the course of 
training in Experiment 2. 
 
There was also a significant three-way interaction, such that there was a greater 
difference in the speed of learning for common than rare trial types in the balanced 
group than in the standard group, F(6,462) = 4.04, p = .001, 𝜂!! = .05.  
3.2.2.1 Transfer 
Choice. Transfer results for critical trials are shown in Figure 3.4, and for all 
items in Table 3.4. There was a significant rare bias on conflicting trials in the standard 
group, t(38) = 5.59, p < .001, d = 0.89, BF10 = 11.7 x 104. Although choice was 
numerically rare-biased in the balanced group, this did not reach significance, t(39) = 
1.27, p = .211, d = 0.20, BF10 = 0.98. Importantly, the effect was significantly stronger 
in the standard group than the balanced group, t(73.12) = 2.44, p = .017, d = 0.55, BF10 
= 10.74. There was a common choice bias on imperfect trials in both the standard, t(38) 
= 9.37, p < .001, d = 1.50, and balanced, t(39) = -7.56, p <.001, d = 1.19, groups. On 
combined trials, choice was unbiased in the standard group, t(38) = 1.57, p = .125, d = 
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0.25, but there was a significant common bias in the balanced group t(39) = 4.01, p < 
.001, d = 0.63, and this group difference was significant, t(77) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 
0.85.  
Again, novel trials showed a common outcome bias in both the standard, t(38) = 
6.15, p < .001, d = 0.98, and balanced groups, t(39) = 3.83, p < .001, d = 0.61. As in 
Experiment 1, two separate (2) x 2 mixed measures ANOVAs with group as a between 
subjects factor and cue as a within subjects factor showed that the proportion of rare 
responses on novel trials was significantly higher than imperfect trials, F(1,77) = 15.32, 
p < .001, 𝜂!! = .166, but significantly lower than conflicting trials, F(1,77) = 55.03, p < 
.001, 𝜂!! =.417. This difference between novel and conflicting trials was significantly 
greater in the standard than balanced group, F(1,77) = 5.65, p = .02, 𝜂!! =. 068.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Mean proportion of relevant rare outcome choice (±SEM) for the critical 
transfer items in Experiment 2. 
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Table 3.4 
Outcome choice proportions and mean confidence ratings for all transfer trials in 
Experiment 2.  
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Other  Confidence 
Imperfect Standard .788 .154 .058 59.45 
A, D, G, J Balanced .725 .225 .050 56.27 
Conflicting Standard .288 .692 .019 68.75 
BC, EF, HI, KL Balanced .400 .538 .063 60.83 
Combined Standard .423 .571 .006 70.84 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Balanced .644 .338 .019 66.54 
Novel Standard .654 .269 .077 55.29 
AW, DX, GY, JZ Balanced .581 .300 .119 47.86 
Common predictor Standard .942 .013 .045 71.36 
B, E, H, K Balanced .963 .013 .025 71.13 
Rare predictor Standard .038 .936 .026 80.56 
C, F, I, L Balanced .063 .838 .100 68.67 
Trained Common Standard 1 0 0 92.86 
AB, DE, GH, JK Balanced .988 .013 0 91.42 
Trained Rare Standard .051 .929 .019 88.40 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Balanced .081 .900 .019 82.87 
 
Comparing choice accuracy for perfect predictors, A 2 x (2) mixed measures 
ANOVA with group as a between subjects factor, and trial type as a within subjects 
factor revealed a significant effect of trial type, such that accuracy was better for 
common predictors (M = .99, SD = .06) than rare predictors (M = .94, SD = .15), 
F(1,77) = 6.337, p = .014, 𝜂!!  = .076. There was no main effect, F(1,77) = 1.41, p = 
.238, 𝜂!!  = .018, or interaction, F(1,77) = 1.18, p = .281, 𝜂!!  = .015, with group. 
Confidence. Confidence ratings are shown in Table 3.4. Confidence for the 
conflicting cues was significantly higher in the standard than the balanced group 
F(1,77) = 4.92, p = .03, 𝜂!! = .06. All other differences were non-significant, highest 
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F(1,77) = 3.86, p = .053, 𝜂!! = .048. Post-hoc contrasts revealed a similar pattern of 
results to those in Experiment 1. Participants were significantly more confident in their 
choice on imperfect than novel trials, F(1,77) = 14.71, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .160, and on 
conflicting trials compared to the average of novel and imperfect trials, F(1,77) = 31.57, 
p < .001, 𝜂!! = .291. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
When all outcomes were experienced at an equal rate in the balanced condition, 
such that no one outcome was more novel than another, the inverse base-rate effect was 
considerably weakened compared to the standard condition. This result indicates that 
global outcome frequency differences are important for the effect, as outcome novelty 
influenced rare choice on conflicting trials. 
Still, the overall pattern of results is somewhat problematic for a general 
novelty-matching explanation. Responses to novel cues again favoured the common 
outcome in both conditions. Medin & Edelson (1988) ruled out novelty-selection in its 
simplest form because combined cues (ABC trials) showed a common outcome bias. 
Nevertheless, in Experiment 2, we observed significant differences in responding to the 
combined trials between groups, with the standard group making fewer common 
choices than the balanced group. This result may suggest that a novelty bias contributes 
to choices on the combined transfer trials to some extent. 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 may instead suggest that a 
preference for a novel outcome is driven by ‘prediction conflict’ in the transfer trial, and 
resulting uncertainty, rather than novelty per se. The conflicting trials consist of two 
cues that are both equally predictive of their respective outcomes, and therefore the 
correct response is unclear. The imperfect predictor and novel compound contain a cue 
that was paired with both a common and rare outcome and thus some conflict may also 
	 64	
occur on these trials. However, this conflict may be substantially weaker since the 
imperfect predictor was not consistently paired with a single outcome during training. 
The combined transfer trials also contain conflicting information yet often elicit 
common outcome choices (albeit not as consistently as the biases observed for 
conflicting and imperfect trials). In this case, the addition of the rare predictor may tip 
the weight of evidence in favour of the common outcome in some cases and may fail to 
do so in others. This explanation suggests that strong conflict between equivalent 
predictors of the cues presented on test and a global outcome frequency difference may 
be jointly sufficient to produce the effect. However several studies have failed to find an 
effect under these conditions, when two predictors of different outcomes (one common, 
one rare) that were not trained with a shared-cue were combined on test (Medin & 
Edelson, 1988; Kruschke, 2001; Wills et al., 2014). Their results suggest that cue-
overlap in the training trials, producing at least some conflict in outcome predictions 
during training, may also be critical for the inverse base-rate effect. In addition, this 
experiment replicated the finding that choice accuracy for B is greater than C in the 
presence of a significant inverse base-rate effect (Wills et al., 2014).  
3.3 Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 3 tested whether a global outcome frequency difference was 
sufficient to produce a rare bias for conflicting cues, even without critical trial 
frequency differences, provided a shared-cue was still used during training. That is, 
even if the two predictors that comprise the conflicting test trial were themselves 
presented with equal frequency, an effect might still be possible based on the overall 
novelty of the outcome, provided prediction conflict is present during both training 
(because of the shared-cue A) and test (because of the combination of two perfect 
predictors B & C).  
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The standard condition from Experiment 2 provides a suitable control, as the 
difference in outcome frequency occurs in conjunction with the difference in trial 
frequency. This was compared to an equal-trial group that equated trial frequency while 
maintaining outcome frequency differences. In this group, AB–O1 and AC–O2 trials 
were presented at an equal 1:1 base-rate. The global frequency of one outcome was 
increased by including high-frequency filler cue-compounds paired with that outcome, 
e.g., ST–O1. Because AB and AC were both presented at equal frequencies, cue 
competition theories would predict no bias on conflicting BC trials, as each contingency 
would be learned at an equal rate. However, B was paired with an outcome that was 
otherwise experienced at a greater frequency than the outcome paired with C. If the 
inverse base-rate effect is simply the result of matching conflicting cues to rare 
outcomes, the experience of a global outcome frequency difference should produce an 
effect in the equal-trial group.  
3.3.1 Method  
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-one students participated in return for partial course credit. Three 
participants were excluded for failing to meet the training criterion, leaving 58 
participants (44 female, mean age = 19,33, SD = 2.53), randomly allocated to each 
group (n = 29).  
3.3.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli 
The apparatus was identical to previous experiments. The 18 symptoms cues 
were randomly allocated from the following 20 symptoms: sneezing, dizziness, 
headache, fever, rash, nausea, earache, coughing, hair loss, fatigue, twitching, blurred 
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vision, wheezing, swelling, back pain, fainting, stomach cramps, slurred speech, puffy 
eyes, and bloody nose. The disease outcomes were identical to Experiment 2. 
3.3.1.3 Design 
 The design is presented in Table 3.5. The standard group was compared to an 
equal-trial group in which all critical AB/AC trials were presented at a 1:1 base-rate, 
while the frequency of the common outcome was increased through pairings with filler 
compounds. To maintain the number of trials and the 3:1 outcome base-rate in the 
equal-trial group, each of the critical contingencies was presented twice per block, and 
each of the filler compounds was presented eight times per block. Thus in both groups, 
each common outcome was presented 12 times per block, and each rare outcome was 
presented four times per block. The filler compounds were also included in the transfer 
phase for the equal-trial group. 
Table 3.5  
Design of Experiment 3.  
TRAINING      
Group Base-rate Trials    
      
Standard 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JL – O3 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JK – O4 
      
Equal-trial 1 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JL – O3 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JK – O4 
 4  ST – O1  UV – O3 
      
TEST      
Trial type  Trials    
Imperfect  A D G J 
Conflicting  BC EF HI KL 
Combined   ABC DEF GHI JKL 
Novel  AW DX GY JZ 
Common predictor  B E H K 
Rare predictor  C F I L 
Trained common  AB DE GH JK 
Trained rare  AC DF GI JL 
Filler cues  ST UV   
Note: A – V represent different symptom cues, O1 – O4 represent different disease 
outcomes. Filler cue transfer trials were presented in the equal-trial condition only.  
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3.3.1.4 Procedure 
The task proceeded in the same manner as the previous experiments, with 224 
training trials in each group, 32 test trials in the standard group, and 34 test trials in the 
equal-trial group.  
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Training 
Figure 3.5 depicts accuracy for each trial type during training in the standard and 
equal-trial groups. Analysis of training focused on the critical trial-types, ignoring the 
filler cues in the equal-trial group. A 2 x (2) x (7) mixed measures ANOVA was run 
with group (standard vs. equal-trial) as a between subjects factor, and trial type 
(common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within subjects factors. This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of block F(6,336) = 162.23, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .743, trial type, 
F(1,56) = 7.49, p = .008, 𝜂!! =  .118, and group F(1,56) = 10.46, p = .002, 𝜂!! = .157. 
There was also a significant interaction between trial type and group, F(1,56) = 47.03, p 
< .001, 𝜂!! = .456. Further analysis of simple effects revealed that the standard group 
learned common trial types better than rare trial types overall, F(1, 28) = 64.12, p <.001, 𝜂!! = .696, whereas the equal-trial group learned the rare trial types better overall, 
F(1,28) = 6.62, p = .016, 𝜂!! = .191. Note that these groups did not experience these trial 
types at an equal rate during training. There was also a significant interaction between 
block and group, such that the change in learning over blocks was greater for the equal-
trial group, F(6,336) = 3.32, p = .003, 𝜂!! =  .056, even though their accuracy was poorer 
overall. The three-way interaction between group, block, and trial type was also 
significant, F(6,336) = 3.82, p = .001, 𝜂!! = .064, such that the difference in learning for 
cues was greater in the standard than equal-trial group. 
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 	Figure 3.5. Mean accuracy for common, rare trials and filler trials (equal-trial group 
only) across the course of training in Experiment 3.  
3.3.2.2 Transfer 
Choice. In the following analyses, AB, DE, GH, JK will still be referred to as 
common trial types and AC, DF, GI, JL as rare trial types, according to the global 
frequency of the outcome with which they were paired. The proportion of rare choice 
for the critical transfer items is shown in Figure 3.6, and for all items in Table 3.6. 
There was a significant rare bias in the standard group, t(28) = 3.81, p = .001, d = 0.71, 
BF10 = 24.5 x 103, but not in the equal-trial group, t(28) = 0.82, p = .417, d = 0.15, BF01 
= 4.40, and this group difference was significant, t(56) = 2.30, p = .025, d = 0.60, BF10 
= 42.11.  
There were also significant group differences on imperfect, t(56) = 4.16, p < 
.001, d = 1.09, and novel, t(56) = 2.40, p = .02, d = 0.63, trials.  In the standard group, 
there was a common bias for imperfect trials, t(28) = 7.28, p = <.001, d = 1.35, and 
novel trials, t(28) = 4.58, p = .001, d = 0.85. Choice was unbiased on combined trials, 
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t(28) = .26, p = .796, d = 0.05. In the equal-trial group, outcome choice was unbiased 
for all the critical transfer trials, highest t(28) = 1.21, p =.238, d = 0.22 for novel trials. 
Two separate (2) x 2 mixed measures ANOVAs with test trial and group as 
factors revealed that across both groups, rare choice on novel trials did not differ 
significantly from the imperfect trials, F < 1, but was significantly lower than 
conflicting trials, F(1,56) = 23.50, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .296. There was also a significant 
interaction with group, F(1,56) = 9.22, p = .004, 𝜂!! = .141, indicating a greater 
difference in the standard than the equal-trial group.  
A 2 x (2) mixed measures ANOVA was run to compare choice accuracy for 
perfect predictors. In this case, there was no difference in choice accuracy for common 
(M = .92, SD = .16) and rare (M = .87, SD = .24) predictors, F(1,56) = 1.81, p = .184, 𝜂!! 
= .031, and no effects of group, Fs < 1. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Mean proportion of relevant rare outcome choice (±SEM) for the critical 
transfer items in Experiment 3. 
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Table 3.6 
Outcome choice proportions and mean confidence ratings for all transfer trials in 
Experiment 3.  
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Other  Confidence 
Imperfect Standard .784 .164 .052 62.25 
A, D, G, J Equal-trial .483 .440 .077 61.94 
Conflicting Standard .250 .672 .078 67.86 
BC, EF, HI, KL Equal-trial .431 .491 .077 68.86 
Combined Standard .483 .483 .034 71.90 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Equal-trial .474 .466 .06 72.38 
Novel Standard .690 .198 .112 50.79 
AW, DX, GY, JZ Equal-trial .483 .388 .13 54.09 
Common predictor Standard .897 .043 .06 71.80 
B, E, H, K Equal-trial .784 .095 .12 71.79 
Rare predictor Standard .112 .828 .06 75.13 
C, F, I, L Equal-trial .095 .802 .103 73.87 
Trained Common Standard .759 .198 .043 82.31 
AB, DE, GH, JK Equal-trial .767 .207 .026 83.37 
Trained Rare Standard .112 .828 .06 85.30 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Equal-trial .095 .802 .103 85.21 
 
Confidence.  Confidence ratings are shown in Table 3.6. There were no 
significant group differences in confidence ratings for any of the trial types, highest F < 
1. Post-hoc orthogonal contrasts again indicated that novel trials were rated lower than 
imperfect trials, F(1,56) = 8.54, p = .005, 𝜂!! = .132, and conflicting trials were rated 
higher than novel and imperfect trials on average, F(1,56) = 17.84, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .242. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested whether global outcome frequency differences and 
conflicting cue-outcome combinations are jointly sufficient to produce an inverse base-
rate effect, despite equal frequencies of the relevant predictive-cue trials. When AB–O1 
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and AC–O2 were trained with equal base-rates, and the frequency of O1 was 
independently increased through pairings with high frequency filler trials, the effect was 
substantially reduced relative to the standard condition. Responding to all other critical 
transfer trials also did not differ from chance in this condition. This result indicates that 
although global outcome frequency differences are important, the effect is not simply 
the result of matching conflicting cues with a novel outcome. Taken together, 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that a combination of differences in both relevant trial 
frequency and global outcome frequency are important for producing the inverse base-
rate effect. 
The results are consistent with Johansen et al.’s (2007) conclusion that 
asymmetric representations are necessary for the effect. That is, O1 is predicted by both 
A and B, whereas O2 is primarily predicted by C. Differences in trial frequency serve to 
establish this asymmetry, as AB–O1 is learned faster than AC–O2. In the equal-trial 
condition, asymmetric representation is lost, as the imperfect predictor would become 
equally well associated with both outcomes. Indeed, the typical common outcome bias 
for the imperfect predictor was not observed in this condition. Novel trial responses, 
which could be guided by imperfect cue associations, also showed no bias. Similar to 
Experiment 1, there was also no difference in accuracy for B and C trials at test.  
Interestingly, participants were slightly slower to learn AB trials than AC trials 
in the equal-trial group, even though they were both presented at an equal rate 
throughout training. This finding may indicate a role of context learning in outcome 
frequency manipulations. It is possible that the context became associated with the 
common outcome, which may then overshadow or impair learning for the relationship 
between AB and the common outcome. We will consider the implications of context 
learning further in the general discussion. However, for this experiment, the difference 
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in acquisition is unlikely to affect performance at test, as accuracy for AB and AC trials 
was equivalent by the end of training.   
3.4 Experiment 4 
The results of Experiments 1-3 are not clearly consistent with any particular type 
of inference entertained thus far (e.g., eliminative inference, novelty-matching). To take 
a different approach, Experiment 4 introduced a post-experimental questionnaire to 
assess participants’ justification for their outcome choice on conflicting trials. The aim 
was to determine whether participants articulate a clear inferential reasoning strategy for 
rare choice at test, and if so, whether this strategy is consistent across participants. The 
questionnaire provided a written summary of the abstract structure of the task design, 
the outcome base-rates, and the conflicting trials (see Appendix B). It is worth noting 
that this questionnaire is similar to the one used by Johansen et al. (2007), who found 
that participants given a written summary of contingencies and outcome base-rates 
showed base-rate consistent choices to conflicting cues. They suggested that providing 
this explicit summary of base-rate information encouraged the use of that information in 
decision-making, whereas trial-by-trial learning lead to base-rate neglect. In their study, 
participants completing the questionnaire had never experienced trial-by-trial 
acquisition of the contingencies. Thus, it is unclear whether this would also be the case 
for participants prone to making rare outcome choices in the task. In the current 
experiment, participants were administered the questionnaire after they had completed 
the test phase of the computer task in the standard condition. They were asked to 
indicate which outcome they tended to choose on conflicting trials during the test phase 
of the computer task, and were then asked to describe their reason for choosing that 
outcome. This can be used to determine how well responding on the questionnaire 
reflects actual choice during the task.  
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3.4.1 Method 
 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty students (20 female, mean age = 20.23, SD = 2.05) participated in return 
for monetary compensation. There were no exclusions based on training accuracy.  
3.4.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli 
 The 16 symptom stimuli for the computer task included sneezing, dizziness, 
headache, fever, rash, nausea, earache, coughing, hair loss, fatigue, twitching, blurred 
vision, wheezing, swelling, back pain, fainting. An additional questionnaire was 
included, which is described in further detail below.  
3.4.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure of the inverse base-rate task was identical to that for the standard 
group in Experiments 1-3. After completing the computer task, participants were 
provided with a paper questionnaire (see Appendix B). The questionnaire provided a 
summary of the task design, and the conflicting test trials. Because stimuli were 
randomly allocated to cues and outcomes for each participant, the questionnaire 
outlined the structure of the task using abstract labels, rather than symptom and disease 
names. All participants saw the following information: 
During the experiment, the following pattern was true for all combinations of 
symptoms and diseases: Patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM B always had 
DISEASE 1. Patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM C always had DISEASE 2. 
DISEASE 1 occurred three times more often than DISEASE 2. That is, patients 
with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM B that had DISEASE 1 were seen three times 
more often than patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM C that had DISEASE 2. 
 During the final phase of the experiment (when you did not receive feedback), 
you saw patients with SYMPTOM B + SYMPTOM C. 
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Participants were then asked to answer two questions. First, they were required to 
indicate which of the two diseases they tended to diagnose for these patients. Second, 
they were asked to briefly explain the reason for their choice in the space provided.  
3.4.2 Results 
3.4.2.1 Training 
Training accuracy is shown in Figure 3.7. There was a significant main effect of 
block, F(6,174) = 91.44, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .759 . Common trials were learned better 
overall, F(1,29) = 39.12, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .574  while a significant interaction between 
block and trial type indicates that accuracy for the two trial types converged towards the 
end of training, F(6,174) = 4.41, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .132.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Response accuracy for common and rare trial types in the training phase of 
Experiment 4.  
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3.4.2.2 Test 
Choice. The proportion of rare outcome choice for each critical test trial is 
shown in Figure 3.8, and for all trials in Table 3.7. There was a significant inverse base-
rate effect on conflicting trials, t(29) = 4.41, p < .001, d = .80, BF10 = 25.4 x 103. Choice 
was significantly common-biased on imperfect trials, t(29) = -6.90, p < .001, d= -1.26, 
and novel trials, t(29) = 3.07, p = .005, d = 0.56, but was unbiased on combined trials, 
t(29) = .57, p = .573, d = 0.10. Two separate one-way ANOVAs with trial type as a 
factor showed that the proportion of rare responses on novel trials was again 
significantly higher than imperfect trials, F(1,29) = 8.27, p = .007, 𝜂!! = .222, and 
significantly lower than conflicting trials, F(1,29) = 17.82, p < .001, 𝜂!! =.381. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with trial type as a factor did not show a significant 
difference between common predictors (M = .96, SD = .09) and rare predictors (M = 
.96, SD = .13), F < 1.  
 
Figure 3.8. Mean proportion of rare outcome choice (±SEM) for each of the critical trial 
types in the test phase of Experiment 4. 
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Table 3.7 
Outcome choice proportions and mean confidence ratings for all transfer trials in 
Experiment 4. 
 Choice proportion  
Transfer Trial Common Rare Other  Confidence 
Imperfect 0.742 0.208 0.050 56.83 
A, D, G, J     
Conflicting 0.267 0.692 0.042 64.22 
BC, EF, HI, KL     
Combined 0.525 0.475 0.000 67.19 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL     
Novel 0.633 0.325 0.042 48.03 
AW, DX, GY, JZ     
Common predictor 0.925 0.033 0.042 72.86 
B, E, H, K     
Rare predictor 0.033 0.908 0.058 81.95 
C, F, I, L     
Trained Common 0.967 0.025 0.008 92.26 
AB, DE, GH, JK     
Trained Rare 0.083 0.908 0.008 87.33 
AC, DF, GI, JL     
Confidence. Confidence ratings are shown in Table 3.7. Contrasts again showed the 
same pattern of results as in previous experiments. Novel trials were rated lower than 
imperfect trials, F(1,29) = 12.43, p = .001, 𝜂!! = .300, conflicting trials were rated higher 
than novel and imperfect trials on average, F(1,29) =, p = .003, 𝜂!! = .264. 
3.4.2.2 Questionnaire 
 Participants were classified as rare-biased, common-biased, or unbiased, 
according to their responses to conflicting trials in the test phase. Participants were 
classified as biased if their choice differed from 50%, considering only relevant 
outcome choices. The weakest choice bias to be classified in either direction was 2 out 
of 3 choices (for three participants only). The distribution of questionnaire responses 
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according to response bias at test is shown in Table 3.8. Of the 19 rare-biased 
participants, 15 chose the common outcome in the questionnaire. Only seven 
participants indicated that they had chosen the rare outcome, and of these seven, only 
four did so consistently. A simple linear regression showed that outcome choice in the 
questionnaire did not significantly predict the strength of the rare bias at test, β = .083, 
R2 = .007, F(1,29) = .195, p = .662.  
Table 3.9 provides category definitions into which outcome choice responses 
were classified. As this questionnaire was primarily an exploratory exercise, these 
categories were determined post-hoc, based primarily on proposed explanations for the 
effect. Explanations for choosing the common outcome were classified as base-rate 
normative, associative memory, or intuitive. Explanations for choosing the rare outcome 
were classified as elimination, novelty, or asymmetric representation. Given the 
importance of outcome and trial frequency shown in the previous experiments, 
responses that referred to novelty were separated into three sub-categories, including 
outcome novelty, trial novelty, and novelty-matching. Any responses that did not fall 
into the above categories and did not provide a clear alternative explanation for their 
choice were scored as unclassified. Classification was carried out by the experimenter 
and independently verified by a second experimenter. The number of responses falling 
into each of these categories, mean rare biases at test for each category, and example 
responses, are also summarised.  
Table 3.8.  
Outcome choice in the questionnaire by bias shown at test in Experiment 4 
 Questionnaire Response 
Bias at test Common Rare Total 
Common 3 0 3 
Rare 15 4 19 
None 5 3 8 
Total 23 7 30 
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Table 3.9 
Explanations for outcome choice by category. 
Outcome Category Classification N 
Mean 
rare bias Example response 
Common Base-rate 
normative 
The more frequent outcome 
has a higher probability of 
occurring 
9 .67 (±.11) “Since disease 1 occurred more often it makes sense that 
there is a bigger probability that the patient suffers from 
disease 1 rather than 2.” 
 Associative 
memory 
Remembered the relationship 
between B and O1 better  
6 .71 (±.08) “I remembered the symptoms of this disease better than the 
other diseases which weren’t seen as often.”  
 Intuitive  Other reason for choosing O1, 
e.g., greater confidence, or 
salience of the cue or outcome 
etc. 
4 .75 (±.10) “I was more confident on the symptoms displayed for 
disease 1 than 2”; “I would often give symptom C less 
weighting than B because it would feel somehow more 
natural for me to do so.” 
 Unclassified  4 .71 (±.17)  
Rare Elimination If the cues do not match those 
of the common outcome, the 
rare outcome is chosen. 
 
1 .50  “Disease 1 occurred so often that it was really easy to 
identify whether or not it was disease 1, and if the symptoms 
did not match or seem familiar to that of disease 1, I would 
choose disease 2.  
 Novelty     
 Outcome O2 was chosen because it was 
a novel outcome 
0 -  
 Trial O2 was chosen because C was 
novel 
 
2 .50 (±.0) “…Since symptom C is unusual, when it appears it probably 
means the patient is more likely to get the rare disease 
associated with symptom C” 
 Novelty-
matching 
BC was novel, so the more 
novel outcome was chosen 
0   
      
 Asymmetric 
representation 
C indicates the rare outcome 
more than B indicates the 
common outcome. 
 
3 .92 (±.08)  “Symptom C could be the main signal of a rare kind of 
disease”  
“Because that symptom seemed to be exclusive to only that 
disease.” 
      
 Unclassified  1 1.0  
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3.4.3 Discussion 
The pattern of responses in the test phase was generally consistent with the previous 
experiments, with a significant inverse base-rate effect on conflicting trials. However, 
responses in the questionnaire did not clearly correspond with choice at test. The majority of 
participants indicated that they had chosen the common outcome at test. Most interestingly, 
of the 19 participants who were clearly rare-biased at test, 15 indicated that they had chosen 
the common outcome.  
Although Johansen et al. (2007) also found greater common responses in a similar 
questionnaire, it is interesting that providing this kind of base-rate summary was also able to 
override choices made during the test phase. It could be the case that participants simply 
could not recall which outcome they had chosen on these trials, although the questionnaire 
was administered directly following the test phase. Alternatively, it may be difficult for 
participants to map the abstract structure described in the questionnaire to the appropriate 
trials during the test phase, especially considering the large number of test trials. However, 
this mismatch in choice did not occur in the opposite direction. That is, while some 
participants who indicated they chose the common outcome in the questionnaire had actually 
shown a rare bias at test, no participants who indicated they had chosen the rare outcome in 
the questionnaire had shown a common bias at test. Thus it seems to be the case that 
providing a summary of the base-rates leads to more rational responding, even in participants 
prone to making rare responses when contingencies are learned on a trial-by-trial basis. The 
particular category of response in the questionnaire was also not clearly predictive of the 
strength of rare biases at test. 
Most participants who chose the common outcome in the questionnaire gave a rational, 
base-rate normative explanation. That is, the more common outcome is more likely to occur. 
Several other participants gave an explanation based on associative memory, where they 
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indicated that they remembered the outcome that went with cue B better, because it was seen 
more frequently. Others relied on more intuitive explanations, such as greater confidence in 
that response.  
The explanations for choosing the rare outcome were of greater interest. One participant 
clearly articulated an eliminative inference, stating that if the symptoms did not match those 
of the common disease, they chose the rare disease. Thus, despite the general dismissal of 
eliminative inference in the literature, it appears that this is in fact an inferential strategy that 
participants may form and use when responding in these tasks. Even so, it is clear that this 
inference is either used by only a very small minority of participants, or is one that is not 
readily articulated. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that using an eliminative inference is 
more common than reporting it.  
There were no responses expressing a clear novelty-matching strategy, or a preference for 
a more novel outcome. Responses that mentioned novelty did so only in reference to the 
novelty of the rare predictor. That is, the rarity of cue C meant that its associated outcome 
was more likely. These responses emphasise the importance of trial frequency for the effect, 
in which cue C is seen as more novel or unusual, which is consistent with the results of 
Experiment 3. Thus the novelty of cue C during training appears to lead to a strong link 
between C and the rare outcome, which could indicate either an inferential or associative 
process. This is similar to the responses given by three participants classified as an 
asymmetric representation, in which C indicated the rare disease more than B indicated the 
common disease.  
While it is difficult to make strong conclusions given the small sample of rare choice 
explanations, these results do suggest that, a) eliminative inference is a plausible inference, 
but is not commonly reported, b) the novelty of C is important for the effect, and c) there is 
little evidence for a unified inferential process resulting in rare outcome choice.  
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Figure 3.9. Probability of choosing the relevant rare outcome on conflicting trials (i.e. 
showing an inverse base-rate effect) as a function of the number of trials since previously 
choosing that outcome for participants in the standard condition of each experiment 
(including the shared-outcome condition of Experiment 1). Data labels indicate the 
percentage of cases.  
 
3.5 Sequential guessing strategies 
 
 Participants might employ a different kind of guessing strategy on ambiguous test 
trials. When participants are uncertain about a response, they may simply choose an outcome 
they have not recently chosen. Due to the nature of the task, participants tend to make fewer 
rare outcome responses than common outcome responses. Thus on conflicting trials, a 
participant may select the rare outcome simply because they have not chosen it recently. If 
this is the case, participants should be more likely to show a rare bias on conflicting trials 
when they have made a greater number of common outcome choices on the preceding trials. 
To assess this possibility, we determined the probability of choosing the rare outcome on 
conflicting trials as a function of the number of trials since last selecting that outcome, 
collapsed across the standard group of each experiment (See Figure 3.9). A simple linear 
regression revealed that number of trials did not significantly predict the probability of 
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selecting the relevant rare outcome, R2 = 0.01, F < 1. Furthermore, the probability of 
choosing the rare outcome on conflicting trials was consistently above 50%, regardless of the 
number of trials since choosing the rare outcome, suggesting the effect is not driven by a 
guessing strategy influenced by sequential choice factors.  
3.6 General Discussion 
The experiments reported in this chapter manipulated the relative frequencies of 
outcomes and cues to investigate their importance for the inverse base-rate effect. Perhaps the 
most striking finding is that a combination of outcome frequency differences and specific 
trial frequency differences are important for the effect; it was substantially weakened when 
either one of these biases was independently removed in Experiments 2 and 3. The influence 
of these manipulations on the effect will first be summarised, before discussing the 
theoretical implications of these findings.  
The similarity of transfer trials to trained contingencies does not appear to influence 
the likelihood of choosing the rare outcome in a straightforward way. All four experiments 
included novel transfer trials that were at least as dissimilar to the trained trials as were the 
conflicting transfer trials. In all but one condition (where no bias was shown), the relevant 
common outcome was more likely to be chosen. Experiment 2 demonstrated that relative 
outcome frequency differences are important for the effect. Preference for the rare outcome 
was reduced when each outcome had been experienced at an equal rate, even when trial 
frequency differences of relevant cue-compounds were maintained. Relative trial frequency 
differences nevertheless appear to be important. The presence of conflicting predictors and a 
global outcome frequency difference were not sufficient to produce the effect when those 
predictors were experienced in equal frequency during training in Experiment 3.  
Given the inverse base-rate effect only occurs following a specific set of training 
conditions sensitive to global outcome frequency, trial frequency and the presence of a 
	 83	
shared cue, any inferential decision bias that is generated de novo at test will struggle to 
account for the data. Nevertheless, it is still possible that inferential processes form during 
training, which then influence outcome choice at test. If this were the case, it would not be 
surprising that training parameters affect the way in which those inferences are formed and 
applied.  
3.6.1 Inferential processes 
These experiments aimed to test reasoning processes that could plausibly contribute to 
the inverse base-rate effect. Although eliminative inference does not capture all 
characteristics of the effect, previously demonstrated novel cue effects (Juslin et al., 2001; 
Johansen et al., 2007) suggest that some form of outcome elimination or novelty-matching 
might still be involved on conflicting trials. If this were the case then rare outcome choice 
should increase according to the novelty of transfer trials compared to learned instances, and 
decrease as outcome novelty decreases. Overall, our results are broadly inconsistent with 
these explanations. In all three experiments, the novel transfer cues were consistently biased 
towards the common outcome, with the exception of the equal-trial condition in Experiment 
3, which showed no bias. Moreover, this common response bias only occurred in conditions 
where an inverse base-rate effect was also observed, and not in the absence of an effect 
(Experiment 3). This is an important observation, as rare biases for single novel cues have 
only been demonstrated in conjunction with a non-significant inverse base-rate effect (Juslin 
et al., 2001; Johansen et al., 2007). Rare responses were greater to novel trials than imperfect 
trials in Experiments 1 and 2, which may suggest at least some influence of novelty on rare 
responding, although this may be a result of a generalisation decrement, rather than inference 
(e.g., Lotz & Lachnit, 2009; Karazinov & Boakes, 2004). That is, the addition of a novel cue 
weakened the common bias and reduced confidence, and it never generated a rare bias, as 
would be predicted by an elimination account.  
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When presented with conflicting cues, participants were more likely to predict the 
relevant rare outcome if that outcome was experienced less often over the entire course of the 
experiment. When participants experienced each outcome at an equal rate, such that neither 
outcome could provide a ‘novel’ response, the effect was considerably weakened. However, 
there was no clear reference to a novelty matching inference, or to the novelty of the rare 
outcome as basis for rare outcome choice in Experiment 4. Thus, if people are using a 
novelty-matching strategy, there is no real evidence that it can be easily articulated, or even 
generated as a rational response in a more abstract post-experimental test. Outcome novelty 
therefore appears to be important for the effect, but it is possible that this influence of global 
outcome frequency is a result of associative processes (see below for further discussion). 
Here, it appears rare choice is enhanced by the global rarity of the outcome. However, novel 
test trials consistently produced common biases across these experiments. This second result 
suggests that choosing the more novel outcome may not be driven by the novelty of the 
transfer trial, as a novelty-matching account would predict. Instead, novelty selection may 
occur when prediction conflict is present in the transfer trial, that is, when uncertainty is 
created specifically because more than one outcome is strongly predicted by the cues present. 
This uncertainty created by conflicting cues may be what leads to choice of a novel outcome. 
Although some conflict may occur on other critical transfer trials, this may be weaker than 
the combination of two equivalent predictors of conflicting outcomes (see Experiment 2 
discussion). However, other results indicate that this explanation is insufficient. Confidence 
ratings on conflicting trials were consistently high compared to imperfect and novel trials, 
which suggests that participants were not uncertain about their choices on conflicting trials. 
Moreover, experience of a conflicting combination of predictive cues and outcome frequency 
differences in the equal-trial group of Experiment 3 failed to elicit the effect. Here, no bias 
was observed when the relevant cues had been experienced at an equal rate during training. 
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Experiment 3 therefore demonstrates that relative trial frequency differences during training 
are critical for the effect, in a way that is not consistent with adopting novelty-selection as a 
general strategy on test. 
The importance of trial-frequency was also reflected in the questionnaire. Some 
participants indicated that the novelty of C meant that its associated outcome was more 
likely. These responses therefore have similarities to responses classified as asymmetric 
associations, in which C is a better indicator of O2 than B is of O1. Therefore considering the 
results of both Experiment 3 and Experiment 4, it does not appear to be the novelty of BC 
transfer trials that is critical for the effect, but the relative novelty of C that is established 
throughout training. C as a strong indicator of O2 would then transfer to BC trials at test. If 
this is the case, and trial similarity is not critical, it is understandable that novel cues in the 
test phase simply elicit responses consistent with the outcome base-rates, as they do not 
contain the rare predictor.  
Although Experiment 4 indicated that an eliminative inference is a plausible 
reasoning strategy that participants may employ when responding to trial types that do not 
match the learned inferences, overall there is little evidence to suggest that this strategy is 
widely or reliably used across participants. Although there were some commonalities 
between the different reasoning strategies reported in the questionnaire, there was no one 
consistent response. As such, it is unlikely that all participants adopt an eliminative inference 
strategy, or that only one kind of reasoning strategy is responsible for an inverse base-rate 
effect. 
3.6.2 Cue competition and the EXIT model 
Although the current experiments were not designed to test the predictions of EXIT, 
we will also consider how the results fit within this theoretical framework (Kruschke, 1996; 
2001a). Learning about the imperfect cue is crucial for prediction error accounts of the 
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inverse base-rate effect. According to EXIT, the imperfect predictor is more strongly 
associated with the common outcome, which then elicits a shift in attention towards the 
perfect predictor on rare trials. Assuming the imperfect predictor would primarily control 
responding, this account can readily explain the common outcome bias for novel transfer 
trials, and the absence of a common bias for novel trials when there was no bias for imperfect 
predictors in Experiment 3. The necessity of relative trial frequency differences observed in 
Experiment 3 is also clearly consistent with EXIT, as the imperfect predictor would become 
equally associated with both outcomes in the equal-trial condition. 
However, EXIT should also predict an effect in the balanced group of Experiment 2, 
as the difference in relative trial frequencies during training would allow the imperfect 
predictor to become strongly associated with the relevant common outcome, regardless of 
global outcome frequency differences. Global outcome frequency effects may be consistent 
with attention-based explanations if we assume a strong role of context learning. EXIT 
permits learning about base-rates in a cue-independent way by using ‘bias’ units, which 
essentially serve as a background context that can become associated with the outcomes. In 
the standard condition, where the common outcome is experienced frequently, the context 
could become strongly associated with this outcome, which may further encourage attention 
shifts towards the predictive cue on rare trials. Yet in the balanced condition, where each 
outcome was experienced equally, the context does not provide a greater expectation of either 
outcome, such that prediction error and subsequent attention shifts on rare trials may be 
reduced, consequently weakening the inverse base-rate effect.  
It is difficult to reconcile this explanation with the training results of Experiment 3. 
Learning for AB–O1 appeared to be overshadowed during training, which suggests that 
context conditioning does occur. However if context conditioning produces greater choice of 
the rare outcome on conflicting trials, then the strong association between the context and the 
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common outcome (due to the high frequency filler cues) should then facilitate the inverse 
base-rate effect. This pattern of results clearly did not occur, which is problematic for the 
context conditioning hypothesis. It is possible that both context and imperfect cue 
associations are necessary to drive an attention shift strong enough to influence responding at 
test, while each alone is insufficient. The role of context learning in the effect still needs to be 
clearly determined. From the results presented here, an explanation based on competitive 
associative learning and attention biases provides a reasonable but perhaps incomplete 
account of the current results. Chapter 4 therefore aims to test how well these sorts of models 
can predict the effects observed here.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Computational models of attention  
The predominant explanation for the inverse base-rate effect is in terms of error-driven 
selective attention to predictive cues (Kruschke, 1996; Kruschke, 2001a). Kruschke 
(2001a) has shown that the EXIT model can readily predict the inverse base-rate effect 
and related highlighting effects, and as such, attentional explanations of the effect have 
typically relied on the specific mechanisms proposed in this model. The EXIT model 
assumes that attention capacity is limited, and that attention is rapidly shifted towards 
cues that will reduce error. Attention distributions are then learned, and applied on 
subsequent trials according to their similarity to past exemplars. The EXIT model is 
therefore conceptually related to a class of other attentional theories of associative 
learning based on predictiveness principles, the most prominent being the associative 
learning model first proposed by Mackintosh (1975; hereafter referred to simply as 
Mackintosh). Mackintosh assumes that attention increases to cues that are good 
predictors of the outcome, and decreases to poorer predictors. The Mackintosh model 
has a long history in animal learning and has been explicitly applied to human learning 
phenomena related to the inverse base-rate effect, such as the learned predictiveness 
effect.  
There are of course several attention-based models that may be relevant for 
understanding attention biases in the inverse base-rate effect; for example, models that 
reconcile the influence of predictiveness and uncertainty on attention to cues (Le Pelley, 
2004; Esber & Haselgrove, 2011), or equate attention with associative strength (Le 
Pelley, 2016). While the inverse base-rate effect may provide a good test bed for a 
broad range of attention models, a comprehensive comparison is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Instead, this chapter focuses on the comparison of EXIT and Mackintosh, as 
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there are unresolved theoretical questions about these models in particular, as outlined 
below. 
It is often assumed that the EXIT model operates similarly to Mackintosh. 
Indeed, Kruschke (2001b) described the EXIT model as a connectionist implementation 
of the theoretical principles proposed by Mackintosh, and claims that the models make 
the same predictions for changes in attention. Despite the similarities, there have been 
recent questions about the ability of Mackintosh to account for some characteristics of 
the inverse base-rate effect. For instance, Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey (2014) 
state that Mackintosh cannot account for the presence of an inverse base-rate effect 
when accuracy for B is greater than accuracy for C. According to Mackintosh, this 
difference in accuracy implies greater associative strength for B than C, which would 
result in greater common outcome responses on conflicting BC trials. EXIT can account 
for this dissociation (see Kruschke, 2003), as learned attention distributions towards C 
will lead to greater rare responses on BC trials, whereas on B alone and C alone trials, 
each cue will have complete control over responding. An alternative explanation for this 
dissociation proposed in this thesis is that the context may act as a cue that can become 
associated with the outcomes. Thus, learning about the relationship between the context 
and the common outcome would facilitate accuracy on B alone trials, and impair 
accuracy on C alone trials. In principle, this might allow Mackintosh to account for the 
presence of an inverse base rate effect in these circumstances, as associative strength for 
C may still outweigh associative strength for B when there are greater common 
responses on B trials. Models of associative learning like Mackintosh often make the 
simple assumption that outcome predictions are based on a simple linear summation of 
the associative strengths of cues present on a given trial. Given this assumption, it may 
be difficult for these models to simultaneously predict that a) B + context could result in 
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a stronger prediction of O1 than C + context of O2, and b) that B + C + context could 
lead to stronger prediction of O2 than O1.11 However, these circumstances could be 
possible if an assumption of nonlinearity in the summation process at test is made, for 
example, assuming that the context contributes more when only a single cue is present 
(e.g., B alone) than when two cues are present (e.g., BC). Mackintosh does not have a 
built-in capacity for this type of nonlinearity, which means that it may be limited in 
what it can predict, but also means its predictions are less parameter specific. 
There remains some ambiguity as to how well Mackintosh can predict the 
inverse base-rate effect, and, despite its relevance to attentional explanations of the 
effect, it has never been formally tested in this context, nor have its predictions for 
outcome choice and attention to cues been compared to that of EXIT for the inverse 
base-rate effect specifically. Therefore in this chapter, EXIT and Mackintosh are fit to 
the data from Chapter 3 to address this question, and predicted attention weights for 
cues and context are extracted from both models. The version of Mackintosh used here 
is a modified version that uses a summed error term, and is therefore not the same as the 
original model described by Wills et al. (2014), which uses a separable error term. The 
addition of a summed error term allows Mackintosh to better account for some cue 
competition effects (Le Pelley, 2004), and therefore may provide a better account of the 
inverse base-rate effect than the original model. In addition to providing a formal 
comparison of the models, these model fits will also ascertain whether attentional 
explanations provide a convincing account of the results of these experiments, which 
were originally designed to test conditions that may affect inferential processes. The 
remainder of the chapter will first describe the formalisation of the EXIT and 																																																								11	In principle, there are combinations of associative strengths for cues A, B, C and context that allow 
linear summation to produce this pattern of results when learning is at asymptote for AB and AC trials. 
This seems to be the case when the context-O1 association is stronger than the A-O1 association, and A is 
more strongly associated with O2 than O1. However, it is unclear whether the learning rules in 
Mackintosh would ever predict this pattern.  
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Mackintosh models used here, before discussing the model predictions for each of the 
experiments.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. A diagram of the EXIT model, reproduced from Kruschke (2001a), 
representing a situation with two cues, one exemplar, and two potential outcomes. 
Circles represent nodes; thin lines represent fixed weight connections; thick arrows 
represent learned weight connections; square boxes represent the multiplicative factor 
of attention on cue activation. When a stimulus is presented, cue nodes are activated, 
and this activation spreads to the exemplar nodes according to the similarity between 
the presented stimulus and exemplar stimulus. Attention gain nodes are then activated 
based on prior exemplar-specific learned attention distributions. Attention is normalized 
and attention strengths are multiplied with the cue activations. Activation spreads to the 
outcome nodes, and an outcome is selected based on the relative activation of outcomes.  
 
92	
4.1 The EXIT model 
The EXIT model is a connectionist model of associative learning (Kruschke, 2001a; 
2001b). In EXIT, each cue is represented by a corresponding input node, and each 
outcome is represented by a corresponding output node. Activation spreads from the 
input nodes to the output nodes via weighted connections that are modulated by learned 
attention weights, represented in Figure 4.1.  
4.1.1 EXIT model assumptions 
1. People learn associations between cues and outcomes. These associations 
are implemented in EXIT as connections from cue nodes to outcome nodes 
(represented by thick arrows at the bottom of Figure 4.1). 
2. Attention can be differentially allocated to cues. Attention modulates the 
influence of cues on both responding and learning, implemented by 
multiplicative factors of attention on each cue (represented by the boxes with 
an “X” below the cue nodes in Figure 4.1).  
3. Attention capacity is limited. EXIT normalises attention to cues, such that an 
increase in attention to a particular cue results in a decrease in attention to 
other present cues (represented by crossed connections from attention nodes 
to gain nodes). The gain nodes express attention to each cue prior to 
attention normalisation. At least some attention gain is allocated to all cues 
present (represented by connections from cue nodes to gain nodes in Figure 
4.1).   
4. Attention distributions can be learned. The connection between cues and 
attention gains is mediated by exemplar-nodes. When a cue or combination 
of cues is encountered and an attention shift occurs, the new attention 
distribution becomes a learned response to that particular stimulus. This is 
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implemented by associations between the cues and the attention gains 
(represented by thick arrows from exemplar nodes to attention gain nodes in 
Figure 4.1). 
5. Learning and attention shifts occur efficiently. Error is defined as the 
discrepancy between the predicted outcome, and the outcome that occurs on 
a given trial. The EXIT model uses gradient descent on error to reduce error 
quickly.  
4.1.2 EXIT model process 
When a stimulus is presented, the corresponding cue nodes are activated. This 
cue activation then spreads to the exemplar nodes, which are activated to the extent that 
the presented cue combination is similar to the cue combination represented by the 
exemplar node. The exemplar node activation then spreads to the attention gain nodes. 
If the exemplar has been encountered previously, the attention gain nodes are activated 
based on prior learned attention distributions for that particular exemplar. Attention gain 
is then normalised, and attention strengths are multiplied with the cue activations. This 
activation then spreads to the outcome nodes, where the model makes an outcome 
prediction based on the relative activation of outcome nodes. The model then provides 
corrective feedback. Attention is rapidly shifted towards cues that will reduce 
subsequent prediction error. Associative weights from the attended cues are adjusted 
proportional to the attention on each cue, so that the new attention distribution is used 
when the stimulus is encountered in the future. 
4.1.3 EXIT Model formalisation 
The following description of the EXIT model borrows heavily from Kruschke 
(2001a; 2001b). When stimuli are present, they activate their respective input nodes. For 
instance, when cue i is present, 𝑎!!" = 1, and when cue i is absent, 𝑎!!" = 0. When 
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outcome k is present the output node is activated via a teacher signal tk = 1 (tk = 0 when 
outcome k is absent). wki represents the link with associative weight connecting input 
node i to outcome node k. Associative weights are initialized at zero but adjust with 
learning. Activation of output node k is determined by: 
 𝑎!!"# =  𝑤!"! α!𝑎!!" (1) 
where α! is the attention strength on input node i. EXIT uses the softmax rule (Bridle, 
1990; Rumelhart, Durbin, Golden, & Chauvin, 1995), a version of the Luce (1959) 
choice rule, to map node activations to response probabilities: 
 𝑝 𝑐 = e!!!!"#e!!!!"!!  (2) 
The outcome category c is chosen according to the relative magnitude of c’s activation 
compared to the sum of all category activations. Here ϕ is a scaling constant that 
determines choice decisiveness, with higher values indicating a highly decisive choice. 
That is, a high value of ϕ indicates that a small difference in relative activation will 
translate into a large choice preference, while a small value of ϕ indicates that a large 
difference in relative activation will only translate into an indecisive choice.  
Base rates in EXIT are reflected by learned associations with a bias cue. This 
bias cue essentially represents the context, and is activated on every trial. Attention can 
shift to and from this cue in the same way as to presented stimuli, although the bias cue 
is allowed a separate salience to that of presented stimuli. When the same attention is 
paid to the bias cue on every trial, the bias cue weights will reflect the category base 
rates. However throughout learning, attention is likely to shift away from the bias cue, 
such that its weights will not perfectly reflect the base rates.  
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Activation of the exemplar node occurs based on the similarity of the stimulus to 
the exemplar, each with a small receptive field. The exemplar activation value is 
determined by:  
  𝑎!!" = e(!! !!! !!"! !!!" )  (3) 
where ex indicates the exemplar, c is a specificity constant that determines the 
narrowness of the receptive field, 𝜎! is the salience of cue i  and 𝜓!"  represents the 
presence or absence of cue i in the exemplar. Cue salience is arbitrarily fixed at 1.  
Attention learning modulates the connection between input and outcome nodes. 
Activation can spread either from the input node to the gain node via the exemplar 
node, or directly from the input node to the gain node. The activation of gain node i is 
determined by:  
 𝑔 =  𝑎!!"𝜎!e( !!"! !!!") (4) 
where wix is the associative weight from exemplar node x to gain node i. The associative 
weights are initialized at zero, and gains are always non-negative. For input nodes with 
zero activation, there will be zero gain. For input cues about which nothing has been 
learned, the gain will be the cue’s salience (𝜎!). Activation then spreads from the gain 
nodes to the attention nodes, where attention is normalised. Attention to the ith cue is 
the normalised gain of the ith cue:  
 𝛼! =  𝑔!( 𝑔!!)! !/! (5) 
where P indicates attention capacity, with larger values of P reflecting increased 
attentional capacity. When P = 1, the attention strengths must sum to 1, and the 
attention to any given cue is the proportion of its gain relative to the total of the other 
gains 𝛼! =  𝑔!/ 𝑔!!  . In this case, an increase in attention to one cue results in the 
same decrease in attention to other cues. When 0 < P < 1, an increase in attention to one 
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cue results in a greater amount of decrease in attention to other cues, indicating 
particularly strong competition for attention. In contrast, when P > 1, attention is less 
competitive and as P approaches infinity, attention becomes essentially non-
competitive; attention to each cue approaches the proportion of its gain relative to the 
maximal gain of any cue: 𝑎! =  𝑔!/𝑚𝑎𝑥!{𝑔!}. The cue with maximal gain receives an 
attentional strength of nearly 1, and other cues receive attention proportional to the 
maximal gain. If several cues are tied for maximal gain, they all receive attention of 
nearly 1.  
Activation then spreads to the outcome nodes, where an outcome is predicted in 
the manner described above. Following corrective feedback, a rapid shift of attention 
occurs to reduce error, where error is measured as the sum squared deviation between 
the teacher values and the generated activation values across the k output nodes: 
 𝐸 =  .5 (𝑡! −! 𝛼!!"#)! (6) 
The change that will reduce error the quickest is computed by gradient descent on error. 
Gradient descent on error for gains gives: 
 ∆𝑔! =  −𝜆! 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝑔! = 𝜆! (𝑡! − 𝑎!!"#)(𝑤!"! 𝑎!!"−𝛼!!!!𝑎!!"#)( 𝑔!!! )!/!  (7) 
Where 𝜆! is the shift rate for attention, which is a positive constant of proportionality. 
Following Kruschke’s (2001a) convention, in this equation and hereafter, a lowercase 
subscript indicates an index that can vary, and an uppercase subscript indicates an index 
that has a fixed value. It is hypothesized that attention can shift a large amount on a 
single trial. In Kruschke’s (2001a) implementation of the model, the change in gain was 
arbitrarily iterated 10 times on each trial, such that a large shift in attention was 
achieved via 10 small shifts in attention. For consistency, this method was also used 
here. After attention shifts, the associative weights are also adjusted by gradient descent 
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on error: 
 ∆𝑤!" =  −𝜆! 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝑤!" =  𝜆!(𝑡! − 𝛼!!"#)𝛼!𝑎!!" (8) 
Where 𝜆! is the learning rate for output weights and a constant of proportionality, and 𝑡! − 𝛼!!"#  is a standard error term like that used in the Rescorla-Wagner model 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The shifted attentional distribution is learned by adjusting 
the associative weights for the gain nodes by gradient descent on error. Here, error is the 
sum of squared differences between the shifted value and the pre-shifted value, where 𝜆! is the learning rate for the associative weights from exemplar to gain nodes: 
 ∆𝑤!"! =  𝜆!(𝑔!!!!"# −  𝑔!!"!#)𝑔!!"!#𝛼!!" (9) 
4.1.4 EXIT model parameters 
The EXIT model has seven free parameters:  
1. Exemplar specificity: the specificity of the exemplar nodes (c in equation 3; 
range: 0.01 – 20.0) 
2. Attention capacity: or the attention normalisation power (P in equation 5; range: 
0.1 – 20.0) 
3. Attention shift rate: A positive constant of proportionality (λg in equation 7; 
range: 0.1 – 20.0) 
4. Choice decisiveness: a response probability scaling constant that converts output 
activation to response probability (ϕ in equation 2; range: 0.1 – 20.0) 
5. Output weight learning rate: the associative weight learning rate (λw in equation 
8; range: 0.01 – 1.0)  
6. Gain weight learning rate: the learning rate for the associative weights from 
exemplar nodes to gain nodes (λx in equation 9; range: 0.01 – 1.0)  
7. Bias salience: The salience of the bias (context) cue, (𝜎 in equations 3 and 4; 
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range: 0.01 – 2.0. All other cue saliences were fixed at 1.0) 
The parameter values were constrained to the interval between the upper and lower 
limits shown in brackets. To the best of my knowledge, Kruschke (2001a) did not 
include limits on the parameters in his model simulations. As such, where these 
parameters typically vary between zero and 1, e.g., learning rate, these limits were 
imposed, and where they do not, an arbitrary limit of 20 was imposed.  
4.2 The Mackintosh model 
Mackintosh (1975) proposed that attention to a stimulus increases if that 
stimulus is a better predictor of an outcome than other stimuli present on any given trial, 
and decreases if it is a poorer predictor. As mentioned in Chapter 1, attention influences 
the rate at which stimuli enter new associations, or their associability (α). This is 
expressed formally as:  
 ∆V! =  𝑆α!(λ− V!) (10) 
where ΔVA is the change in associative strength of cue A, and S and α are learning rate 
parameters. The error term, (λ – VA), represents the discrepancy between the magnitude 
of the outcome on that trial (λ) and the extent to which cue A predicts the outcome, or 
the individual associative strength of cue A (VA). A small error term indicates that the 
cue is a good predictor of the outcome, while a large error term indicates that the cue is 
a poorer predictor. Mackintosh (1975) allows stimulus specific α to change on each trial 
according to experience of a cue’s predictiveness, such that: 
 ∆α! > 0  𝑖𝑓  λ− V!  <    λ− V!  ∆α! < 0  𝑖𝑓  λ− V!  ≥   λ− V!  (11) 
where Vx is the associative strength of all other stimuli present on that trial.  If |λ – VA| 
is less than |λ – Vx|, αA will increase as cue A is a better predictor of the outcome than 
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all other stimuli. If |λ – VA| is greater than or equal to |λ – Vx|, αA will decrease as cue A 
is an equal or poorer predictor of the outcome than the other stimuli present. Thus, 
according to Mackintosh, cues that are the best available predictor of an outcome will 
maintain a high α, and will subsequently be learned about rapidly, while cues that are 
poorer predictors will have a low α and will be learned about more slowly.  
While the original model used a separable error term for each cue (see Equation 
10), all subsequent variations of Mackintosh have instead used a summed error term (Le 
Pelley, 2004; Suret & McLaren, 2005; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). A summed error 
term can better capture cue competition or interaction between cues, such as 
conditioned inhibition (see Le Pelley, 2004), and is therefore used here for the 
associative strength connecting cue A to outcome k:   
 ∆V!" =  𝑆α!(λ− ΣV) (12) 
The following equation was used to implement Equation 11 computationally, after the 
associative strengths have been updated via equation 12:  
 ∆α! =  θ E  −  E!  × α!(1−  α!) (13) 
where θ is a change parameter that controls the rate of change of α, and E! represents 
the total prediction error of cue A summed across all outcomes k: 
 E! = |λ! − V!|!!!!   (14) 
E represents the total prediction error of each cue summed across all outcomes k, then 
averaged across all cues C, which provides an estimate of mean predictiveness for the 
cues present: 
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 E = 1𝐶 |λ! − V!|!!!!  !!!!  (15) 
Thus a strongly predictive cue should predict the presence of one outcome but also the 
absence of others. If only two cues are present with no context or common element then 
(E  −  E!) will be positive for one cue and negative for the other cue unless they are 
exactly equally predictive (in which case E  −  E! =  0), but once context is also 
considered as an additional cue, this will not necessarily be the case. In equation 13, α! 1−  α!  ensures that α approaches asymptote (0 < α < 1), rather than becoming too 
large or becoming negative.  
A cue that strongly inhibits an outcome might end up with a large summed 
prediction error even when that outcome does not occur, because |λ− V| will be 
positive. Therefore all negative Vs are converted to 0 for the purpose of calculating each 
of the two error terms. To determine choice probabilities, we used the same derivative 
of the Luce (1959) choice rule to map associative strengths to response probabilities: 
 𝑝 𝑐 =  𝑒!!!! / 𝑒!"!!!  (16) 
4.2.1 Mackintosh model parameters 
The implementation of Mackintosh used here has five free parameters: 
1. Learning rate: (S in Equation 12; range: 0.01 – 1.0) 
2. Initial alpha for cues: The initial associability of stimuli (range: 0.1 – 1.0). 
3. Initial alpha for context: The initial associability of the context (range: 0.1 – 
1.0). 
4. Theta:  A change parameter that controls the rate of change of α (range: 0.1 – 
1.0). 
101	
5. Choice decisiveness:  A response probability scaling constant that converts 
output activation to response probability (ϕ in equation 16; range: 0.1 – 20.0). 
4.3 Differences between EXIT and Mackintosh 
In both models, attention to predictive cues should increase, and attention to 
non-predictive cues should decrease. Although both models operate on these similar 
theoretical principles, there are some important differences in the way each model 
operates. In Mackintosh, attention is synonymous with cue associability, such that the 
primary function of learned attention to a cue is to influence the rate of future learning 
about that cue. EXIT also assumes that more will be learned about attended cues. 
However in EXIT, attention influences output activation, such that cues with greater 
attention will have greater control over responding. Thus one clear difference is that in 
EXIT, the associative activation of the outputs can be influenced by the amount of 
attention cues receive. For instance, if cue A is associated with O1, the prediction of O1 
can be enhanced when there is more attention to A and can be reduced when there is 
less attention to A. Mackintosh (1975) remained agnostic about the possibility of 
performance effects of this nature, but left these effects out of the model for the sake of 
simplicity. A second difference is that attention learning in EXIT is exemplar specific, 
such that attention to a particular cue may differ depending on the other cues it is 
presented with. For example, cue A may receive a different amount of attention when it 
is present on AB trials than when it is present on AC trials. In Mackintosh, alpha is 
stimulus-specific.  Further, EXIT makes specific predictions about the timing of 
attention shifting. Specifically, attention rapidly shifts to the most predictive cue online, 
as a response to error, and associative weights are updated after this shift has occurred, 
while Mackintosh assumes that changes in attention are applied on subsequent trials.  
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4.4 Parameter search 
The remaining sections of this chapter describe the fit of these models to the 
data from Chapter 3. Simulated annealing was used to find the best fitting parameters 
for each model for each experiment (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt & Vecchi, 1983; Vanderbilt & 
Louie, 1984), which was run using the simulannealbnd function in the Global 
Optimisation Toolbox for Matlab. Simulated annealing is a preferred parameter 
estimation technique for complex models, as it allows upward movements on the error 
surface, which is useful for avoiding local minima (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). 
That is, it allows the parameter search to jump out of local minima in order to better 
find the global minimum. Because the trial randomisation leads to differences in the 
model predictions from one run to the next, each simulation was run with 30 simulated 
participants per group, and the parameter search was repeated five times. The set of 
parameters with the lowest root-mean-square error (RMSE; the average difference 
between the predicted and observed values for the test trials) at the group level were 
selected (see Table 4.1). These parameters were then used to estimate the model 
predictions for the test trials for each experiment separately. This was again run five 
times, and the simulated data with the lowest RMSE is reported. Model fits were 
compared using two penalised-likelihood criteria; the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC; Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). 
While RMSE indicates the degree to which the model fits the data, AIC and BIC deal 
with the trade-off between goodness of fit and model complexity (the number of 
parameters) by penalising models for additional free parameters. For the purposes of 
model comparison, the model with the lowest AIC or BIC is regarded as the best fitting 
model, and the difference (ΔAIC, ΔBIC) indicates how well the best model performs in 
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comparison to the other model.12 AIC and BIC were calculated from the root sum 
squares (RSS) with the following equations, where k is the number of free parameters, 
and n is the number of data points: 
 AIC =  2𝑘 + 𝑛ln(𝑅𝑆𝑆) (17) 
 BIC = 𝑛ln 𝑅𝑆𝑆/𝑛 + 𝑘ln(𝑛) (18) 
The model predictions for each test trial are presented alongside the relevant human 
choice results in tables for each experiment. Note that these data are presented in the 
percentage of outcome choice out of all possible outcome choices, rather than the  
 
Table 4.1 
The best fitting parameters for EXIT and Mackintosh used in the following simulations.  
Model Parameter Experiment 
1 
Experiment 
2 
Experiment 
3 
Experiment 
2 & 3 
EXIT Exemplar specificity 10.46 15.26 18.86 3.53 
 Attention capacity 16.34 14.78 4.88 6.84 
 Choice decisiveness 7.73 6.17 4.93 3.6 
 Attention shift rate 10.8 17.29 4.21 4.21 
 Output weight learning rate 
0.59 0.37 0.48 0.95 
 Gain weight learning rate 
0.02 0.09 0.01 0.11 
 Bias salience 0.33 0.02 0.47 0.18 
 RSME 4.82 5.81 7.78 7.3 
 AIC 108.69 115.62 124.01 252.13 
 BIC 69.74 75.71 85.06 151.48 
Mackintosh S 0.19 0.32 0.18 0.23 
 Initial alpha for cues 0.6 0.14 0.37 0.25 
 Initial alpha for context 0.14 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 Theta 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 
 Choice decisiveness 12.06 8.88 3.95 7.34 
 RMSE 4.12 5.72 11.24 9.6 
 AIC 99.67 110.17 131.78 265.66 
 BIC 59.17 69.67 91.29 162.08 
Model comparison ΔAIC 9.02 5.47 6.90 13.53 
|EXIT – Mackintosh| ΔBIC 10.57 7.01 5.35 10.60 																																																								12	Typically,	ΔAIC of 0-2 indicates little difference between models, 4-7 indicates considerably less 
support for the model with larger AIC, and >10 indicates a great deal of support for the model with lower 
AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). 	
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relevant choice proportion. The predictions for the critical transfer trials (imperfect, 
conflicting, combined, and novel trials) are also presented in figures for ease of 
comparison. Discussion of the model predictions will focus only on the results of 
primary interest for each experiment. As we are interested in whether differences in 
attention can account for group differences in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, model 
predictions for attention to predictive and imperfect cues during training are also 
included for these experiments.  
4.5 Responding to novel compounds: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 introduced a novel cue compound to test eliminative inference and 
novelty matching accounts of the effect. These trials paired a novel cue with the 
imperfect predictor (e.g., AX). Due to the dissimilarity between the novel compound 
and the trained trials, novelty-matching accounts should predict a rare outcome response 
on these trials. Even though the novel compound contained the imperfect predictor, 
common responses were weaker on novel trials than on imperfect trials. In principle, the 
models should not have any difficulty predicting the direction of response biases on 
imperfect and novel trials. In both cases, they would predict that the stronger association 
between A and the common outcome (relative to the association between A and the rare 
outcome) should generate a common outcome bias. A further question of interest is 
whether EXIT and Mackintosh can account for the difference in the strength of this bias 
between imperfect and novel trials. Experiment 1 also included three groups to 
determine whether the effect was weakened when each outcome was predicted by 
multiple cues. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect regardless of whether 
outcomes were uniquely paired with one cue-compound, or were a shared outcome for 
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multiple cue-compounds. Thus, model predictions for conflicting trials across all three 
conditions will also be compared and discussed.  
4.5.1 Fit of EXIT 
The predictions from the best fitting parameters of EXIT are shown in Table 4.2. 
These parameters produced RMSE = 5.32. The model predictions show an inverse base-
rate effect in each group. EXIT also successfully predicted a common bias on novel 
trials, but did not capture the difference in responding to imperfect and novel trials. 
Instead, responses on novel trials appear to be driven primarily by the imperfect cue 
associations, and to the same degree as imperfect trials that do not contain the novel 
cue. On perfect predictor trials, EXIT consistently predicted greater rare choice on rare 
predictor trials than common choice on common predictor trials, whereas human choice 
was less consistent (see Table 4.2).  
4.5.2 Fit of Mackintosh 
The predictions from the best fitting parameters of Mackintosh are also shown in 
Table 4.2, which produced RMSE = 4.13. Mackintosh also predicted an inverse base-
rate effect in all groups.13 There was a preference for the common outcome on novel 
trials, but the proportion of outcome choice was identical to that for imperfect trials. 
Mackintosh also predicted that accuracy on rare predictor trials was equivalent to 
accuracy on common predictor trials.  
4.5.3 Model comparison 
Overall, Mackintosh provided a considerably better fit to the data than EXIT 
(ΔAIC = 9.02 ΔBIC = 10.57). Both models predicted common biases for novel cues, 																																																								
13 Mackintosh can predict the numerically weaker effect in the cue-matched group compared to the other 
groups that was observed in the human data. EXIT did not predict this difference. However, the group 
difference in human choice was not significant, and may simply be a result of regression to the mean due 
to the large number of outcomes to learn. We therefore do not place too much emphasis on this result.  	
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Table 4.2 
Outcome choice percentages from the test phase of Experiment 1, with predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh. 
 Human choice  EXIT choice  Mackintosh choice 
 Standard  Cue-
matched 
 Outcome-
matched 
 Standard  Cue-
matched 
 Outcome-
matched 
 Standard  Cue-
matched 
 Outcome-
matched 
Trial C R  C R  C R  C R  C R  C R  C R  C R  C R 
A 79.8 17.3  67.3 26.0  84.6 11.5  69.3 25.5  66.0 24.4  74.6 22.3  76.8 21.2  66.1 28.1  76.7 21.3 
BC 23.1 74.0  36.5 59.6  21.2 76.9  28.1 71.5  27.1 72.6  22.9 77.0  26.4 72.6  34.3 62.2  23.2 75.8 
ABC 41.4 57.7  51.0 47.1  40.4 59.6  49.0 50.9  52.5 47.4  52.0 47.9  40.3 59.7  48.7 51.2  41.2 58.8 
Novel 70.2 22.1  65.4 26.0  67.3 23.1  68.6 25.5  64.8 24.1  74.0 22.3  76.8 21.2  66.1 28.1  76.7 21.3 
B 93.3 0.0  91.4 1.9  98.1 0.0  94.7 1.2  91.4 1.3  96.0 1.3  99.9 0.0  99.8 0  99.9 0.0 
C 2.9 93.3  0.0 94.2  3.8 96.2  0.6 98.2  0.4 97.0  0.3 99.2  0 99.9  0 99.8  0 99.9 
AB 97.1 1.0  98.1 1.0  98.1 0.0  99.7 0.1  99.7 0.1  99.8 0.1  100 0  100 0  100 0 
AC 4.8 92.3  4.8 93.3  3.8 96.2  0.9 98.8  0.2 99.5  0.3 99.7  0 100  0 100  0.0 100 
                           
RMSE         5.32         4.13        
Note: C refers to common outcome responses; R refers to rare outcome responses. In the standard group, each outcome was paired with two 
different cue compounds. The cue-matched and outcome-matched groups had outcomes were uniquely paired with one cue-compound, with 
either eight compounds or four compounds, respectively. 
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but neither was able to predict a difference in responding to novel and imperfect 
predictor trials. As the novel trial contained an imperfect predictor, choice appears to be 
driven entirely by this cue in both models. Interestingly, there were differences in the 
predicted pattern of results for the perfect predictor trials. EXIT predicted greater 
accuracy for rare predictors than for common predictors, whereas Mackintosh predicted 
no difference in accuracy between the two trial types. 
4.6 Outcome frequency: Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that global outcome frequency differences are 
important for the strength of the inverse base-rate effect. Preference for the rare 
outcome was substantially reduced when each outcome had been experienced at an 
equal rate across the experiment, even when trial frequency differences of relevant cue-
compounds were maintained. One potential explanation for this effect is group 
differences in learning about the context. The context provides a strong prediction of the 
common outcome in the standard group, such that less attention is needed to predictive 
cues on common trials to make a correct outcome prediction. In the balanced group, 
where outcome frequency is matched, the context is less useful in making a correct 
response, and so participants may pay more attention to the most predictive cue on any 
given trial. Table 4.3 shows human choice for the test trials from Experiment 2. To 
determine how trial frequency may affect attention to cues, attention weights (α values) 
for predictive cues, imperfect cues, and the context across training were extracted from 
the model. Attention outputs for EXIT included attention weights both post-attention 
shift and pre-attention shift. Post-shift attention reflects attention to cues after feedback, 
at the point just prior to updating learning weights. Attention following feedback 
indicates which cues the model finds to be most useful in reducing error. Pre-shift 
attention reflects the learned distribution of attention to cues carried forward to future 
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trials, prior to making a decision (see equation 5). The difference between post-shift 
attention and pre-shift attention at each point in training is also included, which 
indicates the amount of change in attention to cues within a trial. Positive scores 
indicate a shift towards the cue, while negative scores indicate a shift away from a cue. 
4.6.1 Choice predictions 
The predictions from the best fitting parameters of EXIT are shown in Table 4.3, 
and produced RMSE = 5.99. Responses for the critical trial types are shown in Figure 
4.2. EXIT successfully predicted a smaller rare bias on conflicting trials in the balanced 
group compared to the standard group, although the predicted biases in both groups 
were larger than those in human choice (Panel B of Figure 4.2). EXIT was also able to 
predict the differences in choice between groups on combined trials, but underestimated 
the decrease in the common bias on imperfect trials. Comparing choice for perfect 
predictor trials between groups, humans tended to show greater accuracy for the 
common predictor over the rare predictor in the balanced group (which suggests the 
group difference is due to better learning about the common predictor in the balanced 
group, since this pattern was not observed in the standard group). In EXIT, there was a 
greater benefit in accuracy for the rare predictor over the common predictor in the  
Table 4.3 
Outcome choice percentages from the test phase of Experiment 2, with predictions from 
EXIT and Mackintosh. 
Trial 
Human  EXIT  Mackintosh 
Standard  Balanced Standard  Balanced Standard  Balanced 
C R C R  C R C R C R C R 
A 78.8 15.4  72.5 22.5  63.2 25.3  61.4 28.5  73.3 19.5  61.1 31.2 
BC 28.8 69.2  40.0 53.8  25.4 74.1  37.3 61.9  29.0 69.3  45.8 52.0 
ABC 42.3 57.1  64.4 33.8  40.2 59.4  57.5 42.2  43.5 56.3  63.1 36.7 
Novel 65.4 26.9  58.1 30.0  62.1 25.3  60.4 28.4  73.3 19.5  61.1 31.2 
B 94.2 1.3  96.3 1.3  87.2 4.4  91.8 2.7  99.6 0.0  99.5 0.0 
C 3.8 93.6  6.3 83.8  1.1 96.7  2.0 93.7  0.0 99.5  0.0 99.5 
AB 100 0.0  98.8 1.3  97.8 0.8  98.9 0.4  100 0.0  100 0.0 
AC 5.1 92.9  8.1 90.0  0.4 99.1  1.1 97.6  0.0 99.9  0.0 99.9 
                  
Note: C refers to common outcome responses, and R refers to rare outcome responses 
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standard group compared to the balanced group (which suggests the group difference 
predicted by EXIT is achieved through better learning about the rare predictor in the 
standard group). Nevertheless, EXIT can predict the group difference in the right 
direction.  
The predictions from the best fitting parameters of Mackintosh are also shown in 
Table 4.2 and yielded RMSE = 5.72. Mackintosh also predicted a weaker rare bias on 
conflicting trials in the balanced group compared to the standard group. In fact, the rare 
bias was slightly underestimated in the balanced group. The model also accurately 
predicted differences between groups on combined trials, and predicted the decrease in 
common biases on imperfect trials. Similarly to Experiment 1, Mackintosh predicted 
equal accuracy for common and rare predictors.  	
 Figure 4.2. A comparison of model predictions with human choice for the four critical 
trial types from Experiment 2.  
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Figure 4.3. Pre-shift and post-shift attention for predictive cues, imperfect cues and 
context in Experiment 2 as predicted by EXIT. 
4.6.2 Attention predictions 
Attention outputs for EXIT are shown in Figure 4.3. In EXIT, attention shifts to 
the cues most likely to reduce error after making an outcome prediction. This is 
reflected in post-shift attention (panels C and D). Across both groups, attention to 
predictive cues is higher than imperfect cues on both common and rare trials. This 
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difference in attention is much larger on rare trials than common trials, and this pattern 
of attention did not differ substantially between groups. Attention to the context did 
differ, however. In the standard group, there was greater attention to the context on 
common trials than rare trials, consistent with the notion that the context was a more 
predictive cue on these trials. In contrast, the balanced group showed weaker attention 
to the context on common trials and stronger attention on rare trials. It is worth noting 
that post-shift attention occurs fairly rapidly, and reaches asymptote by the second block 
of training.  
Pre-shift attention indicates how much of this attention shift is learned and 
carried forward on subsequent trials (Panels A and B). Attention to the rare predictor 
was slightly higher than the common predictor in the standard group. Learned attention 
to predictive cues remained high throughout training in both groups, but there were 
differences in learned attention to the imperfect cues. In comparison to the standard 
group, the balanced group showed a slightly weaker decrease in attention to the 
imperfect cue on rare trials, and a slightly stronger decrease in attention to the imperfect 
cue on common trials. This might result in stronger learning for the common predictor 
and weaker learning for the rare predictor in the balanced group compared to the 
standard group. Interestingly, the post-shift attention to the context does not appear to 
be learned, which may be due to the low bias salience in the best-fitting parameters.  
The difference in post-shift and pre-shift attention (Panels E and F) indicates that early 
in training, there are large shifts in attention away from the imperfect predictor on rare 
trials, which then decreases across training as this attention distribution is learned. 
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Figure 4.4. Alphas for predictive and imperfect cues in Experiment 2 as predicted by 
Mackintosh  	
 
Alphas for all cues as predicted by Mackintosh are shown in Figure 4.4. Across 
training, alphas for predictive cues increased while alphas for the imperfect cues 
decreased. Overall, alphas for the predictive cue were higher on common trials than on 
rare trials. Mackintosh can still predict an inverse base-rate effect on conflicting trials 
when alpha for B is greater than alpha for C, as there would be greater competition from 
the imperfect predictor on common trials than rare trials. Although A is an imperfect 
predictor, it is a better predictor of the common outcome than the rare outcome, so C 
will gain a relatively large proportion of the associative strength with the rare outcome. 
In the balanced group, alphas are higher for common predictors and lower for rare 
predictors compared to the standard group. Therefore Mackintosh appears to account 
for the difference between groups via greater overshadowing by A on rare trials, and 
weaker overshadowing by A on common trials. Interestingly, Mackintosh predicts that 
alpha for the context reaches floor fairly quickly.  
4.6.3 Model comparison 
Overall, Mackintosh provided a considerably better fit of the data than EXIT 
(ΔAIC = 5.47; ΔBIC = 7.01). However, both models were able to predict a reduction in 
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the effect in the balanced group compared to the standard group. In addition, despite the 
fact that choice biases on combined trials tend to be less consistent than biases on other 
transfer trials, both models were able to predict the differences between groups on these 
trials. Although the pattern of choice results was similar between models, the predicted 
pattern of attention to cues during training varied substantially. EXIT predicts a rapid 
decrease in attention to the imperfect predictor on rare trials over common trials, while 
maintaining high attention to the predictive cues. In comparison, Mackintosh predicts a 
gradual increase in attention to the predictive cues across training. Due to the base-rates, 
the common predictor gains a higher alpha than the rare predictor early in training, with 
alpha for the rare predictor gradually catching up across training. Thus, EXIT predicts 
greater attention for C on AC trials than B on AB trials, and Mackintosh predicts greater 
attention for B on AB trials than C on AC trials. 
The influence of exemplar-mediated attention is clear here in the differences in 
attention to the imperfect predictors. In EXIT, attention to the imperfect cue is allowed 
to differ when it is presented on a common trial versus a rare trial. Stimulus specific 
attention in Mackintosh means that attention to the imperfect cue on one trial will 
influence the allocation of attention on all subsequent trials, regardless of the trial type, 
such that attention to the imperfect cue on rare trials will be influenced by attention on 
common trials.  
4.7 Trial Frequency: Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 matched the frequency of AB-O1 and AC-O2 trials, while 
maintaining outcome frequency differences by training high frequency filler trials 
paired with O1. This effectively abolished the inverse base-rate effect on conflicting BC 
trials. There was also no bias on imperfect or novel trials. Human choice on each test 
trial is shown in Table 4.4. The presence of conflicting predictors and a global outcome 
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frequency difference were not sufficient to produce the effect when those predictors 
were experienced in equal frequency during training in Experiment 3. Attention-based 
explanations may account for this result; as there is no difference in trial frequency 
between AB and AC trials, A should compete with B and C to a similar extent. 
However if context learning is needed to explain the results of Experiment 2, then the 
association between the context and the common outcome here might encourage a rare 
bias on conflicting trials. Greater competition between the context and predictive cues 
on AB trials than on AC trials, should result in stronger associative strength for C.  
Although trial frequency is matched, in the following discussion AB trials will still be 
referred to as “common” trials, and AC trials as “rare” trials. B and C will also be 
referred to as the common and rare predictor, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. A comparison of model predictions with human choice for the four critical 
trial types from Experiment 3.  
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4.7.1 Choice predictions 
The predictions from the best fitting parameters of EXIT are shown in Table 4.4, 
with RMSE = 7.99. Predictions for the critical transfer trials are shown in Figure 4.5. 
EXIT correctly predicted an inverse base-rate effect on conflicting trials in the standard 
group, accompanied by the absence of an effect in the equal-trial group. EXIT also 
shows greater accuracy for C than B in the standard group, but greater accuracy for B 
than C in the equal trial-group. This differed from human choice, which showed 
numerically greater accuracy for B than C in the standard group, and no difference in 
accuracy for B and C in the equal-trial group, although these effects did not reach 
significance.   
The choice predictions of Mackintosh are also shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 
4.5, and yielded RMSE = 11.25. While Mackintosh correctly predicted no bias on 
conflicting trials in the equal-trial group, this was accompanied by a much weaker rare 
bias in the standard group. There were also weaker common biases on imperfect and 
novel test trials in the standard group compared to human choice. Mackintosh again 
predicted no difference in accuracy for rare and common predictor test trials.  
 
Table 4.4 
Outcome choice percentages from the test phase of Experiment 3, with predictions from 
EXIT and Mackintosh. 
Trial 
Human  EXIT  Mackintosh 
Standard  Equal-trial Standard  Equal-trial Standard  Equal-trial 
C R C R  C R C R C R C R 
A 78.5 16.4  48.3 44.0  66.3 19.6  44.0 39.2  48.2 27.7  39.7 35.1 
BC 25.0 67.2  43.1 49.1  31.5 63.9  46.6 47.6  36.1 47.7  40.1 43.3 
ABC 48.3 48.3  47.4 46.6  50.3 47.5  40.4 57.0  48.7 45.3  43.4 50.2 
Novel 69.0 19.8  48.3 38.8  63.0 19.9  42.5 37.7  48.2 27.7  39.7 35.1 
B 89.7 4.3  78.5 9.5  86.2 2.6  87.6 2.7  85.7 2.4  82.8 3.0 
C 11.2 82.8  9.5 80.2  3.9 90.1  8.2 79.9  2.2 85.2  3.3 82.0 
AB 75.9 19.8  76.7 20.7  95.7 2.0  88.3 8.3  94.5 1.8  91.0 3.5 
AC 11.2 82.8  9.5 80.2  6.0 91.6  4.1 93.0  3.3 91.4  3.5 91.2 
                  
Note: C refers to common outcome responses, and R refers to rare outcome responses 
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4.7.2 Attention predictions 
EXIT model predictions for pre-shift and post-shift attention are shown in 
Figure 4.6. Post-shift attention in the standard group showed a similar pattern to that in 
the fit of Experiment 2. In the equal-trial group, attention to the predictive cues was 
generally greater than attention to the imperfect cues, and overall, attention was 
 
Figure 4.6. Pre-shift and post-shift attention for predictive cues, imperfect cues and 
context in Experiment 3 as predicted by EXIT. 
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higher on rare trials than common trials. However, the difference in attention between 
perfect and imperfect predictors was very similar on common and rare trials, such that 
competition between cues should be similar on these trials. Attention to the context was 
greater on common trials than on rare trials in both groups, suggesting the context is a 
more useful predictor on common trials. However, the relative balance of attention to 
the imperfect predictor compared to the context in the post-shift attention weights may 
also be important. In the standard condition, A is attended more than the context on both 
common and rare trials, but to a greater extent on common trials. In comparison, in the 
equal-trial group, A is attended more than the context on rare trials only, and A is 
attended more on rare trials than on common trials. This is important because on BC 
trials, A is removed, but the context is still present. Consequently, a large proportion of 
the common outcome weights will be removed on BC trials in the standard group, but 
this will not be the case in the equal-trial group.  
Overall, the differences in attention were not learned as strongly as in the 
previous fit. This means that there are still large changes in attention from pre-shift to 
post-shift even at the end of training (Panels E and F). However while there was still a 
greater difference in attention to perfect and imperfect predictors on rare trials 
compared to common trials in the standard group that emerged over training, there was 
no difference in attention on common and rare trials in the equal-trial group. Although 
the difference in pre-shift attention to cues is only small in the standard group, we know 
that learned attention is not needed to predict an inverse base-rate effect, as ADIT can 
predict the effect without learning attention shifts (Kruschke, 1996).  
Compared to the previous fit, there is at least some pre-shift attention to the 
context, perhaps due to the higher bias salience in the best fitting parameters for this 
experiment, however there is very little learning of the difference in attention to the 
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context on common and rare trials over training. Overall, EXIT appears to account for 
the lack of effect in the equal-trial group by equal attention differences between cues on 
common and rare trials.  
Alphas for each cue predicted by Mackintosh are shown in Figure 4.7. In the 
standard group, alphas for predictive cues increased over training, and alphas for 
imperfect cues decreased over training. This difference between predictive and 
imperfect cues was again larger on common trials than rare trials. Compared to the 
previous experiment where there was a strong predicted inverse base-rate effect, 
Mackintosh predicted that attention to cues started out at a much higher level, resulting 
in greater attention to imperfect cues across training. Alphas for the rare predictors were 
also higher, and were equivalent to that for common predictors by the end of training.  
Mackintosh predicted little difference in alphas for common and rare predictors 
across training in the equal-trial group. Therefore Mackintosh also appears to account 
for rare choice on conflicting trials via similar differences in attention to cues on 
common and rare trials throughout training. Once again, alphas for the context 
approached floor by the second block of training.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Alphas for predictive cues, imperfect cues and context in Experiment 3 as 
predicted by Mackintosh. 
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4.7.3 Model comparison 
Overall, EXIT provided a considerably better fit of the data than Mackintosh  
(ΔAIC = 6.90; ΔBIC = 5.35). EXIT closely predicted the strength of the inverse base-
rate effect in both the standard and equal-trial groups. With these parameters, 
Mackintosh correctly predicted a larger inverse base-rate effect in the standard group 
than the equal-trial group, but the effect in the standard group was much weaker than 
that observed empirically. Nevertheless, both models seem to account for the lack of an 
effect in the equal-trial group by predicting equal competition between predictive and 
imperfect cues on common and rare trials.  
4.8 Discussion 
This chapter aimed to compare the EXIT model and the Mackintosh model in 
relation to the inverse base-rate effect, and to determine whether these attention models 
can account for the results presented in Chapter 3. Both the EXIT model and the 
Mackintosh model are based on predictiveness principles, in which attention is directed 
towards the most predictive cues in order to reduce future prediction error. It is 
therefore often assumed that these models operate in a similar way, and Kruschke 
(2001b) states they should make the same predictions for changes in attention. While 
the models can account for most of the quantitative effects in Chapter 3, they differ in 
their predictions for attention towards cues during training.  
4.8.1 Test predictions 
Both EXIT and Mackintosh models are able to predict an inverse base-rate 
effect in the standard design conditions, which appears to be a result of greater 
competition between perfect and imperfect predictors on common trials than on rare 
trials. Both models also predicted a common outcome preference on novel AX trials, 
although neither could predict the difference in responding to imperfect and novel trials. 
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Choice on these trials is instead controlled completely by the presence of the imperfect 
predictor in each model. The difference between model predictions and human choice 
suggests that there is some influence of the novel trial on choice that is not captured by 
these models. This difference could instead be explained by a generalisation decrement, 
where adding a novel cue to a predictive cue decreases the strength of responding 
compared to the predictive cue alone (Lotz & Lachnit, 2009; Karazinov & Boakes, 
2004). 
Both models also predicted a weaker inverse base-rate effect when global 
outcome frequency is matched across training. EXIT correctly predicted the effect of 
trial frequency in Experiment 2, producing an inverse base-rate effect in the standard 
group, and no effect in the equal-trial group. While Mackintosh was able to predict 
roughly equal rare and common choice probabilities in the equal-trial group, it was 
unable to simultaneously predict a strong effect in the standard group with the best 
fitting parameters. Overall, neither model clearly performed better than the other. 
Mackintosh provided better fits for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, while EXIT 
provided a better fit for Experiment 3.  
4.8.2 Differences in attention 
Although it has been claimed that EXIT and Mackintosh make similar 
predictions in regard to attention change (Kruschke, 2001b), the attention weights 
derived from the model fits clearly demonstrate that the models do differ in their 
specific predictions for attention to cues. EXIT predicts a greater difference in attention 
(both pre-shift and post-shift) between predictive and imperfect cues on rare trials than 
common trials, where this difference in pre-shift attention increases across training. 
Mackintosh instead predicts a greater difference in attention on common trials than rare 
trials, and this difference between common and rare trials decreases, with rare predictor 
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alphas catching up to common predictor alphas towards the end of training. Mackintosh 
can still predict an inverse base-rate effect in this case, because A will compete more 
effectively on common trials than rare trials, such that C may still have greater 
associative strength. It is worth noting that the summed error term used in this version 
of Mackintosh is critical for this prediction. The original version of Mackintosh without 
the summed error term would presumably fail to predict a rare bias where associability 
for B is greater than associability for C.   
For Experiment 2, EXIT predicted weaker differences in attention biases 
between common and rare trials in the balanced group than the standard group. This 
may result in a smaller associative strength advantage for rare predictors in the balanced 
group. Differences in attention to the context may also contribute to the outcome 
frequency effect, which will be discussed further below. Mackintosh instead predicted 
greater differences in attention biases between common and rare trials in the balanced 
group compared to the standard group. For Experiment 3, both models predicted little 
difference in the attention advantage for predictive cues on AB trials and AC trials.  
One noteworthy difference in the operation of the two models is that EXIT’s 
exemplar-mediated attention allows the imperfect predictor to receive different levels of 
attention when it is presented on common trials compared to when it is presented on 
rare trials. In the standard condition, attention to the imperfect cue was generally lower 
on rare trials than on common trials. This differs from Mackintosh, where α is stimulus-
specific. Therefore Mackintosh may allow greater interaction between AB and AC 
compounds than EXIT. Specifically, because AB trials are common, a decrease in α for 
imperfect predictor A on these trials will then benefit C on subsequent AC trials. 
Granted this may also occur in EXIT, but will be parameter specific; if exemplar 
specificity is high, and gain weight learning rate is low, then attention on AB trials will 
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have little influence on attention on AC trials. If exemplar specificity is low, and gain 
weight learning rate is high, then attention on AB trials might also influence attention 
on AC trials in a similar way to Mackintosh, with reductions in attention for A 
transferring across trial types. 
The models also differ in their predictions for accuracy on individual predictive 
cue test trials. EXIT consistently predicted better accuracy for C compared to B, 
whereas Mackintosh consistently predicted similar accuracy for B and C trials. Human 
choice on these trials appears far less consistent, although there are several reports of an 
inverse base-rate effect where accuracy for B exceeds that for C (Wills et al., 2014; 
Bohil, Markman, & Maddox, 2005; Kruschke, 1996; Medin & Edelson, 1988; Medin & 
Bettger, 1991; Shanks, 1992; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin, & Shanks, 2005). This 
result has previously been highlighted as problematic for the Mackintosh model (Wills 
et al., 2014), and the EXIT model (Winman, Wennerholm & Juslin, 2003; but see Wills 
et al., 2014). Kruschke (2003) has shown that EXIT is able to predict an inverse base-
rate effect when accuracy for B is greater than C, when the perfect predictor trials are 
weighted heavily in the model fit. It is unclear whether Mackintosh can still predict an 
effect in this situation. I did not attempt to address this here, as the accuracy difference 
between B and C is fairly inconsistent in human choice in the experiments reported in 
Chapter 3; there was significantly greater accuracy for B than C in only one experiment, 
and no significant difference in accuracy in the remaining two.   
4.8.3 Context learning 
The experiments in Chapter 3 have highlighted the potential role of context 
learning in the inverse base-rate effect, so the model predictions for attention to the 
context throughout training are of particular interest. Interestingly, Mackintosh 
predicted that attention to the context declined towards zero fairly rapidly, although it is 
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possible that learning about the context occurs very early, and in a way that influences 
subsequent learning about cues. Nevertheless, much of the following discussion will 
focus instead on the predictions of EXIT.  
In simulations of Experiment 2, outcome frequency did appear to influence post-
shift attention to the context. As expected, there was greater attention to the context on 
common trials than on rare trials in the standard group. This suggests that the context is 
a more useful predictor on common trials than rare trials in this condition. Compared to 
the standard group, the balanced group showed much weaker attention to the context on 
common trials, and stronger attention to the context on rare trials. On rare trials in the 
standard group, both the context and the imperfect predictor provide a strong prediction 
of the incorrect outcome, and so attention is directed away from these cues. In the 
balanced group, A predicts the incorrect outcome, but the context is uninformative, and 
therefore attention may not be as strongly biased away from the context on rare trials.  
In Experiment 3, there was greater attention to the context on common trials in 
both the standard and equal-trial groups. This is because even when trial-frequency is 
matched, the context is still a good predictor of the outcome on common trials. 
Although there were differences in post-shift attention to the context between trial 
types, learned (i.e. pre-shift) attention to the context did not differ for common and rare 
trials. One potential reason why pre-shift attention to the context on rare trials might be 
higher than post-shift attention is that the shift rate is much higher than the rate of 
learning in the best-fitting parameters for this experiment. In the discussion of Chapter 
3, it was suggested that learning about the context might overshadow learning about B 
on AB-O1 trials in the equal-trial group, which might then lead EXIT to predict a rare 
bias on BC trials. This does not match the simulation results found for Experiment 3, 
although the choice predictions that occur from differences in attention to the context 
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and the imperfect predictor shown in these simulations are sensible. It is still 
noteworthy that the best fitting parameters for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 were 
very different.  
4.8.4 Parameter specificity 
The best fitting parameters for EXIT appear to vary considerably between 
experiments. For example, attention capacity ranged from 4.88 in Experiment 3 to 16.34 
in Experiment 1, and the attention shift rate ranged from 4.21 in Experiment 3 to 17.29 
in Experiment 2. Kruschke (2001a) acknowledged the variability of parameters between 
experiments, but suggested that parameters may be situation specific, rather than 
universal.14 The parameters for Mackintosh were generally more consistent between 
experiments, especially theta and initial alphas for context. Initial alpha for cues were 
less consistent, varying between .14 and .6, and choice decisiveness varied between 
3.95 and 12.06. As noted above, if we assume a role of context learning, then the 
intuitive prediction from the principles of EXIT would suggest there should be a rare 
bias in the equal-trial group, which was not the case in Experiment 3, nor in the best fit 
of EXIT. The effects in different experiments may also be parameter specific. The best 
fitting parameters for EXIT did vary widely for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 (see 
Table 4.1), and it remains to be seen whether a single set of parameters can account for 
the results of both experiments, which were, after all, run under nearly identical 
conditions using the same general procedure and stimuli. These experiments were 
therefore fit simultaneously. The best fitting parameters are also shown in Table 4.1, 
which produced RMSE = 7.30 for EXIT and RMSE = 9.60 for Mackintosh. Overall, 
EXIT provided a better fit of the data than Mackintosh (ΔAIC = 13.52, ΔBIC = 10.60).  																																																								14	Given the overwhelming situational similarity across experiments, for instance in terms of the testing 
conditions, procedural parameters and sample characteristics, it seems hard to justify arguing that the 
parameters should be very different across experiments, especially given that they are assumed to reflect 
baseline states at the start of the experiment, not variables that shift in response to the procedure itself.	
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Figure 4.8. A comparison of model predictions with human choice for the conflicting 
trials types from Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 fit simultaneously.  
 
Unsurprisingly, these fits were poorer than those for each experiment individually. The 
model predictions are shown in Table 4.5, and for conflicting trials specifically in 
Figure 4.8. 
EXIT now predicts only a small quantitative difference between standard and 
balanced conditions of Experiment 2, and now also predicts a rare bias in the equal-trial 
group of Experiment 3. The model therefore has difficulty accommodating both effects 
simultaneously. Much like EXIT, Mackintosh also now erroneously predicts a rare bias 
in the equal-trial group. Thus, even though differences in parameters appear to have 
large effects on the model predictions, neither model convincingly accounts for the 
results of both experiments simultaneously with a single set of parameters.  
4.8.5 Conclusions 
Despite the clear relevance of the Mackintosh model to attentional explanations of the 
inverse base-rate effect, there has been some uncertainty regarding the model’s ability 
to predict the effect. This chapter has shown that a modified version of Mackintosh with 
a summed error term, and in which alpha is determined relative to the average 
prediction error for all cues, can predict the inverse base-rate effect, as well as 
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Table 4.5 
Outcome choice predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh when fitting Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 simultaneously.  
Trial 
EXIT    Mackintosh 
Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
Standard  Balanced Standard  Equal-trial Standard  Balanced Standard  Equal-trial 
C R C R C R C R C R C R C R  C R 
A 55.8 31.4  55.7 31.4  61.6 24.7  42.8 47.6  66.6 22.8  58.9 30.2  66.3 23.0  50.2 37.4 
BC 36.2 57.7  39.0 54.8  32.4 61.4  39.8 54.1  33.7 62.5  41.8 53.8  33.9 62.2  40.8 54.8 
ABC 51.3 46.2  55.0 42.6  52.1 45.1  42.9 55.7  49.4 50.1  59.9 39.5  49.6 49.8  39.2 60.2 
Novel 53.5 31.2  53.3 31.2  58.8 24.9  41.8 46.2  66.6 22.8  58.9 30.2  66.3 23.0  50.2 37.4 
B 82.8 5.1  83.1 5.2  81.1 5.6  80.2 6.4  98.6 0.1  98.5 0.1  98.6 0.1  97.7 0.2 
C 3.5 89.4  3.6 88.6  3.5 89.7  4.3 87.7  0.1 98.5  0.1 98.4  0.1 98.5  0.2 97.7 
AB 91.7 2.9  92.2 2.7  92.0 2.8  85.1 8.2  99.8 0.1  99.8 0.1  99.8 0.1  99.4 0.3 
AC 3.7 91.4  4.3 90.3  3.8 91.4  3.2 92.4  0.2 99.6  0.2 99.5  0.2 99.6  0.2 99.5 
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differences in the effect under balanced outcome conditions. In some cases, Mackintosh provided a 
better fit of the data than EXIT. In spite of the view that EXIT and Mackintosh operate in the same 
way, the model fits revealed differences in the predicted pattern of attention to cues. When the 
experiments are fit separately, most results from Chapter 3 can be accounted for by attentional 
theories, including the effects of outcome frequency and trial frequency. 
Despite some limitations in the models’ abilities to account for some aspects of the data, 
such as the difference between novel and imperfect trials, and the inability to predict the effects of 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 with a single set of parameters, the model comparisons reveal a 
very clear testable prediction regarding attention change. One model predicts that attention to B 
should be higher than attention to C. The other predicts that attention to C should be higher than to 
B. Specifically, Mackintosh makes the prediction that alpha for B will be at least as high, if not 
higher, than alpha for C at every point during training. The EXIT model makes the prediction that 
the attentional bias towards C over A should be much higher than the attentional bias towards B 
over A, as a product of greater attention to C than to B, and/or diminished attention to A on AC 
trials relative to AB trials. As this seemed like the clearest point of departure in the two models, 
Chapter 5 aimed to test these models by measuring attention biases in the inverse base-rate effect. 
To test the model predictions, Chapter 5 measured attention transfer via changes in cue 
associability, as well as fixation time to cues via eye tracking. Because the role of context learning 
may be a point of interest for both models in accounting for the effect when accuracy for B is 
greater than accuracy for C, these experiments also compared attention in the standard and balanced 
groups. 
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CHAPTER 5  
Attention biases in the inverse base-rate effect 
Chapter 3 did not reveal strong evidence for any particular inferential explanation of the 
inverse base-rate effect. Widespread use of elimination or novelty matching therefore 
seems unlikely. On the other hand, Chapter 4 demonstrates that attention-based 
associative models provide a reasonable (although not perfect) account of these effects 
and can explain differences between the standard and balanced conditions from 
Experiment 2 based on the involvement of context learning. In an associative model, 
learning about the context is the primary mechanism for tracking overall base-rates 
irrespective of the predictive cues that are presented. The previous chapters have 
highlighted context learning as a potential explanation for choice of the rare outcome on 
conflicting trials when common responses to B alone are greater than rare responses to 
C alone (Le Pelley et al., 2016). It therefore seems like the most constructive way to 
make further progress is to assume that the effect is associative to a large degree, and 
that trade-offs in learning about the context versus learning about cues plays an 
important role in how the effect develops. Assuming then that these associative 
explanations are still the most plausible unified accounts of the effect, the next sensible 
step is to rigorously test one of the predictions on which they consistently diverge, 
namely whether attention is more strongly weighted in favour of B or C. The aim of this 
chapter was therefore to test these predictions. Although the predictions for attention to 
B versus C appear to be consistent across conditions in Chapter 3, this chapter will 
specifically focus on the predictions made for attention in the standard and balanced 
groups, which allows a test of the influence of context learning on attention to 
predictive cues.  
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 5.1 Predictions from EXIT and Mackintosh 
In Chapter 4, the EXIT model predicted greater attention to cue C on rare AC 
trials than to cue B on common AB trials, whereas Mackintosh predicted greater 
attention to B on AB trials than to C on AC trials at all points during training. EXIT 
predicted that the bias in learned attention to cues increased over training, and appears 
to reflect a learned shift away from the imperfect predictors, as well as smaller 
differences in learned attention towards the perfect predictors. Mackintosh instead 
predicts that attention towards the predictive cues is gradually learned, such that alpha 
for C catches up to that for B over training.  
The two models also account for differences between groups in different ways. 
In EXIT, the bias for C over B was greater in the standard group than the balanced 
group, while in Mackintosh, the bias in B over C was slightly stronger in the balanced 
group than the standard group, although this difference is only subtle. EXIT also 
predicted differences in attention to the context between the standard and balanced 
groups. In the standard group, there was greater attention to the context on common 
trials than rare trials, which is a consequence of the context being a more useful 
predictor on common trials. This bias to context on common trials was much weaker in 
the balanced group than the standard group.  
EXIT and Mackintosh therefore make different ordinal predictions about relative 
attention to cues, how those attention differences change across training, and how 
attention biases differ based on global outcome frequency. These predictions are readily 
testable through measures of attention in learning.  
5.2 Measuring attention 
There are several techniques for measuring attention in learning. The methods 
outlined here are those used in the following experiments. There are of course other 
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ways in which attention may be measured; for instance, ERP correlates of selective 
attention (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey, 2014), or 
the dot-probe task (e.g., Le Pelley, Vadillo & Luque, 2013). 
5.2.1 Attention transfer 
In Mackintosh (1975), attention is defined as the associability of a cue, such that 
greater attention to a cue increases the rate at which that cue is learned about in new 
associations. In EXIT, attention is defined as multipliers on cue activations in such a 
way that attention affects responding as well as associability on a given trial (Kruschke, 
2001a; Kruschke, Kappenman, Hetrick, 2005). Yet, EXIT also assumes that attention 
distributions are learned, and carry forward on future trials, such that enduring attention 
biases to cues will influence future learning in a similar way.15 This learned attention 
distribution is best reflected by the pre-decision attention biases shown in Figure 4.3 
(Panels A and B). 
Both models assume that learning occurs faster when a stimulus is attended than 
when it is ignored, and therefore measuring attention transfer, or differences in 
associability of cues in new learning can provide a test of the model predictions. 
Transfer of associability has been the most widely used index of attentional change in 
learned predictiveness research, where previously predictive cues are learned about 
more readily than previously non-predictive cues (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Le 
Pelley et al., 2011; Livesey, Thorwart, De Fina & Harris, 2011; Don & Livesey, 2015).  
Attention transfer has been measured in different ways. In some studies, cues are 
paired with a novel outcome in a new training phase, and the rate of learning for cues 
that have previously experienced different training histories are compared (e.g., 																																																								15	Earlier versions of the model, for instance ADIT (Kruschke, 1996) did not have this learning of the 
attention settings and still predicted the inverse base-rate effect. However, without this feature, the model 
performs poorly in predicting relative difficulty of training trials and cannot explain transfer effects such 
as those reported by Kruschke (2005).	
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Kruschke, 2005). Other studies have paired combinations of cues that have experienced 
different training histories with a novel outcome, and learning for those cues is assessed 
in a separate test phase (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). The idea is that these cues 
will compete for associative strength with the novel outcome, and the cue with greater 
associability or attention will be more strongly associated with the new outcome. 
Importantly, in the second training phase, all cues are equally predictive of their 
respective outcomes, such that any biases in learning for these cues can be attributed to 
prior training history, and not generalisation of cue-outcome associations from the first 
phase.  
In a highlighting study, Kruschke (2005) demonstrated transfer of attention to 
cues that previously predicted the late outcome in a new training phase. The design of 
this study is shown in Table 5.1. In an initial training phase, AB-O1 and DE-O3 trials 
were learned prior to the addition of AC-O2 and DF-O4 trials. After a test phase, an 
additional learning phase was included that paired some new and some old 
combinations of cues with novel outcomes, where the imperfect predictor was now 
predictive of the outcome. In an “easy” group, the imperfect predictor was paired with 
the early outcome predictor (e.g., AB-O3, AE-O3). In a “hard” group, the imperfect 
predictor was paired with the late outcome predictor (e.g., AC-O3, AF-O3). Overall, 
training accuracy was poorer in the hard group than in the easy group. This negative 
transfer effect was taken as evidence of continued attention to the late predictor, which 
would impair learning about the new predictive cue (e.g., A), and therefore provides an 
indirect test of the difference in attention for C vs. B.  
However there are some limitations in the design of this study. The primary 
issue is that it reuses some familiar compounds from Phase 1 in the new training phase, 
and it doesn’t balance the outcomes orthogonally between Phase 1 and Phase 2.  
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Table 5.1 
Design of Kruschke’s (2005) highlighting attention transfer study. 
TRAINING PHASE 1 TEST TRAINING PHASE 2 
Early Late  “Easy” group “Hard” group 
AB – O1 AB – O1 A, D AB – O3 AC – O3 
 AC – O2 BC, EF AE – O3 AF – O3 
DE – O3 DE – O3  DB – O4 DC – O4 
 DF – O4  DE – O4 DF – O4 
 
This could introduce some element of outcome equivalence, in which participants 
assume that new AC trials are similar to previous AC trials, and new AB trials are 
similar to previous AB trials. That is, because AB-O1 is followed by AB-O3 in the easy 
group (or AC-O2 is followed by AC-O3 in the hard group), participants might assume 
that O3 is like O1 (or O3 is like O2). Given the difference in familiarity, it might well 
be the case that outcome equivalence is stronger for the early compounds (AB) than the 
late compounds (AC). The results might therefore be a result of generalisation across 
trials or phases, rather than differences in attention to cues. Although the outcomes in 
the new training phase were novel, Kruschke did not report whether the additional 
training phase also involved a change in context. The absence of a context change may 
facilitate assumptions of outcome equivalence. 
Moreover, attention biases in highlighting might differ from those in the inverse 
base-rate effect. Although these effects are often referred to interchangeably, and are 
assumed to arise via similar mechanisms, the structures of the tasks in which these 
effects occur differ in potentially important ways. In highlighting, AB-O1 trials are 
learned before the introduction of AC-O2 trials. In the inverse base-rate effect, AB-O1 
and AC-O2 trials are experienced concurrently. It could be the case that biases towards 
C over A may be stronger in the former case, where A is firmly established as predictive 
	 133	
of O1 before AC trials are encountered, than in the latter case, where A is experienced 
as an imperfect predictor early in training.  
5.2.3 Eye gaze 
It makes intuitive sense that attention will be correlated with where one is 
looking, and that people will spend longer looking at cues they have learned to attend to 
compared to cues they have learned to ignore. Although it is possible to make covert 
shifts of attention without accompanying eye movements, attention and eye gaze are 
generally closely related (Posner, 1980). This measure has been successfully used as an 
index of visual attention in associative learning tasks, with several studies showing that 
learning influences overt attention as measured by eye gaze (Le Pelley, Beesley & 
Griffiths, 2011; Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson & Le Pelley, 
2011; Thorwart, Livesey, Wilhelm, Liu & Lachnit, 2017) 
Kruschke, Kappenman and Hetrick (2005) measured gaze duration to cues in a 
highlighting task. They found greater fixation time on cue C on BC test trials, and a 
greater bias in gaze to the predictive cue on AC trials than AB trials at test. Thus, it 
might be tempting to assume that this provides clear evidence in favour of EXIT’s 
predictions for attention. Yet, differences in attention to cues across training were not 
reported, and again, it is unknown whether base-rate differences when all trials are 
experienced at each stage of training will result in the same differences in attention as 
when cues are trained in a staged manner in highlighting. Wills et al. (2014) also found 
greater ERP correlates of selective attention for C than for B when they were presented 
individually at test. In potentially conflicting findings, a recent fMRI study found that 
cue B was processed to a greater extent than cue C on conflicting trials where the rare 
outcome was chosen (O’Bryan, Worthy, Livesey & Davis, 2017). Therefore there are 
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inconsistent results regarding which cue is processed to a greater extent on BC trials at 
test.  
5.3 Chapter aims 
This series of experiments therefore aimed to test the predictions of Mackintosh 
and EXIT using attention transfer and eye tracking measures of overt attention. 
Experiment 5 aimed to replicate the effect of outcome frequency on the inverse base-
rate effect, using the same task conditions required for the subsequent experiments. 
Experiment 6 assessed relative differences in the associability of common and rare 
predictors in the inverse base-rate effect in a way that addresses the limitations of 
Kruschke’s (2005) design. Using a similar design to that used to assess the learned 
predictiveness effect (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003), this experiment included a new 
training phase that paired a previously common predictor (B) with a previously rare 
predictor (C), followed by a novel outcome in a novel context. If, for example, greater 
attention is paid to rare predictors than common predictors throughout base-rate 
training, then rare predictors should be more strongly associated with the novel 
outcomes than the common predictors.  
Although neither model specifies the way in which attention will translate to 
overall eye gaze, the models at least make different ordinal predictions in terms of 
which cues should experience greater attention. Experiment 7 therefore used eye 
tracking to measure fixation times to cues across training. This will provide an 
indication of how attention to cues changes throughout training when all relevant trials 
are trained concurrently, and also to determine the influence of outcome frequency on 
overt attention.  
5.4 Experiment 5 
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Experiment 5 simply aimed to replicate the effect of outcome frequency on the 
inverse base-rate effect in an allergist task, which is a widely used learning paradigm 
that has proven very useful for studying attentional transfer in the learned predictiveness 
effect (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Don & Livesey, 2015; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 
2015). In the allergist task, participants assume the role of a doctor whose task is to 
determine which foods are causing which allergic reactions in fictitious patients. The 
allergist task enables a clearer and more intuitive change in context for the transfer 
phase used in Experiment 6 than the medical decision making task that is often used in 
these studies. In the medical decision making task, each trial shows the symptoms of a 
different patient. Here, it would be reasonable for participants to assume that the same 
symptoms are indicative of the same underlying cause, regardless of a change in 
context. In the allergist task, each phase of training can be presented as a different 
patient with different kinds of allergic reactions, and there is no reason to assume that 
the second patient would be allergic to the same foods as the first patient. This would 
allow a better assessment of changes in attention based on prior learning, rather than 
reasoning about causes between phases.  
In the standard group, each outcome was either always paired with a common 
compound, or always paired with a rare compound. In the balanced group, each 
outcome was paired with a common and a rare compound, such that each outcome 
would be experienced at an equal rate across the entire experiment (see Table 5.2). The 
context strongly predicts the common outcome in the standard condition, but does not 
provide a strong prediction of either outcome in the balanced condition. In Chapter 3, 
there was a reduction in the inverse base-rate effect in the balanced condition when four 
outcomes were included in the training phase. The inclusion of the balanced condition 
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in Experiment 2 was important because it demonstrated the importance of global 
outcome frequency in producing the inverse base-rate effect. 
Subsequent experiments in this series use only two outcomes during initial base-
rate training. To determine whether this affects the strength of the effect, we compared a 
version of the task with two outcomes (Experiment 5A) and four outcomes (Experiment 
5B). We predicted that the balanced condition would show a weaker inverse base-rate 
effect than the standard condition.   
 
Table 5.2. 
Experimental design used in Experiment 5A, Experiment 5B, and Experiment 7 
TRAINING      
Experiment Group Base-
rate 
Trials    
5A Standard 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O1  JK – O1 
  1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O2 JL – O2 
 Balanced 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O1 JK – O2 
  1 AC  – O2 DF – O1 GI – O2 JL – O1 
5B Standard 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JK – O3 
  1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JL – O4 
 Balanced 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O3 JK – O4 
  1 AC  – O2 DF – O1 GI – O4 JL – O3 
TEST       
 Trial type  Trials    
 Imperfect  A D G J 
 Conflicting  BC EF HI KL 
 Combined   ABC DEF GHI JKL 
 Common predictor  B E H K 
 Rare predictor  C F I L 
 Trained common  AB DE GH JK 
 Trained rare  AC DF GI JL 
Note: Experiment 5A and Experiment 7 had two outcomes during training, whereas 
Experiment 5B had four outcomes. The designs of the standard and balanced groups are 
otherwise identical.  
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5.4.1 Method 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
 
One hundred and seven undergraduates from the University of Sydney 
participated in Experiment 5 in return for partial course credit. One participant in 
Experiment 5A did not meet the training criterion and was excluded from the analyses. 
All participants met the training criterion in Experiment 5B. This left 53 participants in 
both the two-outcome (39 female, mean age = 18.9 years, SD = 1.52) and four-outcome 
(43 female, mean age = 20.43, SD = 6.20) version of the task, randomly allocated to the 
standard (n = 26) and balanced (n = 27) conditions in both Experiment 5A and 5B.  
5.4.1.2 Design 
The experimental design is shown in Table 5.2. In both conditions, common 
compounds occurred three times as often as rare compounds, such that there was a 3:1 
trial base-rate of overlapping compounds (e.g., 3 x AB – O1 / 1 x AC – O2). In the 
standard condition, outcomes were either always paired with a common compound, or 
always paired with a rare compound. In the balanced condition, each outcome was 
paired with both common and rare compounds. Therefore in the standard condition the 
base-rates of trials and outcomes are both 3:1, whereas in the balanced condition the 
base-rate of the trials is 3:1, but the base-rate of the outcomes is 1:1. There were two 
available outcomes in Experiment 5A, and four available outcomes in Experiment 5B.  
5.4.1.3 Apparatus and Stimuli  
The experiment was programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Kleiner, 
Brainard & Pelli, 2007) and was presented using Apple Mac Mini computers attached to 
17 inch displays. Experimental stimuli included 300 x 300 pixel images of Coffee, Fish, 
Lemon, Cheese, Eggs, Garlic, Bread, Peanuts, Avocado, Banana, Bacon, Peas, Apple, 
Mushrooms, Strawberries, Broccoli, Cherries, Butter, Olive Oil, Chocolate, Carrots, 
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Peach, Milk, and Prawns, with accompanying labels in blue text. Allergic reaction 
outcomes were Headache, Nausea, Rash and Fever. Foods and allergic reactions were 
randomly allocated to cues A-L and outcomes 1-2, or 1-4, respectively. Stimuli were 
presented on a white background.  
5.4.1.4 Procedure 
The allergist task was conducted as described in Chapter 2. Participants in 
Experiment 5A had the choice of two outcomes, while participants in Experiment 5B 
had the choice of four outcomes.  
5.4.2 Results 
5.4.2.1 Training 
Training accuracy, which is displayed in Figure 5.1, was analysed separately for 
Experiment 5A and 5B, as the chance guessing rate differed (.5 in Experiment 5A and 
.25 in Experiment 5B). A 2 x (2) x (7) mixed measures ANOVA was run with group 
(standard vs. balanced) as a between-subjects factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) 
and block (1-7) as within-subjects factors for each experiment.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Training accuracy in a) Experiment 5A and b) Experiment 5B for all trial 
types. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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Both analyses revealed a significant main effect of block, indicating an increase 
in accuracy across training, lowest F(6,306) = 139.96, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .733. Although in 
both experiments accuracy was greater for common trials than rare trials overall, lowest 
F(1,51) = 82.11, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .617, there was a significant interaction between block 
and trial type, such that the common trials were learned faster than the rare trials, lowest 
F(6,306) = 19.78, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .279. In Experiment 5B, there was also a significant 
main effect of group, F(1,51) = 9.63, p = .003, 𝜂!!  = .159, and a significant interaction 
between group and block, F(6,306) = 2.26, p = .038, 𝜂!!  = .042, indicating faster 
learning overall in the standard group. This appears to be driven by faster learning for 
the rare trials in the standard group, as the difference in accuracy between common and 
rare trials was greater for the balanced group, F(1,51) = 14.41, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .220.   
5.4.2.2 Test 
The test phase included all trial types presented in Table 5.2 (see Table 5.3 for 
choice responses and confidence ratings for all trial types), but the analyses focused on 
the three critical test trials, including the imperfect (A), conflicting (BC), and combined 
(ABC) test trials. Choice proportions for these trials are shown in Figure 5.2. There 
were no significant differences in choice responses for any of the critical trial types 
between experiments 5A and 5B, and therefore analyses of the test phase were 
collapsed across all participants.  
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Figure 5.2. Proportion of relevant rare responses on imperfect, conflicting and 
combined transfer trials in the standard and balanced groups. Values above .5 indicate 
more frequent choice of the rare outcome, values below .5 indicate more frequent 
choice of the common outcome. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Table 5.3 
Choice responses and confidence ratings for all test trials in Experiment 5 
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Other  Confidence 
Imperfect Standard .817 .144 .038 58.09 
A, D, G, J Balanced .677 .300 .023 51.00 
 
Conflicting Standard .303 .697 0 65.15 
BC, EF, HI, KL Balanced .432 .559 .009 58.35 
 
Combined Standard .418 .582 0 58.05 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Balanced .632 .368 0 57.84 
 
Common predictor Standard .981 .014 .005 74.74 
B, E, H, K Balanced .945 .036 .018 72.77 
 
Rare predictor Standard .053 .938 .010 73.44 
C, F, I, L Balanced .059 .932 .009 69.73 
 
Trained Common Standard .995 .005 0 94.78 
AB, DE, GH, JK Balanced 1 0 0 94.19 
 
Trained Rare Standard .005 .990 .005 87.35 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Balanced .082 .918 .000 83.32 
Imperfect Conflicting Combined
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There was a significant inverse base-rate effect, with greater choice of the rare 
outcome on conflicting trials, in both the standard, t(51) = 4.58, p < .001, d = 0.63, and 
balanced groups, t(53) = 2.12, p = .039, d = 0.29. The standard group showed 
significantly stronger rare-biased responding on conflicting trials than the balanced 
group, t(104) = 2.42, p = .017, d = 0.47. 
Responding was significantly common-biased on imperfect trials in the standard 
group, t(51) = 12.76, p < .001, d = 1.77, and the balanced group, t(53) = 6.0, p < .001, d 
= 0.82. The balanced group showed significantly stronger common-biased responding 
on the imperfect (A) trials, t(104) = 3.69, p < .001, d = 0.72. 
The groups also differed significantly on combined (ABC) trials, t(104) = 3.68, 
p < .001, d = 0.71. Choice for the combined trials was unbiased in the standard group 
t(51) = 1.74, p = .088, d = 0.24, but was significantly common-biased in the balanced 
group t(53) = 3.97, p < .001, d = 0.54.  
A 2 x (2) ANOVA compared accuracy for the common and rare predictors, 
including group as a between subjects factor. Accuracy was slightly greater for perfect 
common predictors (mean = .97, SD = .08) than for perfect rare predictors, (mean = .95, 
SD = .14), however this difference did not quite reach significance, F(1,104) = 3.82, p = 
.053, 𝜂!!  = .035. There were also no main effects or interactions with group, Fs < 1.  
5.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5 replicated the effect of outcome frequency on the inverse base-rate 
effect observed in Experiment 2. The bias towards choosing the rare outcome on 
conflicting trials was significantly reduced in the balanced condition, where each 
outcome was experienced at an equal rate, compared to the standard condition, where 
there was a difference in the overall frequency of each outcome. However, the effect 
was not completely removed in the balanced group, which showed a small but 
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significant inverse base-rate effect. This is also the first demonstration, to my 
knowledge, of the inverse base-rate effect using the food allergist task. As there were no 
differences in the proportion of rare responses to each of the critical transfer trial types 
between the two- and four-outcome versions of the task, the two-outcome version will 
subsequently be used for base-rate training.  
5.5 Experiment 6 
To test the predictions from EXIT (Kruschke, 2001a; 2001b) and Mackintosh 
(1975) in Chapter 4, Experiment 6 compared the associability of common and rare 
predictors in the standard and balanced groups. Mackintosh predicted higher alphas for 
the common predictor than the rare predictor at all stages, but this difference decreased 
as training progressed. This attention bias also appears to be slightly greater in the 
balanced group than the standard group. Conversely, EXIT predicted a greater bias in 
attention to the predictive cue on rare trials than on common trials, and this difference 
increased over training. These biases were also stronger in the standard group than the 
balanced group.  
The cues that receive greater attention during base-rate training should be 
learned about more readily in a new learning phase. The design of the experiment is 
shown in Table 5.4. In Phase 1, participants were trained with either the standard or 
balanced design as in Experiment 5A. Then, in Phase 2, all participants completed a 
second training phase in which they were presented with new compounds comprising 
one previously rare predictor and one previously common predictor, paired with a novel 
outcome, in a novel context. Importantly, in this new learning phase, all compounds 
were trained in equal base-rates, and each cue was equally predictive of its respective 
outcome. Thus, any differences in learning about cue-outcome associations in phase 2 
would be attributable to changes in their associability as a result of previous base-rate 
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training. It is worth noting that this design does not include the typical test phase to 
assess the inverse base-rate effect. Kruschke et al. (2005) included test trials before the 
transfer phase, however this could potentially disrupt the transfer of associability 
between phases. Instead, learning in Phase 2 was tested using two different kinds of test 
trial, including summation and negation compounds to provide converging evidence of 
associability biases (e.g., Livesey et al. 2011). On summation trials (e.g., BE), two cues 
of the same type in Phase 1 (e.g., previously common predictors) that were paired with 
the same outcome in Phase 2 were presented together. Thus the critical comparison is 
prediction accuracy for the summation compounds composed of previously common 
predictors compared to the compounds composed of previously rare predictors. On 
negation trials (e.g., BC), two cues of different types in Phase 1 (e.g., one previously 
common predictor, one previously rare predictor) that were paired with different 
outcomes in Phase 2 were presented together. The critical comparison here is the 
proportion of choice of the outcome that was paired with the previously common 
predictor compared to choice of the outcome that was paired with the previously rare 
predictor. Note that these negation trials are the same as the conflicting trials, but here 
they do not provide a test of the inverse base-rate effect, but assess learning of the 
contingencies with the new outcomes in Phase 2. If there is a significant attention bias 
to rare cues in Phase 1 which influences associability in Phase 2, then participants 
should have greater accuracy on the rare summation trials than common summation 
trials, and show a greater proportion of choice of the outcome paired with the previously 
rare predictor in the negation trials.  
To determine whether associability increases or decreases across training, there 
were two training length conditions, where participants either received seven blocks of 
training in Phase 1 (Experiment 6A), or a shorter training phase with only three blocks 
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of training (Experiment 6B). As it was unclear whether the inverse base-rate effect 
occurs after this short amount of training, and whether differences between groups are 
also present at this stage, a version of Experiment 5 was run with only three blocks of 
training (see Appendix C). This found that the difference in the effect between standard 
and balanced conditions was still substantial, with a strong inverse base-rate effect in 
the standard group only.  
Mackintosh predicts better learning about the previously common predictors 
than the previously rare predictors in Phase 2. This transfer effect should also be greater 
after three blocks of training than after seven blocks of training in Phase 1, and greater 
transfer in the balanced group than the standard group. EXIT predicts the opposite 
effects, with better learning for the rare predictors than common predictors in Phase 2, a 
greater transfer effect after seven blocks of training than three blocks, and in the 
standard group than the balanced group. Due to the exemplar specificity of EXIT, 
transfer effects may be highly parameter specific. For instance, if exemplar specificity is 
high (that is, if learned attention is highly specific to the particular cue combination), 
there may be little attention transfer into Phase 2. If exemplar specificity is low, then 
transfer should occur provided the trials in Phase 1 and Phase 2 share cues in common.  
5.5.1 Method 
5.5.1.1 Participants 
One hundred and ten first-year psychology students at the University of Sydney 
participated in return for partial course credit. One participant was excluded for not 
reaching the training criterion during Phase 1. This left 109 participants (70 female, 
mean age = 19.4, SD = 3.2) randomly allocated to 7-block standard (n = 27), 7-block 
balanced (n = 27), 3-block standard (n = 27), and 3-block balanced (n = 28). 	
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Table 5.4. 
Experimental design used in Experiment 6 
TRAINING PHASE 1 
Group Base-rate Trials    
Standard 3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O1 JK – O1 
 1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O2 JL – O2 
Balanced 3 AB – O1 DE – O2 GH – O1 JK – O2 
 1 AC  – O2 DF – O1 GI – O2 JL – O1 
TRAINING PHASE 2 
 1 BI - O3 CH - O4 EL - O3 FK - O4 
TEST PHASE      
Trial type  Trials    
Summation  BE HK CF IL 
Negation  BC EF HI LK 
Note: Letters refer to individual food cues, O1-O4 refer to different allergic reaction 
outcomes.  
 
5.5.1.2 Design 
The design is shown in Table 5.4. In Phase 1, participants received either 
standard or balanced base-rate training, as in Experiment 5A. In Phase 2, new 
compounds comprising one previously common predictor, and one previously rare 
predictor were paired with one of two novel outcomes, e.g., BI – O3. The test phase 
assessed learning of the contingencies in Phase 2 using the summation and negation test 
trials described above.   
5.5.1.3 Apparatus and Stimuli  
Apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 5.  
5.5.1.4 Procedure 
Phase 1 was identical to the training phase in Experiment 5, with the exception 
of training length. Two versions of the experiment were run consecutively. In 
Experiment 6A, there were seven blocks of training, and in Experiment 6B there were 
three blocks of training. In Phase 1, participants predicted allergic reaction outcomes for 
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their patient, Mr X. At the beginning of Phase 2, participants were instructed that they 
would now see a new patient, Miss Y, and were to continue predicting which foods 
would lead to which allergic reaction. They were informed that Miss Y ate many of the 
same foods as Mr X, but suffered from different allergic reactions. The Phase 2 
compounds contained one previously common predictor, and one previously rare 
predictor from Phase 1, and each compound was paired with one of two novel 
outcomes. Trials continued in a similar manner as Phase 1, however each cue compound 
was presented at an equal rate, and each cue was equally predictive of the outcome with 
which it was paired. There were three blocks of Phase 2 training in all groups. Each cue 
compound was presented twice per block, with counterbalanced cue position on the 
screen. In the test phase, participants were asked to predict which allergic reaction Miss 
Y was most likely to suffer from, given the presented foods, and to rate their 
confidence. The test phase proceeded in a similar manner to Experiment 5, but included 
the summation and negation test trials previously described to assess Phase 2 learning.  
5.5.2 Results 
5.5.2.1 Training Phase 1 
Experiment 6A.  Training data are presented in Figure 5.3. For analysis of Phase 
1, a 2 x (2) x (7) mixed-measures ANOVA was run with group (standard vs. balanced) 
as the between subjects factor and trial type (common trials vs. rare trials) and block (1-
7) as within-subjects factors. This revealed a main effect of block, F(6,312) = 147.46, p 
< .001, 𝜂!!  = .739, trial type, F(1,52) = 95.38, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .647, and group F(1,52) = 
4.43, p = .04, 𝜂!!  = .078. There was also an interaction between block and trial type, 
such that common trials were learned faster than rare trials, but accuracy on the 
different trial types converged later in training, F(6,312) = 30.28, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .368. 
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Experiment 6B. Experiment 6B showed a similar pattern of results to 
Experiment 6A. There was a main effect of block, F(2,106) = 166.91, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = 
.759, trial type, F(1,53) = 77.87, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .595, and group, F(1,53) = 23.86, p < 
.001, 𝜂!!  = .31, and an interaction between block and trial type, F(2,106) = 6.33, p = 
.003, 𝜂!!  = .107. Additionally, there was a trial type x group interaction, where the 
difference in accuracy for common and rare trials was greater in the balanced than 
standard group, F(1,53) = 24.36, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .315. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Accuracy in training phase 1 of a) Experiment 6A and b) Experiment 6B, 
and c) phase 2 for all participants. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.  
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5.5.2.2 Training Phase 2 
To assess the influence of training length on subsequent learning, accuracy in 
Phase 2 learning was analysed for Experiment 6A and 6B together. A 2 x 2 x (3) mixed 
measures ANOVA was run with training length and group as between subject factors, 
and block as a within subjects factor, which showed a main effect of block, F(2,210) = 
130.33, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .554. There was a significant effect of group, F(1,105) = 4.01, p 
= .048, 𝜂!! = .037, with overall accuracy greater in the standard group. There was also 
an interaction between block and training length F(2,210) = 3.11, p = .047, 𝜂!! = .029, 
suggesting a greater rate of learning in the 3 block than 7 block group, although there 
were no differences between these groups in the final block of training, F < 1.  
5.5.2.3 Test 
Summation trials. Accuracy on summation trials is shown in Figure 5.4A. A 2 x 
2 x (2) ANOVA with training length and group as a between subjects factors, and cue 
type (previously common vs. rare predictors) as a within subjects factor revealed a 
significant main effect of cue type, such that overall, participants were more accurate 
for cue compounds comprising previously rare predictors, F(1,105) = 11.43, p = .001, 𝜂!! = .098. There was no main effect of training length, F < 1. However there was a 
significant interaction between cue type and training length, F(1,105) = 4.65, p = .033, 𝜂!! = .042, indicating that this benefit for rare over common predictors was stronger 
after three blocks of training than after seven blocks.  Two separate ANOVAs for each 
training length group showed a significant effect of cue type after three blocks, F(1,54) 
= 14.45, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .214, but not after seven blocks of training, F < 1. Interestingly, 
there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,105) = 1.03, p = .312, 𝜂!! = .01 and no 
interaction between cue and group F < 1, nor were there any significant main effects or 
interactions with group in either training length condition when analysed separately, 
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highest F(1,53) = 1.13, p = .292, 𝜂!! =.021. These results suggest that the effects of cue 
type were not significantly stronger in the standard group than the balanced group.  
Negation. The proportion of choice of each outcome is shown in Figure 5.4B. 
As these proportions are complementary, analyses focused on the proportion of choice 
of the outcome paired with the previously rare predictor. Overall, participants’ choices 
were significantly biased towards the outcome paired with the previously rare predictor 
(i.e. rare-predictor choice proportion was greater than .5), t(108) = 4.18, p < .001, d = 
0.40. There were no significant main effects of training length, F(1,105) = 2.39, p = 
.125, 𝜂!! = .022, or group, F(1,105) = 1.63, p = .205, 𝜂!! = .015, or interaction between 
training length and group, F < 1. Although there was no significant effect of training 
length condition, based on the significant interaction in the summation results, the effect 
was analysed separately for each group. There were no significant group differences in 
either training condition, Fs < 1. There was a significant bias towards the rare predictor 
in the 3 block group, t(54) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 0.55, but this bias did not reach 
significance in the 7 block group, t(53) = 1.88, p = .066, d = .25. Confidence ratings on 
summation and negation trials are shown in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5 
Confidence ratings for summation and negation trials in Experiment 6.  
  Summation trials  
Group  Common Rare Negation trials 
Standard 3-block 66.16 77.73 67.62 
 7-block 44.58 56.39 60.49 
Balanced 3-block 54.27 68.41 62.13 
 7-block 39.61 40.49 51.26 
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Figure 5.4. A) Accuracy in recalling the correct outcome paired with previously 
common and previously rare predictors in each group. B) Choice of the outcome paired 
with the previously common or previously rare predictor in each group (note that 
common and rare choice proportions on negation trials are complementary and thus sum 
to 1). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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5.5.3 Discussion 
Experiment 6 demonstrates greater associability for rare predictors than common 
predictors overall. Accuracy was better on summation test trials comprising previously 
rare predictors compared to those comprising previously common predictors. On 
negation trials, there was a significant bias in choice favouring the outcome paired with 
the previously rare predictor over the outcome paired with the previously common 
predictor. These findings suggest that participants pay greater attention to rare 
predictors during training, which facilitates subsequent learning about those cues. This 
benefit in associability for rare predictors provides support for the predictions of the 
EXIT model over those of the Mackintosh model. 
Although the bias for rare predictors appeared to be weaker in the balanced 
group than the standard group in several conditions, this difference did not reach 
significance. There was an effect of training length on associability effects as measured 
by the summation test trials. The advantage for previously rare predictors was greater 
following three blocks of training than following seven blocks of training. Although this 
effect was not significant in the negation trials, outcome choice followed a similar 
numerical pattern, and neither group showed a significant effect after seven blocks. This 
decrease in the associability advantage for rare predictors is not consistent with EXIT’s 
predictions for changes in learned attention across training. Although Mackintosh 
predicted a weaker difference in associability after seven blocks, this was specifically a 
decrease in an early advantage for the common predictor, rather than a decrease in the 
advantage for the rare predictor, and therefore this result is also not completely 
consistent with this model. A potential explanation for this result will be addressed in 
the General Discussion of this chapter.  
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It should also be noted that although these results suggest little benefit for rare 
predictors after seven blocks of training, the inverse base-rate effect is reliably 
demonstrated following training of this length or greater. This general finding is not 
necessarily incompatible with the results of the current experiment because attention 
biases early in training may be sufficient to develop stronger learning for the rare 
predictor, which might be maintained throughout extended training even if the 
attentional bias itself is not. Studies that have reversed or altered the base-rates of 
contingencies throughout training tend to show a preference for the early rare over the 
early common outcome on conflicting trials, indicating the importance of early relative 
frequencies for the effect (Medin & Bettger, 1991; Kruschke, 2009). In any case, the 
fact that Mackintosh predicts the inverse base-rate effect even though it produces 
stronger associability for B than for C demonstrates that higher relative attention for C 
is not necessary for there to be stronger learning about C than for B. Overall, this 
experiment provides further evidence for attention biases towards the rare predictor 
when AB and AC trials are trained simultaneously, consistent with the EXIT model. 
However changes in attention during early and late training, as measured by attention 
transfer, were not completely consistent with either model.  
5.6 Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 used eye tracking to determine whether there are differences in 
overt attention biases between the standard and balanced groups at training or at test, 
and to investigate changes in attention biases throughout training. This experiment used 
the same design as Experiment 5A. 
A key distinguishing feature of EXIT compared to other prediction-error 
models, such as Mackintosh (1975), is the assumption of rapid attention shifting that is 
proportional to prediction error and influences responding as well as future learning. 
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EXIT makes clear predictions about attention shifts after an incorrect prediction. That 
is, attention is driven towards the cue that is most likely to reduce future error within the 
trial. Part of this attention shift is learned, such that the new attention distribution is 
applied when a similar stimulus is encountered. Due to this distinction, measures of 
fixation time were divided into two time periods; fixation time from the onset of cues 
until a response is made, which should reflect the learned pre-shift attention to cues in 
Figure 4.3 (panels A and B), and fixation time after making a response, during 
corrective feedback, which should reflect post-shift attention illustrated in Figure 4.3. It 
is possible that overt gaze at this stage of the trial will reflect the end-state of attention 
(as in panels C and D), or the amount of change in attention from pre-shift to end-state 
post-shift attention (as in panels E & F).  
Participants completed either the standard or balanced version of base-rate 
training, followed by the typical inverse base-rate effect transfer test trials (see Table 
5.2). Kruschke et al. (2005) reported greater overall fixation time to cue C on BC trials, 
whereas O’Bryan et al (2017) reported greater processing of cue B on BC trials when 
the rare outcome was chosen in an fMRI study. In order to resolve these potentially 
discrepant findings, we also measured fixation time to cues at test according to outcome 
choice.  Assuming eye gaze is a good reflection of attention to cues, EXIT predicts 
greater pre-decision attention to cue C on AC trials than to cue B on AB trials. This bias 
should be greater in the standard group than in the balanced group, and should increase 
over training. During feedback, there should also be a stronger bias in gaze towards the 
predictive cue on rare trials than common trials, which does not differ between groups. 
If attention during feedback reflects end-state attention, this gaze bias should be 
acquired early and remain consistent throughout training, but if it reflects the change 
from pre- to post-shift attention, the gaze bias should decrease across training. 
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Mackintosh instead predicts greater attention to cue B on AB trials than to cue C on AC 
trials, and that this bias decreases across training. Mackintosh does not make specific 
predictions about attention biases during the feedback period of the trial, though one 
might assume that post-feedback eye gaze could reflect the updating of associability 
that occurs post-learning. If this were the case then one would expect stronger attention 
biases towards B early in training, and stronger attention towards C later in training, as 
alpha for B reaches ceiling faster than alpha for C, and prediction error on AB trials 
reaches floor much faster than on AC trials.	 
5.6.1 Method 
5.6.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from the University of Sydney participated in 
return for partial course credit (51 female, mean age = 19.6 years, SD = 4.21). 
Participants were randomly allocated to standard and balanced conditions (n = 32).    
5.6.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Participants were tested individually, and eye gaze was measured using a 23-
inch Tobii TX300 Eye Tracker, which has a sample rate of 300 Hz. Participants were 
seated approximately 55cm from the monitor, with a chin rest to maintain a fixed 
position. The eye tracker was calibrated using a five-point procedure at the beginning of 
the experiment. The stimuli were the same as those used in the previous experiments, 
surrounded by a 300 x 300 pixel square box, and food labels were removed to 
discourage easy peripheral identification of the stimuli on each trial. Stimuli were 
presented following a 500ms presentation of a fixation cross at the horizontal centre of 
the screen, vertically aligned with the centre of the two cues. The distance between the 
centre of the cross and the centre of each cue was 15cm. Outcome options appeared 
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500ms after the presentation of the cues. Responses were made using a standard mouse 
and keyboard. Feedback was provided for two seconds in the centre of the screen. 
5.6.1.3 Procedure 
Participants responded to the task in the same manner as previous experiments. 
All participants completed seven blocks of training, followed by the test phase.   
5.6.1.4 Eye gaze analysis 
Fixation time on each trial was separated into two time periods – a pre-decision 
period which spanned stimulus onset to a response, and a feedback period, which began 
when a prediction was made, during the time feedback was provided until the end of the 
trial. On each trial, the percentage of missing samples was calculated, and the data from 
the eye with the least missing samples were used. Gaps of missing data less than 75 
milliseconds were interpolated between the data preceding and following the gap. 
Fixations were determined by a displacement method (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). The 
horizontal and vertical coordinates of gaze data were analysed in 150ms windows, and a 
fixation was determined if the coordinates did not deviate beyond a range of 75 pixels. 
This window was then extended until a deviation of greater than 75 pixels was recorded, 
to determine fixation length. Fixation position was taken as the mean horizontal and 
vertical pixel coordinates across the fixation sample. A square 500 x 500 pixel region of 
interest (ROI) was defined around the center of the cue stimuli.  
Trials without any recorded fixations were removed from the analyses, and 
participants with more than 30% missing trials in either phase were excluded from the 
respective eye gaze analysis (their data were used in the behavioural analyses). This 
resulted in the exclusion of one participant from the training phase gaze analysis, and 
two participants from the test phase analysis. For the remaining participants, mean 
excluded trials were 3.7%, (SE = 0.8) during training, and 0.8% (SE = 0.4) during the 
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test phase. To control for potential differences in response time between trial types, 
fixation time was analysed as a proportion of response time in the pre-decision period in 
training, and as a proportion of the time taken to first select an outcome during the test 
phase. Fixations while rating confidence, or altering outcome choice during the test 
phase were not included in the analysis.  
5.6.2 Results 
 
5.6.2.1 Training 
 
Response accuracy. To analyse the training accuracy data shown in Figure 5.5, 
a 2 x (2) x (7) mixed measures ANOVA was run with group (standard vs. balanced) as a 
between subjects factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1 – 7) as within 
subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of block, F(6,372) = 147.60, p < 
.001, 𝜂!!  = .704, trial type, with greater accuracy for common trials overall, F(1,62) = 
134.57, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .685, and group, F(1,62) = 7.33, p = .009, 𝜂!!  = .106.  
 
Figure 5.5.  Response accuracy during training for common and rare trial types in each 
group. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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Again, there was a significant interaction between group and trial, such that there was a 
greater difference in accuracy for common and rare trials for the balanced group, 
F(1,62) = 10.59, p = .002, 𝜂!!  = .146. There was also a significant interaction between 
block and trial, F(6,372) = 27.68, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .309, group and block, F(6,372) = 4.34, 
p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .065, and a significant three-way interaction between group, trial type and 
block, F(6,372) = 2.35, p = .031, 𝜂!!  = .036.  
 
 	Figure 5.6. Fixation time as a proportion of response time (RT) during the pre-decision 
period for a) common trials in the standard group, b) rare trials in the standard group, c) 
common trials in the balanced group, and d) rare trials in the balanced group. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.   
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Eye gaze before decision. Pre-decision fixation time on each cue, as a 
proportion of total decision time is shown in Figure 5.6. We ran a 2 x (2) x (2) x (7) 
repeated measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor, and cue 
predictiveness (imperfect vs. perfect), trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as 
within-subjects factors. There were significantly longer fixations on predictive than 
imperfect cues overall, F(1,56) = 18.61, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .249. Fixation time was also 
generally higher on rare trials than on common trials, F(1,56) = 10.88, p = .002, 𝜂!!  = 
.16, but this difference decreased significantly over training, F(6,336) = 3.85, p = .001, 𝜂!!  = .064. Critically, there was significant predictiveness x trial type interaction, F(1,56) 
= 10.28, p = .002, 𝜂!!  = .155, with a greater bias for perfect predictors on rare trials than 
on common trials, but this also interacted with group, F(1,56) = 9.96, p = .003, 𝜂!!  = 
.151. Further analysis for each group separately showed that in the standard group, there 
was a significant interaction between predictiveness and trial type, F(1,27) = 19.50, p < 
.001, 𝜂!!  = .419, where there was a significant bias towards the predictive cue on rare 
trials, F(1,28) = 20.02, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .417, but not on common trials, F < 1. In contrast, 
in the balanced group, the bias towards the predictive cue did not differ between 
common and rare trials, F < 1, and the predictive cue bias was significant for both trial 
types, lowest F(1,29) = 4.43, p = .044, 𝜂!!  =.133. Importantly, the bias for rare predictors 
on rare trials did not differ between standard and balanced groups F(1,57) = 2.44, p = 
.124, 𝜂!!  = .041. 
To determine whether biases in attention changed over the course of training, we 
examined linear effects of block. This revealed a significant interaction between block, 
predictiveness and trial type, F(1,56) = 8.81, p = .004, 𝜂!!  = .136. To further investigate 
this interaction, common and rare trials were analysed separately. The bias for 
predictive cues relative to imperfect predictors significantly increased across training on 
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rare trials, F(1,57) = 11.91, p = .001, 𝜂!!  = .173, but there was no significant change on 
common trials, F(1,59) = 3.80, p = .056, 𝜂!!  = .061. These effects did not interact with 
group, Fs < 1.  
Eye gaze during feedback. Fixation time during feedback, shown in Figure 5.7, 
was analysed as a proportion of the fixed feedback time of two seconds. There were 
again significantly longer fixations on predictive cues than imperfect cues, F(1,55) = 
33.82, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .381. There was also greater fixation time on rare trials than  
 
Figure 5.7. Fixation time as a proportion of feedback time for a) common trials in the 
standard group, b) rare trials in the standard group, c) common trials in the balanced 
group, and d) rare trials in the balanced group. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean 
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common trials overall, F(1,55) = 42.40, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .435, which changed over 
training, F(6,330) = 2.93, p = .008, 𝜂!!  =  .051. There was a significant interaction 
between trial type and cue type, such that there was a greater difference in fixation time 
to predictive and imperfect cues on rare trials than on common trials, F(1,55) = 23.63, p 
< .001, 𝜂!!  = .301. This effect of cue predictiveness was only significant on rare trials, 
F(1,55) = 37.61, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .406, and not on common trials, F(1,61) = 3.29, p = 
.075, 𝜂!!  = .051. Unlike fixations during the decision period, this did not interact with 
group, F(1,55) = 1.37, p = .247, 𝜂!!  = .024. There was a significant three way interaction 
between the linear trend of block, predictiveness and cue type, F(1,55) = 4.48, p = .039, 𝜂!!  = .075. This indicates that the bias towards the predictive cue was decreasing across 
training for rare trials, F(1,55) = 4.74, p = .034, 𝜂!!  = .079, but not common trials, F < 1. 
There was no significant interaction with group, F(1,55) = 1.34, p = .253, 𝜂!!  = .024.  
Table 5.6 
Choice responses and confidence ratings for all test trials in Experiment 7 
  Choice  
Transfer Trial Group Common Rare Confidence 
Imperfect Standard .836 .164 52.89 
A, D, G, J Balanced .648 .352 57.41 
 
Conflicting Standard .281 .719 60.20 
BC, EF, HI, KL Balanced .445 .555 51.75 
 
Combined Standard .227 .773 68.48 
ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL Balanced .703 .297 65.12 
 
Common predictor Standard .953 .047 76.76 
B, E, H, K Balanced .961 .039 79.22 
 
Rare predictor Standard .039 .961 78.36 
C, F, I, L Balanced .094 .906 75.23 
 
Trained Common Standard .984 .016 94.61 
AB, DE, GH, JK Balanced .984 .016 94.87 
 
Trained Rare Standard .023 .977 94.28 
 AC, DF, GI, JL Balanced .070 .930 88.03 
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5.6.2.2 Test 
 Choice responses. Responses for all trial types are shown in Table 5.6. 
Proportion of rare choices on test, shown in Figure 5.8, replicates the pattern of results 
observed in Experiment 5 fairly closely. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect 
in the standard group with a greater proportion of rare outcome choices on conflicting 
trials, t(31) = 4.39, p < .001, d  = 0.78. While there was a small numerical bias for 
choosing the rare outcome on conflicting trials in the balanced group, this did not reach 
significance, t(31) = 1.27, p = .214, d = 0.22. The rare-bias was significantly weaker on 
conflicting trials in the balanced than the standard group, t(62) = 2.49, p = .016, d = 
0.62. On imperfect trials, responding was significantly common-biased in both groups, 
lowest t(31) = 4.01, p < .001, d = 0.71, but this was significantly weaker in the balanced 
than standard group, t(62) = 3.31, p = .002, d = 0.83. On combined trials, choice was 
significantly rare-biased in the standard group, t(31) = 7.96, p < .001, d = 1.41, and 
significantly common-biased in the balanced group, t(31) = 4.94, p < .001, d = 0.87, and 
there was a significant difference in choices between the two groups, t(62) = 8.89, p < 
.001, d = 2.22. Overall, there was no significant difference in accuracy for common 
(mean = .96, SD = .12) and rare predictors (mean correct responses = .93, SD = .16), 
F(1,62) = 1.32, p = .255, 𝜂!!  =.021. There was also no main effect or interaction with 
group, highest F(1,62) = 2.35, p = .131, 𝜂!!  = .036.  
Eye gaze.  On conflicting test trials, there was no difference in fixation time to 
common or rare predictors, and no effects of group, all Fs < 1. There was also no 
difference in attention to common and rare cues when considering only the trials on 
which a rare outcome was chosen, F < 1 (see Figure 5.9; cf. O'Bryan et al., 2017), and 
no main effect or interaction with group, highest F(1,43) = 1.94, p = .171, 𝜂!!  =  0.043. 
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Figure 5.8. Proportion rare choice on imperfect, conflicting and combined transfer trials 
in Experiment 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Gaze to common and rare predictors according to outcome choice on 
conflicting trials during the test phase.  
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5.6.3 Discussion 
Experiment 7 again demonstrated an effect of overall outcome frequency on the 
inverse base-rate effect. Rare choice on conflicting trials was significantly weaker when 
the outcome occurred at an equal rate across the entire experiment. Although there was 
a small numerical bias in choosing the rare outcome, this did not reach significance.  
The fixation time data revealed several interesting results. In the standard group, 
more time was spent attending to the predictive cue than the imperfect cue on rare trials, 
but not on common trials. That is, both cues were attended equally on AB trials, but 
there was greater attention to C on AC trials. This pattern of results is consistent with 
the EXIT model account of the inverse base-rate effect. In the balanced group, there 
were longer fixation times on the predictive cue than the imperfect predictor on 
common trials as well as on rare trials. This bias towards B on AB trials was no weaker 
than the bias towards C on AC trials. Thus the balanced group spent more time 
attending to predictive cues regardless of the trial type. Importantly, the strength of the 
attention bias towards the rare predictor on rare trials was not significantly different 
between the standard and balanced groups. Therefore, it does not appear that the 
reduction in the inverse base-rate effect in the balanced group is the result of a weaker 
bias towards rare predictors. Instead, it may be due to an increased bias to common 
predictors. In this sense, overt pre-decision attention seems to be consistent with the 
pattern of choices observed at test. 
The pattern of fixations during feedback differed from that prior to decision. In 
both groups, there were longer fixation times to rare predictors on rare trials, which 
appeared to decrease across training. There was no difference in fixation time on 
common trials in either group, and no significant group differences. This bias and the 
finding that this attention shift appears to decrease as accuracy is improving across 
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training seem to provide support for EXIT’s assumption of post-prediction error 
attention shifts on rare trials. Here, gaze appears to be biased towards cues that receive 
the greatest amount of change in attention from pre-shift to post-shift, which decreases 
across training for rare trials in both groups (Figure 4.3, panels E and F).  
Finally, there were no differences in fixation time to common and rare cues on 
conflicting trials during the test phase, even when only considering trials where the rare 
outcome was chosen. This also did not differ between groups. Thus, our fixation time 
data from the test phase does not support either of the previous contradictory findings 
(Kruschke et al., 2005; O’Bryan et al., 2017). This result suggests that the effect is not 
driven by continued overt attention biases to the rare predictor into the test phase. 
Rather, the contribution of attention to choice appears to be constrained to initial 
learning of the contingencies. It should be noted, however, that O’Bryan et al.’s (2017) 
result involved a measure of neural decoding that indicated stronger processing of the 
common predictor but in a fashion that may not manifest in overt changes in attention. 
5.7 General Discussion  
This study tested the conflicting predictions of EXIT and Mackintosh in relation 
to attention to cues in the inverse base-rate effect, and the effect of outcome frequency 
on attention to cues. The discussion will first briefly summarise the results of the three 
experiments, before addressing the theoretical implications.  
Experiment 5 and Experiment 7 found evidence of an inverse base-rate effect 
using the food allergist task and replicated the finding that the inverse base-rate effect is 
weakened when each outcome is experienced at an equal rate across the entire 
experiment, while maintaining differences in the frequency of overlapping compounds. 
However, the effect is not necessarily abolished under these conditions. Both 
experiments showed a small bias towards choosing the rare outcome on conflicting 
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trials in the balanced condition, and this effect was significant in Experiment 5. Of the 
four versions of this experiment, three (Experiment 2, Experiment 5 and Experiment 7) 
have numerically favoured rare choice by approximately the same amount (mean 
proportions of relevant rare outcome choice were .56, .57 and .55, respectively)16, while 
the version with only 3 blocks of training produced a slight common-bias (mean 
proportion of relevant rare outcome choice was .45). 
Experiment 6 showed better learning about cues that were previously rare 
predictors than cues that were previously common predictors in a new learning phase 
with novel outcomes. The strength of this attention transfer did not differ between 
standard and balanced conditions, and the effect was only observed after three blocks of 
initial base-rate training, but not after seven blocks.  
Experiment 7 examined fixation time to cues both prior to making a prediction, 
and during feedback. Prior to making a prediction, the standard group spent longer 
fixating on rare predictors than imperfect predictors on rare trials, and showed no 
difference in fixation to the common predictors and imperfect predictors on common 
trials. There were also biases in fixation to rare predictors in the balanced group, 
however this group also showed an equally strong bias to common predictors on 
common trials. The strength of the bias in attention to the rare predictor on rare trials 
did not differ between groups, and increased over the course of training. During 
feedback, both groups attended more to rare predictors on rare trials, and this bias 
decreased across training. Neither group showed a bias on common trials during 
feedback. There were no differences in fixation time on the common and rare predictor 
on conflicting trials during the test phase. Overall, participants attended to B and C 
equally at test, even when only considering trials where the rare outcome was chosen. 																																																								
16 Pooled across all three experiments, the effect in the balanced group is significant t(125) = 2.71, p = 
.008, d = .24.  
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The following sections compare these results with the predictions of EXIT and 
Mackintosh.   
5.7.1 Relative attention to cues 
 When fitting the results for Experiment 3, EXIT predicted a greater bias in 
attention to C on AC trials that to B on AB trials, whereas Mackintosh predicted the 
opposite pattern, with higher alphas for B than C.  Experiment 6 showed greater 
associability of previously rare predictors than previously common predictors in a new 
learning phase, which indicates that greater attention was paid to these cues during 
training than to common predictors. Measures of fixation time also indicated a bias for 
rare predictors over common predictors, both prior to making an outcome choice (in the 
standard group only), and during feedback (in both groups). These results indicate a 
clear attention advantage for C over B, and are consistent with the predictions from 
EXIT.  
5.7.2 Changes in attention over training 
In Experiment 7, biases in pre-decision attention towards the rare predictor increased 
over training, and there was no significant change in biases on common trials. This is 
mostly consistent with the pattern of change in pre-shift attention biases in EXIT. As 
indicated in fixation time during feedback, preferential attention to C is stronger early in 
training when prediction error is high, and weaker after further training when prediction 
error is very low. The reduction in this bias for the rare predictor during feedback is also 
broadly consistent with the amount of attention change from pre-shift attention to post-
shift attention, which also declines over training. Thus attention during feedback may 
reflect the discrepancy in learned and post-shift attention. The results from Experiment 
7 support the idea that attention during these two stages of the trial reflects different 
processes. Attention prior to choice reflects the current state of learning about cues. 
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Here, cue selection appears to be an exploitative process in which attention is directed 
towards cues that will be most useful in producing a correct outcome prediction. 
Attention during feedback instead appears to be a response to error, with attention 
directed towards the cues most likely to reduce future error. These attention shifts 
appear to be linked to current levels of prediction error, as they are greater on rare trials, 
which experience more frequent errors during training, and the bias in gaze to the rare 
predictor decreases as accuracy on these trials increases across training.  
In Experiment 6, there was a difference in the associability of predictive cues 
following three blocks of training, but not following seven blocks of training. It was 
assumed that the kind of attention that influences future learning would be best reflected 
by pre-decision biases in attention in EXIT, which indicate learned attention to cues. 
Yet the change in transfer effects across training does not reflect this. Transfer effects 
instead appear to follow a similar pattern to eye gaze during feedback. Speculatively, it 
could be the case that attention transfer in this experiment reflects the current state of 
prediction error, rather than learned attention based on predictiveness. This would leave 
the current results seemingly at odds with a wealth of literature on associability and 
attention in the learned predictiveness effect. In the learned predictiveness effect, Phase 
1 training usually proceeds to a point where participant predictions are highly accurate 
(i.e. there is very little prediction error, at least in the participants' overt predictions). 
Nevertheless, there are highly replicable transfer effects where previously predictive 
cues are learned about more readily than previously non-predictive cues (Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2003; Le Pelley et al., 2010; Le Pelley et al., 2011; Don & Livesey, 2015; 
Shone, et al., 2015). These effects are also associated with changes in pre-decision 
fixation biases (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2011). Thus in this literature, there is a strong link 
between transferred attention and learned predictiveness (and not current prediction 
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error). However, the notion that attention might reflect current prediction error is 
consistent with recent findings that suggest uncertainty about the outcome is associated 
with sustained attention to cues (Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson & Le Pelley, 2015). 
The most obvious reason why our results may differ is because in Experiment 6, 
we pitted two perfect predictors against each other. Arguably, this might nullify any 
associability transfer effects attributable to learned predictiveness. Despite the large 
body of research on the effect, the precise operations of the learned predictiveness effect 
are still not well known. Some results suggest, for instance, that competition among 
cues with different predictive validity (i.e. relative predictiveness) is completely 
unnecessary for the effect (Kattner, 2015; Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers & Knipe, 2010; 
Livesey et al., 2011), suggesting that the absolute predictiveness of each cue determines 
their attention in new learning. If this were true then it would be reasonable to assume 
that B and C cues receive the same benefits from learned predictiveness effects in new 
learning and any bias towards C is attributable to other differences, such as those driven 
by its relative utility in resolving prediction error on the most recent trials.  
5.7.3 The role of context learning  
Context learning has been proposed as an explanation for the inverse base-rate 
effect when accuracy for B alone trials is greater than accuracy for C alone (Le Pelley et 
al, 2016)17. In previous chapters, it was suggested that context learning could also allow 
associative models to account for the inverse base-rate effect in this case.  
The comparison of standard and balanced conditions in these experiments 
allows us to determine the influence of context learning on the inverse base-rate effect, 																																																								17	Interestingly, we found no difference in accuracy for cues B and C when they were tested individually 
in Experiment 7. In both experiments, there was a small benefit in accuracy for common predictors, 
although this did not reach significance. There was no difference in accuracy for perfect predictors 
between groups. However, responding on these trials was close to ceiling and therefore may not 
accurately reflect differences in associative strength.   	
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and on attention to predictive cues. The difference in frequency of overlapping 
compounds in both groups means that the imperfect predictor should be associated with 
the relevant common outcome within each compound pair. However, in the standard 
condition, one outcome is consistently paired with common compounds, such that the 
context is strongly associated with that outcome. In the balanced condition, each 
outcome is paired with both common and rare compounds, such that the context would 
be equally associated with both outcomes.  
Not surprisingly then, context associations can provide a reasonable explanation 
for the pre-decision attention biases observed in Experiment 7. In the standard 
condition, participants can rely on the base-rate to help make accurate predictions on 
common AB trials. Although B is more predictive than A, it may be less necessary to 
focus on either cue in particular, relative to the balanced group in which the overall 
base-rate is not helpful. In the balanced group, the context does not provide a good 
prediction of either outcome, and therefore more attention may be paid to the most 
predictive cues on every trial (cue B on common trials, and cue C on rare trials). 
Consistent with this difference, the common-bias to A was also weaker in the balanced 
group. Several authors have noted an association between the strength of common 
responses to imperfect cues and the strength of the inverse base-rate effect (e.g., Shanks, 
1992; Kruschke et al., 2005), which has been taken as support for attention accounts. 
That is, the greater the association between A and O1, the greater the attention shift 
away from A to C on AC trials. Although we observed an equal pre-decision gaze bias 
to rare predictors on AC trials in both groups, increased attention to B on AB trials in 
the balanced group would result in a weaker association between A and the common 
outcome. It is worth noting that the inverse base-rate effect likely cannot be explained 
by appealing to context learning alone. In Experiment 3, AB-O1 and AC-O2 were 
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trained in equal frequency, while pairings of high-frequency filler trials with O1 
provided a strong overall base-rate difference. These conditions were insufficient to 
produce the inverse base-rate effect on BC trials. 
Again consistent with the predictions of EXIT, the pattern of post-feedback 
attention was no different between groups, which is also consistent with EXIT’s 
predictions. Choice differences between groups therefore appear to be primarily related 
to learned attention to cues, rather than error-driven attention shifts during feedback. 
However rather than weaker biases on rare trials in the balanced group, there is an 
additional attention bias to the common predictor when outcome frequency is matched. 
Although the transfer effect in Experiment 6 appeared numerically weaker in the 
balanced group on some tests, we consistently found a lack of significant group 
differences. This pattern of results is therefore only partly consistent with the 
predictions from EXIT.  
5.7.4 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to assess the diverging predictions from EXIT and 
Mackintosh regarding attention to B versus attention to C, and to test whether there are 
trade-offs in attention to cues and attention to the context. Both EXIT and Mackintosh 
can predict a reduction in the effect when global outcome frequency is matched in the 
balanced group. However, only EXIT could predict differences in attention to the 
context between groups. Although EXIT does not provide a perfect account of all the 
results presented in this chapter, on the whole, the results are far more consistent with 
EXIT than with Mackintosh. Across several conditions using several dependent 
measures, there was considerable evidence that attention to C is stronger than attention 
to B, and no evidence that attention to B was stronger than attention to C.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Measuring the Inverse Base-Rate Effect 
In studies of human contingency learning, there are several dependent measures that 
may be used to assess learning about the relationship between cues and outcomes 
(Shanks, 1995). Often, these involve judgements about the strength of the relationship 
between a cue and an outcome on a numerical scale. For example, participants may be 
asked to rate the extent to which a cue caused or predicted the outcome (Shanks, 1995; 
2007), or, in cases where there are multiple outcomes, to rate the likelihood of each 
outcome on a separate scale (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Don & Livesey, 2015; 
Luque, Vadillo, Gutiérrez-Cobo & Le Pelley, 2016). Other studies have employed 
choice response measures, where participants select one response from discrete 
alternative options. These are typically used in category learning tasks, where 
participants learn to classify items during training, and learning is then assessed by 
classification of old items or new transfer items in a test phase. Discrete choice may 
also be used to assess accuracy in recalling an outcome paired with a cue (e.g., Mitchell, 
Lovibond & Gan, 2005; Mitchell, Lovibond, Minard & Lavis., 2006; Kruschke, 
Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005), sometimes paired with a confidence rating (Beesley & 
Le Pelley, 2011; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 2015). While these are not the only 
dependent measures used to assess learning, they are the most common for contingency 
learning studies and are therefore the focus of this chapter.  
It is reasonable to assume that, if these dependent variables accurately measure 
the same process, then learning phenomena should not be confined to just one type of 
test measure. Yet, prior research has shown that particular test demands can modulate 
the observation of causal and predictive learning effects. For example, several studies 
have found that the wording of the test question can affect judgements about the 
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relationship between events (Matute, Arcediano and Miller, 1996; Vadillo, Miller & 
Matute, 2005; Pineño, Denniston, Beckers, Matute & Miller, 2005; Vadillo & Matute, 
2007; but see Cobos, Caño, López, Luque & Almaraz, 2000). Comparing differences in 
responses elicited by causal questions and outcome recall questions has also proven 
useful in teasing apart the influence of controlled and automatic processes in blocking 
and learned predictiveness (Mitchell, Lovibond, Minard & Lavis, 2006; Don & Livesey, 
2015). Furthermore, Tangen and Allan (2004) found an influence of causal scenario on 
cue competition when learning was measured by ratings during the test phase, but found 
no influence of causal scenario on trial-by-trial predictions of the presence or absence of 
an outcome during training. They suggested that participants base their predictions on 
associative strength between events, while ratings require participants to consider not 
only the association between events, but also the causal status of the cue, or the causal 
relationship between cues and outcomes. These kinds of predictions during training are 
essentially the same as those used in choice response test phases. Yet, few studies have 
investigated whether the kind of judgement made during the test phase (e.g., making a 
rating vs. making a choice) influences the observation of cue competition effects that 
are thought to be symptomatic of the same general principles that govern learning in a 
range of situations.  
Several cue competition effects, such as blocking and learned predictiveness, 
have been observed in both continuous ratings (e.g., Aitken, Larkin & Dickinson, 2001; 
Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton & Frohardt, 2003; Mitchell, Harris, Westbrook & 
Griffiths, 2008) and discrete choice measures (e.g., Beesley & Le Pelley, 2011; 
Kruschke et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2006; Shone et al., 2015). 
Similarly, category learning phenomena such as feature- and rule-based generalisation 
in a patterning task (e.g., Shanks & Darby, 1998; Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren & 
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Rolland, 2011; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005), which are typically 
measured with classification or choice responses, have also been demonstrated when 
participants are asked to indicate the likelihood of an outcome on a continuous scale 
(Don, Goldwater, Otto & Livesey, 2015; 2016; Cobos, Gutiérrez-Cobo, Morís & 
Luque, 2017). These learning effects therefore appear robust regardless of the kind of 
dependent measure used.  
The inverse base-rate effect was originally established in a category learning 
task, using a choice measure. Although the effect has since been extended to 
contingency learning tasks more generally (see Chapter 2), subsequent studies of the 
effect have retained the original classification test phase, with the exception of one cued 
recall study (Dennis & Kruschke, 1998). To the best of my knowledge, no existing 
studies have investigated whether the inverse base-rate effect is also observed in a 
ratings test phase. The effect indicates a seemingly irrational tendency to predict a rare 
outcome for a conflicting combination of cues. While a more rational response would 
be to predict the common outcome, another arguably rational response would be to 
expect both outcomes equally, as the probability of the common outcome given cue B is 
equivalent to the probability of the rare outcome given cue C. Yet, on any given trial in 
a discrete choice test phase, there is no option to indicate that several outcomes may be 
equally likely, or that several outcomes may be likely, but to different degrees.18 These 
kinds of responses may be more readily demonstrated using a ratings test phase. That is, 
if participants were instead asked to rate the likelihood of each outcome, would 
participants still rate the rare outcome as more likely than the common outcome, or 
would they be more likely to display a rational response, and rate each outcome 
equally?  																																																								18	This rationale predicts why there is no common choice bias, but does not explain the presence of a rare 
choice bias.	
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This chapter therefore presents three experiments that each compare responses 
between choice and ratings test phases. Experiment 8 compares the inverse base-rate 
effect and the related highlighting effect to other cue-competition effects, including 
blocking and overshadowing. The subsequent experiments compared choice and ratings 
in a simpler inverse base-rate design, using the standard condition from prior chapters. 
To determine whether there are causal scenario effects in ratings (as seen in Tangen & 
Allan, 2004), this design was run using the allergist task (Experiment 9) and the medical 
diagnosis task (Experiment 10). 
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Table 6.1 
Full design of Experiment 8 
 PHASE 1  PHASE 2  TEST 
 Trial type 
Base 
rate Trials  Trial type 
Base 
rate Trials  Trial type Trials 
Inverse base-rate Common 3 AB-O1 ab-O3  Common 3 AB-O1 ab-O3  Imperfect A a 
 Rare 1 AC-O2 ac-O4  Rare 1 AC-O2 ac-O4  Common predictor B b 
           Rare predictor C c 
           Conflicting (within) BC bc 
           Conflicting (between) Bc bC 
           Combined ABC abc 
Highlighting Early 4 DE-O1 de-O3  Early 2 DE-O1 de-O3  Imperfect D d 
      Late 2 DF-O2 df-O4  Early predictor E e 
           Late predictor F f 
           Conflicting (within) EF ef 
           Conflicting (between) Ef eF 
           Combined DEF def 
Blocking &  Pre-trained 2 G-O1 g-O3  Blocked 2 GH-O1 gh-O3  Pre-trained G g 
Overshadowing  2 I-O2 i-O4   2 IJ-O2 ij-O4   I i 
      Control 2 KL-O1 kl-O3  Blocked H h 
       2 MN-O2 mn-O4   J j 
      Single cue 2 O-O1 o-O3  Control K k 
       2 P-O2 p-O4   L l 
            M m 
            N n 
           Negation Hl hL 
            Jn jN 
           Single cue O o 
            P p 
Note: Different letters represent different food cues, O1, O2 etc. represent different allergic reaction outcomes. There were two repetitions of the 
design, and letters in upper and lower case represent different cues of the same type. For example, cue A may be “apple” and cue a may be 
“peanuts”, but both are imperfect predictors in the inverse base-rate component of the design.  
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6.1 Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 compared responses in choice and rating test phases for test trials 
assessing the inverse base-rate effect and other cue competition effects. The design 
included inverse base-rate, highlighting, blocking and overshadowing components, all 
trained within-subjects (See Table 6.1). Blocking and overshadowing are typically 
measured by continuous ratings, but have also been demonstrated in discrete choice, 
and as such, they provide a good comparison for the inverse base-rate effect and 
highlighting.  
Blocking refers to impaired learning about a cue-outcome relationship, if that 
cue is trained in compound with another cue that already predicts the outcome. For 
example, if GH-O1 is presented after learning a G-O1 association, little is learned about 
the H-O1 association. That is, learning about H is ‘blocked’ by prior learning about the 
G-O1 association. Blocking is measured by comparing learning for the blocked cue (H) 
with learning for a control cue that was also trained in compound in phase 2, without 
any pre-training (e.g., K/L after training KL-O1). This control also serves as a measure 
of the overshadowing paradigm. Overshadowing refers to weaker learning for cues that 
have been trained in compound (e.g., KL-O1) compared to cues that have been trained 
individually (e.g., O-O1). Single cue trials were therefore also included in phase 2 to 
measure overshadowing (Pavlov, 1927; Waldmann, 2001; Urcelay, 2017).  
In highlighting tasks, DE-O1 trials are trained in an initial phase, and DF-O2 
trials are introduced in a second training phase. On conflicting EF trials, there tends to 
be a preference for the late outcome, O2 (Kruschke, 1996; Kruschke, 2005). The 
explanation for this is that early learning of DE-O1 leads to a prediction error on DF-O2 
trials, resulting in a strong association between F and O2. Highlighting was included in 
this experiment for two reasons. First, highlighting is conceptually related to the inverse 
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base-rate effect, and is assumed to occur via similar mechanisms. It is therefore 
worthwhile determining whether both highlighting and the inverse base-rate effect also 
occurs in ratings, or whether these effects behave differently in this regard. Second, it 
has clear parallels to blocking. In blocking, prior learning appears to impair learning 
about a novel cue, whereas in highlighting, prior learning appears to facilitate learning 
about a novel cue. Kruschke et al. (2005) found an association between the strength of 
highlighting and the strength of blocking, when each was measured in the same 
participants by a discrete choice test phase. They suggested a common mechanism for 
both effects, specifically, learned shifts of attention either toward the highlighted (late 
predictor) cue, or away from the blocked cue. In support of this view, there was also an 
association between eye gaze biases in highlighting and blocking, such that participants 
who showed a large preferential gaze bias in highlighting also tended to show large 
preferential biases in blocking. These kinds of preferential attention biases are also the 
most widely accepted explanation for the inverse base-rate effect (Kruschke, 2001a; 
Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey, 2014). If these effects are all due to common 
mechanisms, then they should all be observable under the same test conditions.  
To accommodate the blocking design, this experiment used an allergist task, in 
which food cues are presented as causes of allergic reaction outcomes in a fictitious 
patient. Blocking is often demonstrated in this kind of causal scenario, but there is some 
evidence that blocking is less likely in diagnostic scenarios like that conveyed in the 
medical diagnosis task (Waldmann, 2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992;). The inverse 
base-rate effect has been observed using various task scenarios, including the allergist 
task (see Chapter 5), and therefore using this task should not affect the likelihood of 
observing an effect. All participants completed identical training phases, in which 
participants made discrete predictions of the outcome on each trial; only the test phase 
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differed between groups. The choice group completed the same kind of discrete choice 
phase traditionally used in studies of the inverse base-rate effect. On each test trial, 
participants were asked to choose which outcome was most likely, and to additionally 
rate their confidence in their choice. The rating group was instead presented with four 
rating scales, one for each outcome, and were required to rate the likelihood of each 
outcome.  
We expected to observe blocking and overshadowing in both test groups. We 
also expected to see an inverse base-rate effect and a highlighting effect in the choice 
group. The result of interest was whether participants would also show an inverse base-
rate effect or highlighting effect when measured in ratings. That is, whether they would 
rate the rare outcome as more likely than the common outcome, and the late outcome as 
more likely than the early outcome.  
6.1.1 Method 
6.1.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 148 students at the University of Sydney, who participated 
either as part of a class exercise, or for partial course credit. As this experiment had two 
learning phases, and some trials were not introduced until the second phase, the training 
criterion of 60% accuracy was applied across all training. Nine participants did not 
reach this criterion, and were excluded from the analyses. One additional participant 
had incomplete data, and was also excluded. This left 138 participants (88 female, mean 
age = 21.13 years, SD = 5.6), randomly allocated to the choice (n = 68) and ratings (n = 
70) test phase groups.  
6.1.1.2 Design 
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The full design of Experiment 8 is presented in Table 6.1. There were four 
components of the design to assess the inverse base-rate effect, highlighting, blocking 
and overshadowing. Each of these components had two instantiations, each with 
different cues and outcomes. In the table, different instantiations of the same design are 
indicated by upper- versus lower-case letters. To accommodate the blocking and 
highlighting components, there were two phases of training.  
In the inverse base-rate component, common (e.g., AB-O1) and rare (e.g., AC-
O2) trials were presented throughout both phases in a 3:1 base-rate. There were three 
presentations of each common trial, and one presentation of each rare trial per block. In 
the highlighting component, early trials (e.g., DE-O1) were presented in phase 1, prior 
to the addition of late trials (e.g., DF-O2) in phase 2. Each early trial was presented four 
times per block in phase 1, and twice per block in phase 2. Each late trial was presented 
twice per block in phase 2. For the blocking component, each pre-trained cue (e.g., G-
O1, I-O2) was presented twice per block in phase 1. In phase 2, these cues were then 
paired with a novel cue followed by the same outcome (e.g., GH-O1, IJ-O2). These 
novel cues will hereafter be referred to as the blocked cues. Phase 2 also included novel 
compound trials (e.g., KL-O1, MN-O2) as a control comparison for blocking. The 
comparison between these compound cues and single cues (e.g., O-O1, P-O2) gives an 
indication of overshadowing. All contingencies in the blocking and overshadowing 
components were presented twice per block. The global outcome base-rate was 3:1 in 
Phase 1, but was reduced in Phase 2. Although Experiment 2 showed that global base-
rate differences are important for the strength of the inverse base-rate effect, the base-
rates used here should not be problematic for observing an inverse base-rate effect. 
Medin & Bettger (1991) showed a primacy effect, where outcome choice reflected a 
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bias for early rare outcomes, even when base-rates differences were removed or 
reversed at a later stage of training.   
The relevant test trials for the inverse base-rate effect included the imperfect 
(A), conflicting (BC), combined (ABC), common predictor (B) and rare predictor (C) 
trials. Given the large design, to increase power on conflicting trials we included both 
within-compound conflicting trials (e.g., BC) and between-compound conflicting trials 
(e.g., Bc). The critical test of the inverse base rate effect was based on all four 
conflicting compounds.  The test trials for highlighting also included imperfect (D), 
conflicting (EF) and combined (DEF) trials, as well as the early predictors (E), and late 
predictors (F). Analysis of the highlighting effect was also run across all within-
compound and between-compound conflicting trials.  
Blocking was measured in two different ways. First, as is typical in blocking studies, we 
compared accuracy for blocked (e.g., H, J) and control (e.g., K, L) cues, presented 
individually. However, the inverse base-rate effect and highlighting are determined by 
responses to negation compounds. That is, two cues that were paired with different 
outcomes during training are presented together to determine which of those cues have 
greater control over responding (e.g., Livesey, Thorwart, De Fina & Harris, 2011). Thus 
there may be differences between these effects and blocking simply due to the nature of 
the test trial. Therefore we also included negation trials that comprised a blocked and 
control cue (e.g., hL), which were each paired with different outcomes during training. 
Kruschke et al. (2005) also used this kind of test trial in their study comparing blocking 
and highlighting. Here, blocking would be indicated by a preference for the outcome 
paired with the control cue. Overshadowing was measured by comparing accuracy for 
the single cues (e.g., O/P) and compound control cues (e.g., K/L) presented 
individually.  
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6.1.1.3 Stimuli 
Each of the 32 food cue stimuli were randomly allocated from coffee, fish, 
lemon, cheese, eggs, garlic, bread, peanuts, avocado, banana, bacon, peas, apple, 
mushrooms, strawberries, broccoli, cherries, butter, olive oil, chocolate, carrots, peach, 
milk, prawns, mango, pasta, corn, beef, onion, chicken, rice, and pineapple. Allergic 
reaction outcomes were randomly allocated from headache, nausea, fever and rash.  
6.1.1.4 Procedure 
The training phase was run in a similar manner as outlined in the General 
Method section in Chapter 2. All participants were presented with one or two cues on 
each trial, and predicted which outcome was most likely by selecting an option on the 
lower half of the screen. This was followed by corrective feedback. There were five 
blocks of training in phase 1, and five blocks of training in phase 2. Phase 2 followed 
immediately from phase 1 with no break. Trials were presented in the base-rates 
indicated in Table 6.1. Each block presented all contingencies from all components in 
an intermixed manner.  
There were 48 test trials, each presented once and in random order. The position 
of cues on compound test trials was randomised. In the choice group, participants 
responded to test trials in an identical manner to that outlined in Chapter 2. On each 
trial, cues appeared on the top half of the screen. The outcome options, and the question 
“Which allergic reaction is likely to follow after eating this food” were presented 
beneath. Participants made their selection, and rated their confidence.  
In the ratings group, the question “How likely is it that each outcome will occur, 
given that Mr X ate this food?” appeared beneath the food cues. Four separate linear 
analogue scales, one for each outcome, were presented in the same relative location as 
their respective outcomes during training. Participants rated the likelihood of each 
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outcome, ranging from “definitely will not occur” to “definitely will occur”. Each rating 
was converted to a score ranging from 0-100, with a higher score indicating a higher 
likelihood of that outcome. In both test groups, participants could adjust their responses 
as many times as they liked before pressing the space bar to continue to the next trial.  
6.1.2 Results 
6.1.2.1 Training 
The training data for each component of the design are shown in Figure 6.1. 
Although all participants were trained on all contingencies, each component of the 
design will be analysed separately. 
 
Figure 6.1. Training accuracy for each trial type in a) the inverse base-rate component, 
b) the highlighting component, c) the blocking component, and d) the overshadowing 
component. Note that the control cues plotted in panel c and panel d are the same trials 
reproduced for ease of comparison with the blocking and single trials, respectively. 
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean (SEM). 
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6.1.2.1.1 Inverse base-rate  
A 2 x (2) x (10) repeated measures ANOVA was run with group (choice vs. 
ratings) as a between subjects factor, and cue type (common vs. rare) and block (1-10) 
as a within subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of block, F(9,1124) = 
299.09, p < .001,  ηp2 = .687, indicating an increase in accuracy across training. There 
was a significant main effect of cue type, F(1,136) = 245.71, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .644, and a 
significant interaction between cue type and block, F(9,1124) = 29.32, p < .001, 𝜂!! = 
.177, indicating faster learning for the common contingencies than the rare 
contingencies. There was no significant main effect or interaction with group, highest 
F(1,136) = 1.22, p = .232, 𝜂!! = .01. 
6.1.2.1.2 Highlighting 
Phase 1.  Accuracy for early contingencies was analysed with a 2 x (5) repeated 
measures ANOVA with group and block (1-5) as factors. There was a significant main 
effect of block, F(4,544) = 228.14, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .627. There was also no main effect 
of group, F < 1, and no significant interaction between block and group, F(4,544) = 
2.34, p = .054, 𝜂!! = .017. 
Phase 2.  A 2 x (2) x (5) repeated measures ANOVA with group, cue type (early 
vs. late) and block (6-10) as factors again revealed a significant main effect of block, 
F(4,544) = 334.22, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .711. A significant main effect of cue, F(1,136) = 
485.79, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .781, and significant interaction between block and cue, F(4,544) 
= 361.05, p < .001, 𝜂!! =  .726, such that accuracy across training was greater for early 
trials than late trials. There was no main effect or interaction with group, highest 
F(4,544) = 1.39, p =.237 𝜂!! = .01.  
6.1.2.1.3 Blocking  
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Phase 1. Accuracy for pre-trained trials was analysed with a 2 x (5) repeated 
measures ANOVA with group and block (1-5) as factors. This revealed a significant 
main effect of block F(4,544) = 452.48, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .769, and no main effect or 
interaction with group, Fs < 1.  
Phase 2. Phase 2 accuracy was analysed with a 2 x (2) x (5) repeated measures 
ANOVA with cue type (blocking vs. control) and block (6-10) as factors. There was a 
significant main effect of block F(4,544) =  455.19, p < .001 𝜂!! = .77. There was a 
significant main effect of cue type F(1,136) = 264.57, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .66, and interaction 
between cue and block F(4,544) =  229.67, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .628., such that accuracy was 
already high for blocking trials in phase 2. There was no main effect or interaction with 
group, highest F(1,136) = 1.01, p = .318, 𝜂!! = .007.  
6.1.2.1.4 Overshadowing  
A 2 x (2) x (5) repeated measures ANOVA was run with group, cue type (single 
vs. control) and block (6-10) as factors. Note that the control cues are the same as those 
in the blocking analysis. There was a significant main effect of block F(4,544) = 
936.39, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .87. There was a main effect of cue type, F(1,136) = 10.20, p = 
.002, 𝜂!! = .07, and interaction between block and cue F(4,544) = 2.59, p = .036, 𝜂!! = 
.019, such that single cue trials were learned faster than compound control trials. There 
were no main effect or interactions with group, F < 1.  
6.1.2.2 Test 
As the test measures and subsequently the scale of responses differed between 
test groups, the following analysis does not directly compare the strength of effects 
between groups. Instead, analysis of the test phase results determined the presence or 
absence of a significant effect in each group separately, using the most appropriate 
	 185	
measure and analysis for each group. Bayes factors were also included to determine 
evidence for null effects.  
6.1.2.2.1 Inverse base-rate effect 
Responses for the choice group were analysed in an identical manner to that 
outlined in Chapter 2. An inverse base-rate effect is indicated by significantly rare-
biased choice on conflicting trials. For the rating group, a rare-bias score was calculated 
by subtracting the rating for the relevant common outcome from the rating for the 
relevant rare outcome, such that positive scores indicate a higher rating for the rare 
outcome than common outcome, and negative scores indicate higher ratings for the 
common outcome than the rare outcome. Here, a rare-bias score significantly above 
zero on conflicting trials indicated an inverse base-rate effect. See Figure 6.2 for mean 
responses for each group, and Table 6.2 for responses for all test trials.  
Choice group. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect in the choice 
group, with significantly rare-biased choice on conflicting trials, t(67) = 2.09, p = .04, d 
= .25, BF10 = 8.03. Choice on imperfect trials was significantly common biased, t(67) = 
6.89, p < .001, d = 0.84. Choice on combined trials was also significantly common 
biased, t(67) = 2.03, p = .047, d = 0.25. There was a strong common-bias for common 
predictors, t(67) = 21.24, p < .001, d = 2.58, and a strong rare-bias for rare predictors, 
t(67) = 17.74, p < .001, d = 2.15. The bias on common predictor trials was reverse-
scored to compare accuracy for perfect predictors. Although there was a slight 
numerical benefit for common predictors (M = .96, SD = .18) compared to rare 
predictors (M = .93, SD = .20), there was no significant difference between perfect 
predictor trials, t(67) = 1.09, p = .278, d = 0.19. 
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Figure 6.2. Responses to the inverse base-rate test trials. Panel a) shows mean 
proportion of rare outcome choice (±SEM) in the choice group. Panel b) shows mean 
rare-bias scores (±SEM) in the ratings group.  
 
Ratings group. In the ratings group, there was no bias on conflicting trials, t(69) 
= .29, p = .772, d = 0.03, BF01 = 40.51. This indicates that ratings for the relevant 
common and rare outcomes did not differ, however ratings for the relevant outcomes 
were much higher than ratings for the irrelevant outcomes (see Table 6.2). Similar to 
choice, there was a significant common bias on imperfect trials, t(69) = 7.22, p < .001, d 
= 0.86, and a significant common bias on combined trials, t(69) = 2.82 , p = .006, d = 
0.34. There was also a significant common-bias on common predictor trials, t(69) = 
24.82 , p < .001, d = 2.97. Rare predictor trials were significantly rare-biased, t(69) =  
16.04, p < .001 , d = 1.92.  Numerically, accuracy was better for common predictors (M 
= 71.91, SD = 24.23; reverse-scored) than rare predictors (M = 64.87, SD = 33.84), but 
this difference was not significant, t(69) = 1.68, p = .097, d = 0.24. 
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Table 6.2 
Mean proportion of outcome choice or mean outcome rating for each inverse base-rate 
effect test trial in Experiment 8. 
 Choice Group  Ratings Group 
 
Proportion outcome 
choice 
 
 Mean rating 
Trial type Common Rare Other Confidence  Common Rare Other 
Imperfect .69 .22 .10 53.93  59.76 32.09 10.35 
Conflicting (within) .39 .55 .06 56.83  73.05 72.44 8.26 
Conflicting (between) .39 .57 .05 56.82  72.87 73.65 8.39 
Conflicting (total) .39 .56 .06 56.83  72.96 73.05 8.32 
Combined .57 .39 .05 63.15  87.00 79.02 9.48 
Common .92 .02 .06 73.94  80.06 8.16 7.52 
Rare .07 .86 .08 72.42  12.14 77.01 9.07 
 
6.1.2.2.2 Highlighting 
Highlighting was measured in a similar way to the inverse base-rate effect. In 
the choice group, the mean proportion of relevant late outcome choice out of all relevant 
early and late outcome choices was compared to an unbiased level of .5. Choices 
favouring the late outcome will be referred to as late-biased and choices favouring the 
early outcome will be referred to as early-biased. Highlighting is indicated by a 
significant late bias on conflicting trials. In the ratings group, a ‘late bias’ was also 
calculated by subtracting the rating for the relevant early outcome from the rating for 
the relevant late outcome, with higher scores similarly indicating ratings in favour of the 
late outcome. A late bias significantly above zero for conflicting trials is taken as 
indication of a highlighting effect. See Figure 6.3 for mean responses for each group, 
and Table 6.3 for responses for all test trials. 
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Figure 6.3. Responses to the highlighting test trials. Panel a) shows mean proportion of 
late outcome choice (±SEM) in the choice group. Panel b) shows mean late-bias scores 
(±SEM) in the ratings group.  
Choice group. Although on conflicting trials outcome choice was numerically 
late-biased, this did not reach significance, t(67) = 1.84, p = .071, d = 0.22, BF10 = 8.20, 
although the Bayes factor provides evidence in support of a late bias. Choice was 
significantly early-biased on imperfect trials, t(67) = 12.26, p < .001, d = 1.49, and on 
combined trials, t(67) = 3.22, p = .002, d = 0.39. There was also a significant early bias 
for early predictors, t(67) = 38.10, p < .001, d = 4.62, and a significant late bias for late 
predictors, t(67) = 16.27, p < .001, d = 1.97. There was better accuracy for early 
predictors (M = .98, SD = .10) than late predictors, (M = .93, SD = .22) although this did 
not quite reach significance, t(67) = 1.98, p = .051., d = 0.30. 
Ratings group. Late-bias scores for the rating group are shown in panel B of 
Figure 6.3. Similar to the inverse base-rate effect, there was no bias on conflicting trials, 
t(69) = 0.46, p = .651, d = 0.05, BF01 = 31.36. Ratings for imperfect trials were 
significantly early biased, t(69) = 9.24, p < .001 , d = 1.10. There was again a significant 
early bias for combined trials, t(69) = 2.84, p = .006 , d = 0.34, and early predictor trials, 
t(69) = 30.38, p < .001 , d = 3.63. Ratings for late predictors were also significantly late 
biased, t(69) = 16.66, p < .001, d = 1.99. Again, accuracy was numerically better for  
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Table 6.3 
Mean proportion of outcome choice or mean outcome rating for each highlighting test 
trial in Experiment 8. 
 Choice Group  Ratings Group 
 
Proportion outcome 
choice 
 
 Mean rating 
Trial type Early Late Other Confidence  Early Late Other 
Imperfect .86 .09 .05 58.26  60.48 25.63 9.17 
Conflicting (within) .39 .61 .01 56.11  71.84 73.94 7.78 
Cross (between) .42 .55 .03 57.05  74.06 74.04 7.95 
Conflicting (total) .40 .57 .02 56.58  72.95 73.99 7.87 
Combined .63 .34 .03 63.01  87.84 81.46 8.73 
Early predictor .91 .02 .08 70.85  81.01 6.21 7.34 
Late predictor .05 .91 .04 75.32  8.99 76.81 7.62 
early predictors (M = 74.80, SD = 20.60) than late predictors (M = 67.82, SD = 34.06), 
but this was not significant, t(69) = 1.72, p = .09, d = 0.25. 
1.2.2.3 Blocking 
Blocking was measured in two different ways, including accuracy on individual 
blocked and control cue trials, and outcome preference on negation trials, which paired 
a blocked and control cue that were associated with different outcomes in phase 2. In 
the choice group, accuracy for individual cue trials was measured by the proportion of 
correct outcome choices, such that a blocking effect was indicated by a smaller 
proportion of correct outcome responses for the blocked cues than the control cues. On 
negation trials, we measured the proportion of choice of the outcome paired with the 
blocked cue and the control cue, out of the two relevant outcome choices (i.e. the 
outcomes associated with the presented blocked and control cues during training). A 
proportion of outcome choice of .5 indicates no bias towards the outcome paired with 
the blocked cue or the outcome paired with the control cue. A blocking effect is 
therefore indicated by a proportion of choice of the outcome paired with the control cue 
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significantly above this .5 level. In the ratings group, learning scores were calculated by 
subtracting the average rating of the incorrect outcomes from the rating for the correct 
outcome, with higher scores for control cues than blocked cues taken as an indication of 
blocking. For negation trials in this group, the rating for the relevant control outcome 
was compared to the rating for the relevant blocked outcome. These measures are 
shown in Figure 6.4 and responses for all test trials are shown in Table 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4. Responses to blocking and overshadowing compounds. Panel a) shows the 
proportion of correct responses (±SEM) for individual blocked, control and single cue 
test trials, and the proportion of choice for the outcome paired with the blocked and 
control cues (±SEM) on negation trials in the choice group. Panel b) shows the learning 
scores (±SEM) for individual blocked, control and single cue test trials, and the mean 
rating (±SEM) for the outcome paired with the blocked and control cues on negation 
trials in the ratings group.  
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Choice group. On individual cue trials, there was a greater proportion of correct 
responses for control cues than blocked cues t(67) = 4.36, p < .001, d = 0.62. On 
negation trials, the proportion of choice of the outcome paired with the control cue was 
significantly above .5, t(67) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 0.97.   
Ratings group. Learning scores are shown in panel B of Figure 6.4. There was a 
higher learning score for control cues than blocked cues, t(69) = 6.00,  p < .001, d = .75.  
The same result also occurred when directly comparing the correct outcome rating for 
the blocked and control cues, t(69) = 6.23, p < .001, d = .71. 
On negation trials, ratings for the outcome paired with the control cue were 
significantly higher than the ratings for the outcome paired with the blocked cue, t(69) = 
6.49, p < .001, d = 0.78.   
6.1.2.2.4 Overshadowing 
Overshadowing was measured by comparing accuracy for single and compound 
control cues in the proportion of correct outcomes choices in the choice group, and 
learning scores in the ratings group (see left panel of Figure 6.4). Note that these are the 
same control cues used in the blocking analysis.   
Choice group. There was a greater proportion of correct outcome choices for 
single cues compared to compound control cues, indicating a significant overshadowing 
effect, t(67) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 0.92 .  
Ratings group. Learning scores for single cues were significantly higher than 
those for compound control cues, t(69) = 14.26, p < .001, d = 1.83. The same result was 
also observed when comparing the ratings for the correct outcome for each cue type, 
t(69) = 13.01, p < .001, d = 1.98. 
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Table 6.4 
Mean proportion of outcome choice or mean outcome rating for each blocking and 
overshadowing test trial in Experiment 8. 
Group  Proportion outcome choice  
 Trial type Correct Incorrect Blocked Control Other Confidence 
Choice Pre-trained .97 .03    91.62 
 Blocked .74 .26    50.25 
 Control .88 .12    66.16 
 Single .99 .01    94.62 
 Negation   .23 .70 .07 56.26 
  Mean rating  
  Correct Incorrect Blocked Control Other  
Ratings Pre-trained 95.19 4.46     
 Blocked 55.23 9.94     
 Control 69.71 7.88     
 Single 95.20 4.25     
 Negation   49.83 64.92 8.85  
 
6.1.3 Discussion 
Experiment 8 compared choice and rating test phases in the inverse base-rate 
effect, highlighting, blocking and overshadowing. In training, all components of the 
design showed typical patterns of acquisition, and importantly, there were no group 
differences in learning that may have affected performance in the test phase.  
As expected, blocking and overshadowing were observed in both choice and 
ratings groups. In the choice group, there were fewer correct outcome choices for 
blocked cues than control cues, and on negation trials, there was greater choice of the 
outcome paired with the control cue than the blocked cue. Similarly in ratings, learning 
scores were poorer for blocked cues than control cues, and there were higher ratings for 
the outcome paired with the control cue than the blocked cue. There was also a greater 
proportion of correct outcome choices for single than compound control cues in the 
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choice group, and higher learning scores for single than control cues in the ratings 
group, demonstrating overshadowing. These effects therefore appear to be reliable when 
measured by either choice or ratings.  
Critically however, an inverse base-rate effect was only observed in the choice 
group, where participants showed greater choice of the rare outcome on conflicting 
trials. In the ratings group, there was no significant bias in ratings for the common and 
rare outcomes, such that participants tended to rate both relevant outcomes as equally 
likely. Highlighting also showed a similar pattern of results. Although the highlighting 
effect in choice was not quite significant overall, a late bias was more evident in choice 
than in ratings, where each outcome was again rated as equally likely. Bayes factors 
were also in favour of an effect in choice, and in favour of the null in ratings. 
Interestingly, in both the inverse base-rate effect and highlighting, the difference in 
patterns of responding between choice and ratings was specific to the conflicting trials. 
On imperfect and combined transfer trials, there was a preference for the common or 
early outcome in both choice and ratings groups. 
Thus it appears that overall on conflicting trials, when asked to make a choice, 
participants are more likely to choose the rare outcome, but when asked to rate the 
likelihood of each outcome, participants rate both relevant outcomes highly, and equally 
likely. While this response in the ratings group still does not demonstrate a 
consideration of outcome base-rates, it can still be considered a rational response, as it 
reflects the probability of the outcomes, given the cues. That is, the probability of O1 
given B is the same as the probability of O2 given C (i.e., P(O1|B) = P(O2|C)). Vadillo 
et al., (2005) suggest that predictive judgement questions, like those used in this 
experiment, are sensitive to the probability of outcomes given the presence of cues. 
Although the choice group received a similarly phrased question, they are limited in 
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choosing only one outcome. This may suggest that a rating test phase, where 
participants are able to respond with multiple outcomes, simply allows participants to 
demonstrate a more rational response.  
Assuming that there is a difference in associative strength for B and C, ratings 
may reflect more than just simple associative strength. Other factors, such as reasoning 
about causality, may influence ratings more so than choice (Tangen & Allan, 2004). 
Consequently, one factor that may potentially lead to a lack of effect in ratings is the use 
of a causal scenario, where cues are presented as potential causes of the outcomes. In an 
allergist task, it is entirely rational to assume that multiple effects may be equally likely. 
For example, if a patient suffers from headache after eating bananas, and suffers from 
fever after eating cheese, then regardless of the base-rates of these events, it is 
reasonable to assume that the patient would suffer from both headache and fever if the 
patient eats a meal containing both bananas and cheese. Thus, this task scenario may 
encourage participants to give equal ratings for each relevant outcome. This task was 
used primarily to accommodate the blocking and overshadowing components of the 
design, as some research has shown influences of causal structure on these kinds of cue 
competition effects. That is, there is evidence of competition between cues when they 
are presented as causes of the outcome, but not when they are presented as effects of the 
outcome (Waldmann, 2000; Waldmann, 2001; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Booth & 
Buehner, 2007; Beckers et al., 2005; but see Shanks & López, 1996; Cobos, López, 
Caño, Almaraz & Shanks, 2002). Evidence that blocking is sensitive to the causal 
structure of the task is greater when the effect is measured by ratings than when it is 
measured by choice (see Appendix E). While the inverse base-rate effect has been 
observed in several different task scenarios, including the allergist task (see Chapter 2 
and Chapter 5), it is possible that causal structure effects are also more readily observed 
	 195	
when the effect is measured by ratings than when it is measured by choice. This might 
explain why there are differences in blocking and the inverse base-rate effect in ratings, 
as the causal structure would affect each in different ways. That is, reasoning about the 
causal scenario would reduce the inverse base-rate effect, but enhance blocking, as the 
causal structure might encourage participants to reason that the blocked cue does not 
cause the outcome, leading to lower ratings.  
An alternative explanation for the lack of effect in the ratings group could be 
that ratings accurately reflect the strength of associations between cues and outcomes, 
and there is actually no difference in associative strength between the rare and common 
predictors. This would be problematic for cue-competition accounts of the effect, and 
might suggest that the effect in choice is instead driven by other mechanisms. 
Responding to individual common and rare predictive cues at test might provide some 
indication of their relative associative strength. In this experiment, there were no 
significant differences in accuracy for individual common and rare predictor test trials 
in either group. Nevertheless, performance on these trials is not clearly related to	
responding on conflicting trials (see Chapter 4), and there is also good evidence for a 
role of associative processes in the inverse base-rate effect (Johansen, Fouquet & 
Shanks, 2007). As such, this explanation is not strongly supported.  
Alternatively, the complexity of the task may have influenced the results in a 
way that reduced the likelihood of observing an effect in ratings. The inverse base-rate 
effect in the choice group was weaker than that observed in previous experiments in this 
thesis, and the highlighting effect overall only approached significance (although the 
biases here are similar to that reported in other studies, e.g., Juslin, Wennerholm & 
Winman, 2001; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005; Johansen, Fouquet & 
Shanks, 2010). This may simply be due to the number of contingencies to be learned, 
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leading to a higher probability of lapse errors at test, or it could be that including other 
contingencies (i.e., the rare outcome was paired with cues that were not rare predictors) 
interferes with the formation of inferences about the relationship between cues and 
outcomes, which might contribute to the strength of the effect. Although there are 
primacy effects in the inverse base-rate effect, the reduced global base-rate difference 
across the experiment may have reduced the strength of rare choice (see Experiment 2 
in this thesis). If certain task conditions reduced the strength of the inverse base-rate 
effect in the choice group where the effect is typically observed, then this makes it more 
difficult to make clear conclusions about the lack of an effect in the ratings group.  
Effect sizes in blocking and overshadowing were actually larger in ratings than in 
choice, but were smaller in ratings on negation trials. Perhaps negation trials, like those 
in highlighting and the inverse base-rate effect, are better measured with choice than 
ratings. This idea will be discussed further in the General Discussion of this chapter.  
The following experiments therefore aimed to account for these factors, and 
compared choice and ratings groups in a simpler design, including only inverse base-
rate contingencies, in either a causal scenario (Experiment 9) or a diagnostic scenario 
(Experiment 10).   
6.2 Experiment 9 
Experiment 8 demonstrated an absence of an inverse base-rate effect when 
measured by continuous outcome ratings. Experiment 9 simply aimed to replicate this 
effect in a more standard and simple inverse base-rate design, including only the 
common and rare compounds, with an overall 3:1 outcome base-rate, as detailed in 
Table 6.5.  
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Table 6.5.  
Design of Experiment 9 and Experiment 10.  
TRAINING     
Base-rate Trials    
3 AB – O1 DE – O1 GH – O3 JL – O3 
1 AC – O2 DF – O2 GI – O4 JK – O4 
TEST     
Trial type Trials    
Imperfect A D G J 
Conflicting (within) BC EF HI KL 
Conflicting (between) BI EL HC KF 
Combined  ABC DEF GHI JKL 
Common predictor B E H K 
Rare predictor C F I L 
Trained common AB DE GH JK 
Trained rare AC DF GI JL 
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
  Forty-eight undergraduates (33 female, mean age = 21.83, SD = 4.3) at the 
University of Sydney participated in return for partial course credit, and were randomly 
allocated to the choice and ratings groups (n = 24). All participants met the training 
criterion of 60% accuracy in the final three blocks of training and remained in the 
analyses.  
6.2.1.2 Stimuli 
The twelve food cues were randomly allocated from coffee, fish, lemon, cheese, 
eggs, garlic, bread, peanuts, avocado, banana, bacon, and peas. The allergic reaction 
outcomes were the same as those in Experiment 8.  
6.2.1.3 Design 
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 The design of the experiment is shown in Table 6.2, and is identical to the 
standard conditions run in previous chapters.  
6.2.1.4 Procedure  
 The experiment was run in a similar manner to Experiment 8, with the exception 
that there were only seven blocks of training, as in earlier chapters. Common 
compounds were presented six times per block, and rare compounds were presented 
twice per block.  
6.2.2 Results 
6.2.2.1 Training 
 Accuracy for each trial type during training is shown in Figure 6.5. A 2 x (2) x 
(7) repeated measures ANOVA with group (choice vs. ratings) as a between-subjects 
factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within-subjects factors 
revealed a significant main effect of block, F(6,276) = 185.92, p < .001, 𝜂!!  = .802.  
 
Figure 6.5. Mean training accuracy (±SEM) for each trial type in Experiment 9.  
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There was also a significant main effect of trial type, F(1,46) = 55.95, p < .001, 𝜂!! = 
.549, and interaction between trial and block, F(6,276) = 18.67, p < .001, 𝜂!!  =  .289, 
indicating that common trials were learned faster than rare trials. There was an 
unexpected main effect of group, F(1,46) = 5.78, p = .02, 𝜂!! = .112, and interaction 
between block and group, F(6,276) = 3.10, p = .006, 𝜂!! = .063, indicating that the 
ratings group learned slightly faster than the choice group. It is unclear why a group 
difference would emerge as this stage, as this was prior to any between-group 
manipulation. Nevertheless, there were no group differences in accuracy for either the 
common or rare trials in the final block of training, highest t(46) = 0.49, p = .626, d = 
0.14.  
6.2.2.2 Test 
Choice group. The proportion of relevant rare outcome choice is shown in 
Figure 6.6. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect, with greater choice of the 
rare outcome on conflicting trials, t(23) = 2.81, p = .01, d = .57, BF10 = 3.15 x 103.  
 
 
Figure 6.6. Test results from Experiment 9. Panel a) shows the mean proportion of rare 
outcome choice (±SEM) in the choice group, and panel b) shows the mean rare bias 
(±SEM) in the ratings group.  
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Choice on imperfect trials was significantly common biased, t(23) = 6.35, p < .001 , d = 
1.3. In this experiment, choice on combined trials was unbiased, t(23) = 0.85, p = .402, 
d = 0.17. There was a significant common bias on common predictor trials, t(23) = 
19.68, p < .001 , d = 4.02, and a significant rare bias on rare predictor trials, t(23) = 
27.19, p < .001 , d = 5.55. There was no significant difference in accuracy for common 
predictors (M = .95, SD = .11; reverse scored) and rare predictors (M = .97, SD = .08), 
t(23) = .68, p = .504, d = 0.18.  See Table 6.6 for responses to all test trials.  
Ratings group. Although there was a small rare bias on conflicting trials, this 
did not reach significance, t(23) = 1.72, p = .099, d = 0.35, and BF10 = 1.67 is 
inconclusive. There was a significant common bias on imperfect trials, t(23) = 3.57,  p = 
002, d = 0.73, and no bias on combined trials, t(23) = 0.26,  p = .800, d = 0.05. 
Common trials were significantly common biased, t(23) = 11.20,  p < .001, d = 2.29, 
and rare trials were significantly rare biased, t(23) = 15.69,  p < .001 , d = 3.20. In this  
 
Table 6.6 
Mean proportion of outcome choice or mean outcome rating for each test trial in the 
choice group of Experiment 9. 
 Choice Group  Ratings Group 
 
Proportion outcome 
choice 
 
    
Trial type Common Rare Other Confidence  Common Rare Other 
Imperfect .72 .20 .08 61.57  57.09 37.34 12.62 
Conflicting (within) .33 .60 .06 59.52  63.07 69.88 11.06 
Conflicting (between) .30 .65 .05 59.11  65.46 69.96 10.21 
Conflicting (total) .32 .63 .06 59.32  64.26 69.92 10.63 
Combined .54 .43 .03 69.47  87.89 88.68 12.85 
Common  .91 .04 .05 68.62  70.02 14.36 11.21 
Rare .03 .93 .04 72.81  9.26 73.82 9.37 
Trained common .96 .00 .03 94.56  96.91 18.44 8.06 
Trained rare .03 .92 .03 87.65  35.17 88.51 9.22 
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group, learning scores were significantly better for rare predictors (M = 64.55, SD = 
20.15) than common predictors (M = 55.66, SD = 24.34), t(23) = 2.79, p = .011, d = 
0.40. See Table 6.6 for mean ratings for all test trials. 
6.2.3 Discussion 
There was an unexpected group difference in training, such that the rating group 
appeared to learn faster than the choice group. This stage of training was prior to any 
systematic differences between groups, and is therefore likely to be a product of group 
randomisation or type I error. There is no evidence that this difference differentially 
affected performance on rare versus common trials during training, and the differences 
in accuracy had disappeared by the end of training.   
There was again a significant inverse base-rate effect in choice, and in this case, 
the strength of the effect was more comparable to that observed in previous experiments 
in this thesis. In the ratings group, there was also a small numerical rare bias in ratings 
for conflicting trials. This bias did not reach significance overall, though there was also 
much weaker evidence of a null effect in this experiment compared to the previous one. 
Therefore, this experiment did not clearly replicate a convincing absence of an inverse 
base-rate effect in ratings, using a standard inverse base-rate design. Although there is 
some evidence for a small rare bias in ratings, this at least appears to be weaker and less 
reliable than the effect in choice.  
6.3 Experiment 10  
Overall in the previous experiments in this chapter, participants have either rated 
each relevant outcome as equally likely on conflicting trials, or shown a small and non-
significant numerical rare bias overall. These experiments both used a causal scenario, 
where the outcomes are potential effects of the cues, which may influence how 
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participants respond to conflicting trials. While the inverse base-rate effect has been 
demonstrated using a causal allergist task when measured by choice (see Chapter 5), it 
is possible that ratings are more sensitive to task scenario. Therefore Experiment 10 
used a medical diagnosis task, where disease outcomes are the cause of the symptom 
cues. As symptoms are typically the result of one disease, participants may rate the 
relevant disease outcomes differently in this task scenario. With the exception of the 
task scenario and stimuli used as cues and outcomes, the experiment was otherwise 
identical to Experiment 9.  
6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
 Sixty-three undergraduate students from the University of Sydney participated 
in return for partial course credit or monetary compensation. Three participants did not 
meet the training criteria and were excluded from the analyses. This left 60 participants 
(43 female, mean age = 19.6, SD = 3.28) randomly allocated to the choice and ratings 
groups (n = 30).  
6.3.1.2 Stimuli 
Cue stimuli included sneezing, dizziness, headache, fever, rash, nausea, 
earache, coughing, hair loss, fatigue, wheezing, and swelling. Due to a programming 
error, half the participants in each group received the same allocations of stimuli to 
cues. The other half received stimuli that were randomly allocated to cues A-L. There 
were no significant differences in training accuracy or choices for the critical test trials 
considering the participants with and without random allocation of cues, lowest p =  
.125. The four outcomes were randomly allocated from Midosis, Coralgia, Buragamo 
and Terrigitis. 
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6.3.1.3 Procedure 
The task was run in the same manner as Experiment 9, with the exception of the 
task scenario. Details of the medical diagnosis task are outlined in Chapter 2. A minor 
change was made to the wording of the test question to ensure that each group was 
matched as closely as possible. In the choice group, the test question was “Which 
disease is this patient likely to have?” followed by a confidence rating. In the ratings 
group, the test question was “How likely is this patient to have each disease?” with each 
outcome scale ranging from “Unlikely” to “Likely”.  
6.3.2 Results 
6.3.2.1 Training 
Accuracy for each trial type during training is shown in Figure 6.7.  A 2 x (2) x 
(7) repeated measures ANOVA with group (choice vs. ratings) as a between-subjects 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Mean training accuracy (±SEM) for each trial type in Experiment 10.  
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factor, and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-7) as within-subjects factors 
revealed a significant main effect of block, F(6,348) = 208.27, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .782. 
Common trials were once again learned faster than rare trials, with a significant main 
effect of trial type F(1,58) = 129.64, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .691, and interaction between trial 
and block, F(6,348) =, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .107. There were no significant effects of group, 
highest F(1,58) = 3.47, p =.067, 𝜂!! = .057.  
6.3.2.2 Test 
Choice group. The proportion of relevant rare outcome choice is shown in 
Figure 6.8, panel A. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect, with rare-biased 
outcome choice on conflicting trials, t(29) = 3.11, p = .004, d = .57, BF10 = 60.11 x 103. 
Choice on imperfect trials was again significantly common biased, t(29) =  7.82, p < 
.001, d = 1.43, and choice on combined trials was unbiased, t(29) = 0.74, p = .466, d = 
.13. There was a significant common bias on common predictor trials, t(29) = 59.0, p < 
.001, d = 10.77, and a significant rare bias on rare predictor trials, t(29) = 12.31,  
Figure 6.8. Test results from Experiment 10. Panel a) shows the mean proportion of 
rare outcome choice (±SEM) in the choice group, and panel b) shows the mean rare bias 
(±SEM) in the ratings group. 
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p < .001, d = 2.25. Here, accuracy was significantly better for common predictors (M = 
.99, SD = .05) than rare predictors (M = .90, SD = .18), t(29) = 2.57, p =.016, d = .68. 
See Table 6.7 for responses to all test trials. 
Ratings group.  Mean rare biases in the ratings group are shown in panel B of 
Figure 6.8. In this experiment, the rare bias on conflicting trials was small but 
significant, t(29) = 2.29, p = .03, d = 0.42, BF10 = 35.15. There was a significant 
common bias on imperfect trials, t(29) = 3.98,  p < .001, d = 0.73. There was again no 
bias on combined trials, t(29) = 0.34,  p = .735, d = 0.06. Common trials were 
significantly common biased, t(29) = 13.64,  p < .001, d = 2.49, and rare trials were 
significantly rare biased, t(29) = 17.33,  p < .001 , d = 3.16.  As in the ratings group in 
Experiment 9, accuracy for the rare predictors (M = 69.19, SD = 21.86) was higher than 
accuracy for the common predictors (M = 59.06, SD = 23.72), t(29) = 2.94, p = .006, d 
= 0.44. See Table 6.7 for mean ratings for all test trials. 
 
Table 6.7 
Mean proportion of outcome choice or outcome rating for each test trial in the choice 
group of Experiment 10. 
 Choice Group  Ratings Group 
 
Proportion outcome 
choice 
 
 Mean rating 
Trial type Common Rare Other Confidence  Common Rare Other 
Imperfect 0.70 0.20 0.10 66.85  69.41 50.90 16.82 
Conflicting (within) 0.34 0.64 0.02 70.34  61.15 69.94 13.27 
Conflicting (between) 0.36 0.61 0.03 63.26  61.33 68.99 16.25 
Conflicting (total) 0.35 0.63 0.03 66.80  61.24 69.47 14.76 
Combined 0.52 0.46 0.03 75.51  73.42 74.41 13.15 
Common  0.89 0.01 0.10 79.12  78.31 19.25 15.11 
Rare 0.08 0.86 0.06 77.65  13.44 82.62 12.68 
Trained common 0.97 0.02 0.02 88.32  92.69 24.56 9.03 
Trained rare 0.08 0.89 0.03 83.35  43.39 85.83 12.76 
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6.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 10 once again demonstrated a significant inverse base-rate effect in 
the choice group. In this case, there was also a significant effect in the ratings group, 
although the rare-bias was only slightly larger than that in Experiment 9 (d = 0.42 
compared to d = 0.35, respectively). This result might suggest that there is some 
influence of causal models on the inverse base-rate effect when it is measured by 
ratings, in which presenting the cues as causes weakens the effect. However, comparing 
responses between Experiment 9 and 10 revealed no significant differences in ratings on 
conflicting trials, t(52) = 0.52, p = .708, d = 0.36. There were also no significant 
differences between experiments for any other test trial in either group, highest t(52) = 
1.79, p = .079, d = 0.47 for common predictor trials in the choice group. Although this 
is not an ideal comparison, there is no strong evidence here that causal models have an 
effect on ratings. Perhaps the larger sample size in this experiment simply allowed 
better observation of a small rare bias in ratings.  
6.4 General Discussion 
This series of experiments aimed to determine whether the inverse base-rate 
effect would be observed when measured in a continuous rating scale. The experiments 
provided mixed results. In Experiment 8, there was no bias in ratings for conflicting 
cues in either inverse base-rate or highlighting designs, whereas other cue competition 
effects, such as blocking and overshadowing, were robust in each. Experiment 9 
compared choice and ratings in the standard inverse base-rate design, using an allergist 
task. There was a small numerical rare bias on conflicting trials but this was 
nonsignificant. In Experiment 10, which used the same design as Experiment 9 but in a 
medical diagnosis task, there was a slightly larger rare bias that was significant overall. 
Bayes factors provided strong evidence in favour of a null effect in Experiment 8, 
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inconclusive evidence in Experiment 9, and strong evidence in favour of an effect in 
Experiment 10. Considering the results of all three experiments overall, it appears that 
there may be a small preference for the rare outcome in ratings, but this bias is not as 
clear or reliable as the biases in choice. The following discussion will address potential 
explanations for this result.  
 The results of Experiment 8 raised the possibility that, similar to blocking, the 
inverse base-rate effect is more sensitive to causal structure when measured by ratings 
than when measured by choice. That is, presenting cues in a causal scenario may 
encourage participants to rate each relevant outcome as equally likely. The only 
significant inverse base-rate effect in ratings occurred in Experiment 10, which used a 
diagnostic scenario. However, there were no significant differences in ratings on 
conflicting trials, or any other test trials, between Experiment 9 and Experiment 10. 
Indeed, examining Tables 6.6 and 6.7, there are remarkable consistencies in the 
magnitudes of both choice proportions and outcome ratings for conflicting trials across 
the two experiments. Future research should assess causal model effects in the inverse 
base-rate effect within the same experiment, using a large between-subjects design 
manipulating causal model and test phase. Ideally, groups would be presented with the 
same stimuli but would receive different instructions describing the cues and outcomes 
in either a causal or diagnostic structure (e.g., Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992; Booth & 
Buehner, 2007), before completing a choice or ratings test phase.   
The clearest difference in task requirements between the two test phase groups is 
that in the choice group, participants may only select one outcome, whereas in ratings, 
participants are required to respond to all outcomes. This may encourage participants in 
the ratings group to give high ratings to all relevant outcomes. Consistent with this idea, 
across the three experiments, the average difference in ratings for the relevant and 
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irrelevant outcomes was 59.68 (SD = 21.03), whereas the average difference in ratings 
for the relevant common and relevant rare outcomes was only 3.13 (SD = 19.28). If 
participants were able to make multiple responses in the choice test phase, it is possible 
that they would also choose both the common and rare outcome on conflicting trials. If 
this were the case, then we might also expect smaller effects in ratings for other test 
trials comprising cues paired with multiple outcomes, such as the imperfect and 
blocking negation trials (which paired a blocked cue with a control cue that were 
associated with different outcomes). On imperfect trials, participants reliably gave 
higher ratings to the common outcome compared to the rare outcome, demonstrating 
appropriate base-rate use. In blocking negation trials in Experiment 8 there was also a 
clear preference for the outcome paired with the control cue. Although the effects in 
these test trials are consistent across choice and ratings, it could be the case that effect 
sizes are larger in choice measures than ratings measures.  
To explore this idea, a summary of the effect sizes for choice and ratings across 
all three experiments is shown in Table 6.8. This is separated into three kinds of test 
trials, a) ambiguous negation style compound test trials, which pair multiple cues that 
were associated with different outcomes during training, b) ambiguous single cues that 
were paired with multiple outcomes during training, and c) effects that compare 
responses to unambiguous cues on separate trials. Several observations can be made 
from the pattern of effect sizes. First, of these 19 test trials, 13 effects were larger in 
choice than in ratings, binomial p = .083 (one-tailed). Second, the direction of numeric 
outcome biases for each effect within each experiment is mostly consistent between 
choice and ratings measures. Only three trials showed a different direction of biases 
between choice and ratings (two combined, one perfect predictor), and only one of these 
was a significant effect. Third, choice appears to be a more sensitive measure for 
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ambiguous trials where there may be more than one appropriate response. Of the 13 
ambiguous trials (both negation style compound trials and single cue trials), 11 had 
larger effect sizes in choice than ratings, binomial p = .011 (one-tailed). Finally, ratings 
may be a more sensitive measure of effects comparing differences between 
unambiguous cues on separate trials; for example, differences in accuracy for blocked 
and control cues, or differences in accuracy for perfect predictors. Of the six 
comparisons of this type, four had larger effect sizes in ratings than in choice. Of 
course, these ideas remain to be tested rigorously, but this comparison may provide 
some indication of why there might be differences in the strength of the inverse base-
rate effect between choice and rating test phases.  
One potential explanation for these results is that a discrete choice test phase 
provides a more sensitive measure than continuous ratings, particularly for ambiguous 
test trials. That is, the weight of evidence that is required to choose one outcome over 
another might only lead to a small difference in ratings between the two outcomes. For 
example, on conflicting BC trials, if C provides a slightly stronger indication of O2 than 
B provides of O1, then this should result in greater choice of the rare outcome, but O2 
might only be given a slightly higher rating than O1 in ratings. Small but reliable effects 
would therefore be more easily and more consistently detected in a choice measure than 
in a ratings measure. The idea that choice is a more sensitive measure for ambiguous 
trials makes intuitive sense, as these kinds of trials are designed to determine which 
cues are prioritised when making a response, and the choice test phase forces response 
prioritisation, whereas ratings do not.   
Assuming that what is learned in training does not differ between groups, the 
results may also indicate that task conditions, such as task complexity, may influence  
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Table 6.8 
Summary of effect sizes for each trial type in choice and ratings groups.  
  Choice  Ratings  
Trial type 
Exp 
# Cohen’s d Bias 
 
Cohen’s d Bias Δd 
Negation style compound trials        
Conflicting (IBRE) 8 0.25 R  0.03 R 0.22 
Conflicting (IBRE) 9 0.57 R  0.35 R 0.22 
Conflicting (IBRE) 10 0.57 R  0.42 R 0.15 
Conflicting (Highlighting) 8 0.22 R  0.05 R 0.17 
Combined (IBRE) 8 0.25 C  0.34 C -0.09 
Combined (IBRE) 9 0.17 C  0.05 R 0.12 
Combined (IBRE) 10 0.13 C  0.06 R 0.07 
Combined (Highlighting) 8 0.39 C  0.34 C 0.05 
Blocking 8 0.97 -  0.78 - 0.19 
Ambiguous single cue trials 
   
 
   Imperfect (IBRE) 8 0.84 C  0.86 C -0.02 
Imperfect (IBRE) 9 1.3 C  0.73 C 0.57 
Imperfect (IBRE) 10 1.43 C  0.73 C 0.7 
Imperfect (Highlighting) 8 1.49 C  1.1 C 0.39 
Unambiguous single cue 
comparisons    
 
   
Perfect predictors (IBRE) 8 0.19 C  0.24 C -0.05 
Perfect predictors (IBRE) 9 0.18 R  0.4 R -0.22 
Perfect predictors (IBRE) 10 0.68 C  0.44 R 0.24 
Perfect predictors (Highlighting) 8 0.3 C  0.25 C 0.05 
Blocking 8 0.62 -  0.71 - -0.09 
Overshadowing 8 0.92 -  1.83 - -0.91 
Note: “Bias” refers to the numerical direction of choice or ratings on each trial, where C 
= common outcome, R = rare outcome. For example, C indicates greater choice or 
higher ratings for the common outcome than the rare outcome. For highlighting, early 
and late outcome biases are also indicated by C and R, respectively. Letters in bold 
indicate a significant choice bias. Δd indicates the difference between effect sizes for 
choice and ratings, where a positive score indicates a larger effect size in choice. The 
perfect predictor trials are the comparison of accuracy between common and rare 
predictor cues presented individually.  
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ratings more so than they do choice, as an inverse base-rate effect was consistently 
observed in the choice group in conditions where it was difficult to obtain an effect in 
ratings. While some results are consistent with this possibility, it should also be noted 
that that the effect size for the inverse base-rate effect was smaller in Experiment 8 
compared to Experiment 9 and 10 for both the ratings and choice groups. Bayes factors 
in the ratings group in Experiment 9 did not provide strong evidence for either the 
presence or absence of an effect, whereas there was strong evidence for an effect in 
Experiment 10, which might suggest that Experiment 9 was underpowered. 
Nevertheless, with this same sample size, there was substantial evidence in favour of an 
effect in the choice group.  
 Overall, the inverse base-rate effect is not as reliably observed across measures 
as blocking. In the introduction to Experiment 8, I stated that if these effects are all due 
to common mechanisms, then they should all be observable under the same test 
conditions. Yet, the evidence presented above suggests that different measures may be 
needed to provide a sensitive test of these effects. On the surface, this seems to be 
inconsistent with Kruschke et al. (2005), which found an association between the 
strength of highlighting and blocking, albeit using a choice measure. Yet, these kinds of 
cue competition effects may actually be difficult to compare, particularly in the absence 
of a behavioural measure that is linearly related with associative strength. That is, 
blocking compares two cues that should both have limited associative strength because 
they are each paired with another perfectly predictive cue. The difference in the 
associative strength between those two cues should be relatively clear, as only one is 
paired with a cue that has already gained associative strength with the outcome. On the 
other hand, the inverse base-rate effect compares two cues that should both have 
relatively high associative strength because they are both the most predictive cue on 
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their respective training trials. In addition, the cue that is assumed to have the weaker 
associative strength (B) is presented more frequently than the cue that is assumed to 
have stronger associative strength (C). Indeed, accuracy in recalling the outcome 
associated with the common cue is generally fairly high (e.g., Wills et al., 2014), 
whereas accuracy in recalling the outcome paired with the blocked cue is generally 
fairly low (Mitchell et al., 2006). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the inverse 
base-rate effect would be a subtler cue competition effect than blocking.  
One particular limitation of comparing choice and rating measures is that it is 
difficult to directly compare responses in each group, as the measures are on different 
scales. It may be useful for future research to compare test phases within-subjects, either 
by counterbalancing the order of test-phases, or testing half the test trials in either 
condition. Even then, the measures could not be directly compared, but the relationship 
between measures could be assessed to determine whether participants who show rare-
biased choice are more likely to show rare-biased ratings.  
6.4.1 Confidence ratings  
Another potential explanation that has not yet been discussed is that ratings may 
reflect participants’ confidence in their choice. That is, the small biases in ratings might 
indicate low confidence in outcome choice. To investigate this idea, we can compare 
confidence according to choice on conflicting trials, and compare confidence ratings 
between different transfer trials. The imperfect transfer trial is perhaps the best 
comparison, as this cue was also paired with two outcomes in the same base-rate as 
conflicting trials, but tends to elicit responses consistent with the base-rate. To make 
these comparisons, confidence ratings for the relevant trials were collapsed across the 
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standard group from each experiment in this thesis.19 This gave confidence ratings from 
166 participants. For each participant, there were four different imperfect trial 
confidence ratings, and four different conflicting trial confidence ratings. Overall, 
participants gave significantly higher confidence ratings on conflicting trials (M = 
66.46) than on imperfect trials (M = 60.90), t(663) = 5.20, p < .001. A linear mixed 
effects model was run to predict confidence from outcome choice, with choice as a 
fixed effect, and subject as a random effect. Confidence ratings by choice for imperfect 
and conflicting trials are shown in Figure 6.9. On conflicting trials, participants gave  
 
Figure 6.9. Mean confidence ratings according to outcome choice on conflicting and 
imperfect transfer trials, collapsed across the standard conditions from all experiments 
with four potential outcomes.   																																																								19	This analysis only included experiments that had four potential outcomes, so that comparisons between 
confidence ratings may be readily interpretable. For instance, when there are only two outcomes 
available, depending on the way in which participants use the scale, a confidence rating of 50 might 
indicate a guess, whereas this might indicate greater confidence when there are four outcomes available. 
For the data from Chapter 6, the confidence ratings for conflicting trials included only the within-
compound trials, to be consistent with previous experiments. 	
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significantly higher confidence ratings on trials where the rare outcome was chosen (M 
= 69.4, n = 443), compared to trials where the common outcome was chosen (M = 62.1, 
n = 198), p =.005. In contrast, on imperfect trials, participants gave significantly higher 
confidence ratings on trials where the common outcome was chosen (M = 63.5, n = 
505) than trials where the rare outcome was chosen (M = 54.8, n = 113), p < .001. 
These results suggest that participants are not simply unsure of their choice of 
the rare outcome, which is then reflected in ratings. The effect instead appears highly 
robust in choice, and participants are generally as confident in their choice on the rare 
outcome as they are for seemingly rational and base-rate normative choices on other 
transfer trials. 
6.4.2 Conclusions 
Discrete outcome choice is generally reflective of the way in which decision-
making and categorisation occurs in the real world. For example, deciding which car to 
buy, or diagnosing a disease requires a choice between alternative options. Even if 
differences in associative strength are small, determining what information people use, 
and what choices they make when given conflicting information is still an important 
issue, particularly if it results in an irrational choice.  
Overall, while a small inverse base-rate effect may be evident in ratings, it 
appears to be much more reliable in choice. An important decision that faces 
researchers studying learning and decision-making is the most appropriate way to 
measure these psychological effects. The results of this study therefore have practical 
implications for researchers in determining which test measures will best reflect 
learning and decision effects, as well as interpreting the strength of effects in choice and 
ratings measures. Specifically, discrete choice may be a more sensitive measure when 
assessing small effects, or where there are a number of plausible outcomes, or under 
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conditions in which it may be difficult to observe an effect. Although the results for the 
inverse base-rate effect in ratings were mixed, there is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that a weak effect is observable using ratings, under the right conditions. This suggests 
that the effect is not confined to discrete choice, but that choice tests might still be the 
most sensitive way to measure it.  	
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CHAPTER 7  
General Discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to better understand the mechanisms underlying the inverse 
base-rate effect. To recap, the inverse base-rate effect refers to a seemingly irrational 
tendency to predict a rare outcome when presented with conflicting information. The 
effect is characterised by greater rare outcome choice for conflicting BC transfer trials 
following training of common AB-O1 and rare AC-O2 contingencies. This is 
typically accompanied by greater common outcome choice for the imperfect A 
transfer trials, and sometimes, although less consistently, combined ABC transfer 
trials. Specifically, this research aimed to determine the potential role of inferential 
reasoning to the effect, explore the way in which attention to predictive cues is 
influenced by outcome base-rates, and assess whether the effect is observed across 
different test measures. In this chapter, the results will be summarised and discussed 
in relation to these aims.  
7.1 What role do inferential processes play in the inverse base-rate effect?   
The first aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of inferential processes 
in the inverse base-rate effect. Inferential accounts of the effect have largely been 
discounted, due to the failure of the eliminative inference model (ELMO; Juslin, 
Wennerholm & Winman, 2001) to account for several characteristics of the effect, 
including the necessity of a shared cue during training (Medin & Edelson, 1988; 
Kruschke, 2001a). This view is somewhat surprising, given the importance of 
inferential accounts to other cue competition effects (see Mitchell, De Houwer & 
Lovibond, 2009). Moreover, several findings suggest a general contribution of higher-
order processes of some kind (Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin & Shanks, 2005), while 
others have recently argued that greater processing of the common predictor on 
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conflicting trials, particularly when the rare outcome is chosen, provides support for 
an eliminative inference (O’Bryan, Worthy, Livesey & Davis, 2017). Granted, several 
researchers have acknowledged a potential contribution of inference to the effect 
(e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Kruschke, 2005; Johansen, Fouquet & Shanks. 2007; Winman, 
Wennerholm & Juslin, 2003), yet there has been little research since the development 
of ELMO into the form these inferences may take. If the particular formalisation of 
ELMO does not account for the data, then it is useful to ascertain whether some form 
of elimination or novelty-matching could still contribute to the effect, or whether a 
different form of inferential reasoning could be involved. 
While inferential processes may arise during the test phase, as a direct 
consequence of being presented with the new conflicting trial type, inferences may 
also form during training. For example, noticing what happens when a novel cue is 
presented, or what happens when a novel outcome is presented, may influence the 
way in which participants form rules or inferences about how to respond to particular 
trials. These rules or inferences may then generalise to responding to transfer trials at 
test. For this reason, experiments in Chapter 3 focused on conditions during training 
that may affect the formation of novelty or eliminative inferences, including outcome 
frequency and trial frequency.  
Eliminative inference suggests that participants eliminate the outcome 
associated with well-known inference rules when they encounter transfer trials that 
are dissimilar to the learned rules, and guess amongst remaining outcome options 
(Juslin, Wennerholm & Winman, 2001). Due to the base-rates, the common outcome 
is more likely to be eliminated, and the rare outcome is more likely to be chosen. A 
related novelty-matching inference suggests that participants choose the most novel 
outcome in response to a novel transfer trial. The influence of global outcome 
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frequency on rare biases at test could provide support for a contribution of novelty-
matching. Experiment 2 manipulated the relative frequency of outcomes, while 
maintaining trial frequency differences between AB and AC trials. In a standard 
group, each outcome was either always paired with a common compound, or always 
paired with a rare compound, such that there was a 3:1 outcome base-rate both within 
overlapping cue compounds (e.g., AB and AC), and over the entire experiment. In a 
balanced group, each outcome was paired with a common compound and a rare 
compound, such that there was still a 3:1 base-rate within overlapping compounds, 
but a 1:1 base-rate of each outcome across the entire experiment. When each outcome 
was experienced at an equal rate in the balanced group, such that neither outcome 
provided a more novel response, the effect was considerably reduced compared to the 
standard group. This result was replicated a further three times in Chapter 4. 
Interestingly, there was still a small bias towards choosing the local rare outcome on 
conflicting trials in the balanced group. If removing the novelty of some outcomes 
reduces rare choice then perhaps novelty-matching contributes to the effect to some 
extent.  
Yet, the evidence for novelty matching or elimination is less convincing when 
considering the results overall. The results from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 demonstrate 
that attentional processes can accommodate this effect of global outcome frequency. 
Perhaps the most notable evidence against novelty-matching or elimination is that 
participants tended to predict the common outcome for novel transfer trials that 
comprised a novel cue and an imperfect predictor (e.g., AX), and this result was 
replicated across four experiments. Importantly, this common bias occurred in 
conjunction with a significant inverse base-rate effect, whereas previous evidence of 
rare biases for single novel cues that have provided support for inferential accounts 
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have only been demonstrated in conjunction with a non-significant choice bias on 
conflicting trials (Juslin et al., 2001; Johansen et al., 2007). It is worth noting, 
however, that responses on these novel trials do not appear to be entirely driven by 
the imperfect predictor, as there were weaker common biases on novel trials than 
imperfect cue trials, and this result is not well captured by attention models (see 
Chapter 4). While this result may indicate a non-attentional influence on choice, it is 
also consistent with previous findings that pairing a novel cue with a trained cue 
reduces predictive ratings compared to ratings for the trained cue alone (Lotz & 
Lachnit, 2009; Karazinov & Boakes, 2004).20  
The presence of conflicting trials and a global outcome base-rate difference 
established independently of the relevant compounds was also not sufficient to 
produce an effect. Experiment 3 manipulated trial frequency differences of 
overlapping compounds, while maintaining global outcome base-rate differences. In 
the standard group, AB-O1 trials were trained three times as often as AC-O2 trials. In 
an equal-trial group AB-O1 and AC-O2 trials were trained in equal frequency, but the 
base-rate of the common outcome was increased through pairing that outcome with 
high frequency filler trials. The rare bias on conflicting trials was abolished in the 
equal-trial group, as was the common bias on imperfect and novel trials. Thus it 
appears important that trial and outcome frequency differences are experienced in 
conjunction. This absence of an effect in the equal-trial group also emerges from 
associative explanations, as the imperfect predictor would no longer be strongly 
associated with the common outcome, resulting in equal competition on AB and AC 
trials. Consistent with this idea, this result was also predicted by attentional models in 																																																								20	Indeed an analogous effect occurs in animal conditioning, where the conditioned response to a 
conditioned stimulus reduces if that conditioned stimulus is presented simultaneously with another 
novel stimulus, an effect referred to as external inhibition (Pavlov, 1927). Thus there is no particular 
reason to assume that this effect is due to inferential reasoning specifically.	
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Chapter 5, although these models struggle to account for the effects of both trial and 
outcome frequency with the same set of parameters.  
Unlike O’Bryan et al. (2017), who found greater processing of B on BC trials 
when the rare outcome was chosen, there was no evidence of greater visual attention 
to the common cue on conflicting trials in Chapter 5. O’Bryan et al. argued that their 
results were consistent with rare choice being a consequence of inferential reasoning 
about the common cue (e.g., outcome elimination), and thus it is noteworthy that the 
eye tracking measure did not find evidence of the same pattern on test, although the 
measure of neural processing used in their study may not be apparent in fixation time. 
The analysis used by O’Bryan et al. also averaged over a greater number of test trials, 
and so their procedure may be more sensitive to detecting differences at test. There 
was also no evidence of greater attention to the rare predictor on these trials, which 
was the result previously found in a study examining attention biases in the related 
highlighting effect (Kruschke, Kappenman and Hetrick, 2005). Thus there was also 
no evidence for continued attention to cue C on conflicting trials. Instead, fixation 
time on each cue did not differ, regardless of the outcome chosen. This result suggests 
that processing occurring during training has a greater influence on outcome choice 
than biases in processing of cues arising in the test phase.  
Experiment 4 included a post-experimental questionnaire to assess whether 
participants would identify using a novelty matching or eliminative inference, or a 
different reasoning strategy related to rare outcome choice, and whether this was 
consistent across participants. Although the majority of participants showed a clear 
rare bias on conflicting trials in the test phase, most of these participants reported that 
they had chosen the common outcome on these trials in the questionnaire. This could 
suggest that the choice made during the task was not a deliberative one, and when 
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presented with a summary of the base-rates, participants simply choose the most 
rational response.21 However, this post-experimental method of assessing inferential 
reasoning may be limited, as it relies on participants being able to map the abstract 
description of a trial in the questionnaire to what they have seen during the test phase, 
which may be difficult. Another option would be to require participants to provide 
explanations for each choice online, as they are completing the test phase. The reason 
I chose not to use this procedure was because asking participants to reflect on their 
choices might then influence their choice responses on subsequent trials.  
Of those participants who correctly indicated they had chosen the rare 
outcome during the test phase, the explanations provided were varied. Critically, one 
participant clearly reported an eliminative inference. That is, if the presented 
symptoms did not match those of the common disease, the rare disease was instead 
chosen. Although only one participant was able to clearly articulate this strategy, at 
the very least this indicates that participants are able to form and apply this kind of 
inference in response to transfer trials. It is possible that this response is a reflection 
of a small subset of participants who use this inference in these kinds of tasks. Yet, if 
participants do use this inference, why does the effect rely on a shared cue during 
training? The necessity of a shared cue has been the clearest argument against an 
eliminative inference strategy (Kruschke, 2001a, Wills et al., 2014). The presence of a 
shared cue might still be important to observe an effect overall if only a minority of 
participants use an eliminative inference. That is, without a shared cue, the majority 
of participants will show a common bias, which might outweigh the rare bias from 
those using the inference. Alternatively, perhaps the presence of a shared cue is 																																																								
21 In the inverse base-rate effect, summarising base-rates appears to encourage their use (e.g., Johansen, 
Fouquet & Shanks, 2007), yet the opposite appears to be true for base-rate neglect (e.g., Christensen-
Szalanski & Beach, 1982; Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Manis, Dovaline, Avis & 
Cardoze, 1980; Butt, 1988). However the task requirements involved in producing these phenomena 
are very different.  
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necessary to form rules about the task during training that might result in an 
eliminative inference during test. That is, the common outcome rules would be 
learned well due to trial base-rates. When the rare compound is subsequently 
encountered, participants might notice that the rare outcome shares some features 
with the common outcome, due to the presence of the shared cue, but is not a perfect 
match. In this case, the common outcome is not the correct prediction. Participants 
might then learn that when they encounter a trial that is similar to those already 
learned, but not exactly the same, the rare outcome should be chosen. Therefore when 
a similar situation is encountered on BC trials at test, the same inference is applied, 
resulting in a rare bias. This kind of elimination is somewhat different to that 
proposed by Juslin et al (2001), as it does not involve guessing amongst the remaining 
outcomes, but may still involve elimination of the common outcome, or choice of the 
rare outcome based on differences between trials.  This type of inferential elimination 
may be more plausible than that formalised in ELMO, however it still does not 
explain why novel AX trials fail to elicit rare choice, and given the scarcity of 
elimination-like descriptions in Experiment 4, it is questionable whether an inference 
of this sort is really prevalent enough to explain the highly reliable rare bias I have 
now observed over many experiments. 
No participants referred to using a novelty matching strategy in the 
questionnaire. However the novelty of the rare predictor did appear to be an important 
factor for several participants. Here, participants indicated that the fact that the rare 
predictor was uncommon indicated that its associated outcome was more likely. This 
seems to indicate a higher salience of the rare predictor as a result of its infrequent 
presentation, or the fact that it predicts an uncommon event. This is consistent with 
previous results that show increasing the salience of C can lead to a bias in choice 
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without base-rate differences (Bohil, Markman & Maddox, 2005). There is also some 
overlap here with responses classified as ‘asymmetric representation’, where C 
indicates O2 more than B indicates O1. This could either be indicative of a reasoning 
strategy or a conscious reflection of an associative process, where C has a stronger 
association with the rare outcome than B has with the common outcome.  
Although some of these experimental results could be explained by an 
involvement of reasoning processes, prominent attention based explanations of the 
effect can also account for much of these data. Considering the results on the whole, it 
seems likely that participants may use multiple processes when making decisions, 
where choice is sometimes based on associative memory, and sometimes based on 
reasoning. Further, the questionnaire reveals that only some participants appear to 
engage in conscious reasoning processes. Even then, these strategies may not be 
consistent across participants.  
It is possible to conclude from the results presented here that associative 
processes can do a serviceable job of accounting for the inverse base-rate effect 
without the need for inferential processes. If inferential processes were playing a 
substantial role, then we should expect to see stronger evidence of consistent use of a 
particular type of inferential process. Any evidence in favour of some influence of 
novelty (e.g., the importance of global outcome frequency, differences in responses to 
imperfect and novel trials), for instance, can just as easily be explained in associative 
terms. One limitation is that these experiments did not provide a way of 
distinguishing whether these effects were a result of higher-order or lower-order 
processes, for instance, a definitive test in which associative models predict an effect 
in one direction and inferential models predict an effect in the opposite direction. 
Differentiating between the two is also particularly difficult if we assume that 
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inferential processes develop during training, rather than arising when conflicting 
trials are encountered at test, just as it is difficult to determine whether descriptions of 
explanations for outcome choice in the questionnaire, e.g., that C is a better indicator 
of the rare outcome, is an inference or a conscious reflection of an associative 
process.  
One thing these results certainly highlight is the need for further research into 
individual differences in the effect, to determine which factors predict a 
predominance of inferential or associative processes, and whether the tendency to rely 
on either process results in differences in choice. The tendency to choose the rare 
outcome might be associated with different learning orientations or cognitive abilities. 
For example, prior research has shown associations between the use of higher-order 
processes and cognitive reflection (Don, Goldwater, Otto & Livesey, 2015; 2016; 
Livesey Lee & Shone, 2013), and interactions between learning orientation and task 
conditions (Goldwater, Don, Krusche & Livesey, accepted). Winman et al. (2005) 
showed that participants who tend to use rule-based transfer in a patterning task also 
tend to show rare biases on conflicting trials, and Little & McDaniel (2015) have 
shown that participants’ tendency to use higher order processes is stable across tasks. 
Thus it may be beneficial to determine participants’ learning strategies in a separate 
task that can clearly differentiate between responding based on reasoning, and 
responding based on associations.   
7.2 What can the effect tell us about the way in which attention processes operate 
in learning about predictive cues? 
Chapter 3 explored whether there are systematic influences of elimination, 
novelty-matching, or another form of inferential reasoning on the effect. Overall, the 
results do not provide strong evidence in favour of a widespread contribution of a 
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single inferential process, and Chapter 4 showed that attention-based associative 
models can reasonably account for the effects of trial and outcome frequency. It 
seems then that attention based explanations are still the most plausible unified 
account of the effect. Yet, there are still questions about the nature of attention 
processes in the effect (Le Pelley et al., 2016). 
The most widely accepted account of the inverse base-rate effect states that 
prediction error drives attention towards the rare predictor, resulting in a stronger 
association between the rare predictor and the rare outcome. If this is the case, then 
the effect can be explained by the same predictiveness principles that can account for 
a multitude of human learning phenomena (see Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George 
& Wills, 2016). Yet, one result that has been highlighted as potentially problematic 
for attentional explanations is the presence of an inverse base-rate effect when 
common responses to cue B alone are greater than rare responses to cue C alone at 
test, which indicates a dissociation between relative attention to cues and their relative 
associative strengths. While the inverse base-rate effect does not exclusively occur in 
these conditions, greater accuracy for B than C has been reported in several studies 
(e.g., Bohil, Markman, & Maddox, 2005; Kruschke, 1996; Medin & Edelson, 1988; 
Medin & Bettger, 1991; Shanks, 1992; Winman, Wennerholm, Juslin, & Shanks, 
2005; Wills, Lavric, Hemmings & Surrey, 2014). In this thesis, accuracy was at least 
numerically greater on B alone trials than C alone trials in eight of 13 conditions in 
which there was a significant inverse base-rate effect, and this difference was 
significant in four conditions. While overall this might not provide a particularly 
robust replication of Wills et al.’s finding, it is worth considering differences in test 
conditions in these experiments. Whereas Wills et al., had several repetitions of each 
test trial, the experiments in this thesis had only one repetition, which may be less 
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sensitive to detecting differences, particularly as accuracy was close to ceiling on 
these trials. Wills et al. (2014) suggested that EXIT can account for this dissociation, 
whereas the Mackintosh (1975) model cannot. This is an interesting observation, as 
EXIT arose as a connectionist implementation of Mackintosh, and both models are 
generally assumed to make the same predictions for attention (Kruschke, 2001a). This 
dissociation has also made the inverse base-rate effect a notable exception to a simple 
model of attention where attention is equivalent to associative strength (Le Pelley et 
al., 2016).  
In this thesis, it was hypothesized that these effects could be reconciled by 
assuming a role of context learning. That is, the context is likely to become strongly 
associated with the common outcome in a way that could facilitate responding on B 
alone trials, and impair responding on C alone trials, but still allow associative 
strength to be greater for C than for B. If this is the case, then the presence of an 
inverse base-rate effect in these conditions may actually be consistent with 
Mackintosh and simple attention models, although this might rely on additional 
assumptions of non-linear summation processes at test; for example, assuming that 
the context contributes more to choice when a single cue is present than when two 
cues are present. 
The influence of context associations on attention and choice was explored 
through comparisons of the standard and balanced groups previously described. In the 
standard condition, the context will be strongly associated with the common outcome. 
In the balanced condition, where each outcome is experienced at an equal rate, the 
context should not be more strongly associated with one outcome over another. Over 
four experiments in this thesis, the balanced group showed a consistently weaker 
inverse base-rate effect, although collapsed across all experiments, and in one 
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individual experiment, the residual bias was significant. This was also accompanied 
by a weaker common bias on imperfect trials. Both the EXIT model and the 
Mackintosh model were able to predict a reduced effect in the balanced condition 
compared to the standard condition. However, the models consistently differed in 
their predictions for attention to B compared to C. EXIT predicted a greater bias in 
attention for C over A than for B over A, while Mackintosh predicted greater attention 
for B over A than C over A. The models also made different predictions for changes 
in attention across training, and for biases between groups. While EXIT predicted an 
increase in learned attention towards C over training, and a greater bias in the 
standard group than the balanced group, Mackintosh predicted that attention to C 
catches up to B over training, and larger biases in the balanced group than the 
standard group.  
In Chapter 5, attention to cues during training was measured in two ways, first 
via changes in associability for predictive cues (Experiment 6), and second via 
fixation time to cues (Experiment 7). Overall, the results were clearly more consistent 
with the predictions of EXIT than with Mackintosh. Experiment 6 compared the 
transfer of attention to rare predictors and common predictors when these cues were 
paired with novel outcomes in a second training phase. There was a benefit in 
learning for previously rare predictors following three blocks of base-rate training, but 
this transfer effect was diminished following seven blocks of base-rate training. This 
result suggests that the rare predictors enjoy greater associability than previously 
common predictors, but that these effects reduce over training. There were no 
differences in transfer effects between groups, but group differences did emerge when 
attention was measured via fixation time to cues. 
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Experiment 7 used eye-tracking to measure overt attention to cues, both prior 
to making a prediction and during feedback. Prior to making a decision, there was a 
greater bias in attention to C on rare AC trials than B on common AB trials overall, 
and this bias to C increased across training. However this also interacted with group. 
While there was no preferential attention to either cue on AB trials in the standard 
group, there was a bias towards B in the balanced group. During feedback, there were 
longer fixation times to the rare predictor than the imperfect predictor on rare AC 
trials, and no difference in fixation time to cues on common AB trials, and this pattern 
was consistent across groups. This attention bias also decreased across training as 
accuracy in the task increased. Attention prior to making a decision therefore appears 
to reflect a different process than attention after making a decision. While pre-
decision attention appears to be exploitative, and reflects the current state of learning 
about which cues will be most useful in making a correct prediction, attention during 
feedback appears to be a response to error, with attention shifting to the cues most 
likely to reduce that error. These results support the EXIT model’s assumption that 
attention rapidly shifts to cues that will reduce prediction error, after making a 
prediction on a given trial. The decrease in feedback attention biases across training 
appears to reflect the amount of change in attention to cues pre- and post-shift, such 
that as learned attention to the rare predictor increases prior to making a choice, there 
is less bias in attention during feedback. 
It could be argued that the difference in mere exposure to cues B and C results 
in differential attention to cues, where cue B loses salience due to repeated exposure, 
regardless of the contingencies between cues and outcomes. Mere exposure or simple 
novelty effects have been largely discounted due to the necessity of a shared 
imperfect predictor, and the results from the balanced condition provide further 
	 229	
evidence against this account. If mere exposure resulted in attention biases towards 
the rare cue, then we should expect an inverse base-rate effect of equal strength in the 
balanced group, which experienced the same base-rate of cue presentation as the 
standard group. However in this condition, the inverse base-rate effect was reduced, 
and gaze biases towards the predictive cue did not differ between AB and AC trials.  
The results also suggest that context associations affect learning about 
predictive cues.  That is, in the standard group, the context is a good predictor of the 
outcome on common trials, and therefore less attention is needed to the common 
predictor to make a correct response. The context is less useful on rare trials, and 
therefore more attention is directed towards the rare predictor. In the balanced group, 
the context is less useful in predicting the outcome on common trials than in the 
standard group, and so more attention is paid to the most predictive cue on these 
trials. This would result in better learning of the B-O1 association in the balanced 
group compared to the standard group, which may then lead to greater common 
responses on BC trials. In Chapter 4, EXIT predicted greater attention to the context 
on common trials than rare trials in the standard group, but not in the balanced group. 
However this only occurred following a shift in attention. Surprisingly, this difference 
in attention to the context was not learned, with very little, if any, learned attention to 
the context. This is likely due to the low bias salience in the best fitting parameters in 
this experiment. The predictions made by EXIT appear to be highly parameter-
specific, such that other combinations of parameters that fit the data well may show 
greater learning about the context.  
The differences in predicted attention between the two models is likely to be 
driven by differences in their formalization, such as the inclusion of exemplar-
mediated attention in EXIT. This allows attention to the same cue to differ depending 
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on the kind of trial, which appears to be the case in fixation time to the imperfect cue, 
for example. Exemplar specific attention may also be important for the contribution of 
context learning to the effect, as it would allow the context to be more attended on 
some trials than others. Even so, rapid attention shifting prior to learning might mean 
that attention at the time of learning is very different on AB and AC trials, even if 
exemplar-mediated attention is not shaped by learning.  
Although the EXIT model can provide a good (albeit not perfect) account of 
the patterns of attention in Chapter 5, the EXIT model certainly has limitations. The 
model is complex, with seven free parameters, and the predictions appear to be highly 
parameter specific. If not conservatively constrained, the model has sufficient 
flexibility to fit many patterns of data. The ability of the model to capture the results 
of a single experiment might not be a good test of its general plausibility. For 
example, it was difficult for one set of parameters to account for the results of 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 simultaneously, even though they were run using the 
same general procedure in very similar conditions. Moreover, the best-fitting 
parameters for these two experiments seem to vary substantially, such that it is 
sometimes unclear how those parameters relate to choice and attention.  
This thesis limited the model comparison to EXIT and Mackintosh because of 
the theoretical relationship between the two models, and prior suggestions that the 
original Mackintosh model might not accommodate the effect (Wills et al., 2014). The 
simulations in this thesis used a modified version of Mackintosh with a summed error 
term (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Suret & McLaren, 2005; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010), as 
this has previously been shown to better account for other cue competition effects, 
and provides a mechanism for conditioned inhibition. There are of course other 
relevant models that might predict the patterns of attention and choice observed here. 
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For example, models that reconcile the influence of both predictiveness and 
uncertainty on associative change (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004; Esber & Haselgrove, 2011) 
might be particularly informative considering the pattern of attention during feedback 
that appear to be a result of changes in prediction error. To provide a complete 
account, these models would need to predict several aspects of the effect, including 
rare biases on BC trials, common biases on A trials, greater attention for C over A 
than B over A, and reductions in the effect in balanced and equal-trial conditions.  
7.3 Is the inverse base-rate effect only a choice effect?  
The results of Chapter 6 indicate that the way in which learning phenomena 
are measured can have a large influence on the observation of particular effects. 
Previously, the inverse base-rate effect had only been demonstrated in a discrete 
choice test phase. While other cue competition effects like blocking and 
overshadowing appear to be robust across different test measures, including outcome 
choice and outcome ratings, the inverse base-rate effect appears to be considerably 
less reliable when measured in a continuous outcome rating test phase. Evidence for 
an outcome bias in ratings was varied, with a significant rare bias in one of three 
continuous rating test phases. It is possible that allowing multiple responses permits 
more rational responding in the context of the inverse base rate effect, as participants 
would be able to indicate that multiple outcomes may be likely. However, this 
requires further research allowing multiple outcome responses in a discrete choice test 
phase. The result is also not simply a reflection of poor confidence on conflicting 
trials, as participants in the choice conditions across multiple experiments in this 
thesis were more confident in their choice on conflicting trials than imperfect trials, 
and were specifically more confident when they chose the rare outcome than when 
they chose the common outcome on conflicting trials.  
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The conclusion presented here is that discrete outcome choice may provide a 
more sensitive measure of effects when there are small differences in associative 
strength, or when test trials are ambiguous. As conflicting trials present two cues that 
are both good predictors of their respective outcomes, and the cue assumed to have 
lowest associative strength is encountered frequently, it is likely that any differences 
in associative strength for predictive cues would only be small. A small difference in 
the evidence for one outcome over another may then lead to a clear difference in 
outcome choice, but smaller and sometimes no differences in ratings for the two 
relevant outcomes. The pattern of effect sizes suggests that the sensitivity of a choice 
test may also interact in some way with the kind of test trial, such that choice may be 
particularly useful for ambiguous test trials. For example, negation trials that pair 
together two cues that are predictive of different outcomes (e.g., BC), or single cues 
that were paired with multiple outcomes (e.g., A). These kinds of trials require some 
form of response competition, which may be better measured by a test measure that 
forces a decision between alternative options than one that allows multiple options to 
be rated highly. Thus the use of discrete choice may more consistently reveal 
significant biases compared to continuous ratings in these situations.  
The fact that the effect appears less reliable in ratings is not necessarily 
problematic for the interpretation of the effect as a result of differences in learning 
about cues. If we accept that choice provides a more sensitive measure of small 
differences in memory retrieval, then this simply indicates that the effect does not 
involve a large difference in associative strength between cues. Several results, 
including results from this thesis, provide support for the contribution of cue 
competition to the effect, including biases in attention and the importance of trial-by-
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trial training conditions on choice biases. What is perhaps more interesting is the way 
in which this small difference in learning can influence choice behaviour so reliably.  
 These experiments also raised the question as to whether there are causal 
model effects in the inverse base-rate effect, particularly when it is measured by 
ratings. While causal scenarios may emphasise cue competition effects in blocking 
compared to diagnostic scenarios, the opposite may be true in the inverse base-rate 
effect. That is, participants may assume the likelihood of the common outcome and 
rare outcome is equivalent when the cues are presented as causes but not when they 
are presented as effects. Although the effect has been demonstrated in a variety of 
task scenarios (see Chapter 2), including a causal scenario in the allergist task in this 
thesis, the use of discrete choice may mask the expression of differences based on the 
inferred causal model, as seems to be the case in blocking (see Appendix E). The only 
significant effect in ratings was in a diagnostic scenario in the medical diagnosis task 
(Experiment 10), while the non-significant effects occurred in a causal scenario in the 
allergist task (Experiment 8 and 9). The effects did not differ substantially in 
magnitude between the two experiments, which does not provide strong evidence for 
causal model effects. Nevertheless, the comparison between experiments here is not 
ideal to determine the presence or extent of causal model effects, which requires 
further research in large between-subjects design. However if it were the case that 
causal models have an influence on the inverse base-rate effect, this would have 
further implications for the contribution of inferential processes to the effect. 
	7.4	Beyond the inverse base-rate effect. 
While the research presented in this thesis focused on understanding the 
mechanisms involved in the inverse base-rate effect, part of the motivation for doing 
so was to gain insight into the way in which learning and decision making processes 
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operate more generally. What can the results of this thesis tell us beyond the inverse 
base-rate effect?  
Firstly, the results highlight the need to understand interactions between 
associative and inferential processes. Experiment 4 suggests that some participants 
entertain and use inferential reasoning during this learning task, but that this use is 
inconsistent across individuals. Despite the absence of strong evidence for a unified 
inferential processes here, it is still reasonable to assume that inferential processes 
may play some role. Dual-process accounts, which assume contributions of both 
associative and inferential processes, still form the most complete explanations for 
other learning and cue competition effects (McLaren et al., 2014). The assumption is 
that these are general mechanisms governing learning and behaviour, and thus it 
seems unlikely that the inverse base-rate effect should be any different in this regard. 
Several researchers have made progress in examining interactions between controlled 
and automatic processes through instructional manipulations (e.g., López, Alonso & 
Luque, 2016; Mitchell, Griffiths, Seeto & Lovibond, 2012; Shone, Harris & Livesey, 
2015; Don & Livesey, 2015). The observation that not all participants appear to use 
controlled inferential processes also highlights the need for future research to consider 
individual differences in the propensity to use either process, and how these 
differences might predict learning and decision making effects (e.g., Don, Goldwater, 
Otto & Livesey, 2016; Goldwater, Don, Krusche & Livesey, accepted). For example, 
Livesey et al. (2013) showed that non-additive pre-training removes blocking (as 
predicted by propositional explanations of the effect; see Lovibond et al., 2003) in 
participants with high cognitive reflection scores, but not those with low cognitive 
reflection scores. The influence of test measures on the observation of learning effects 
has important practical implications for researchers studying learning and decision-
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making. Specifically, researchers should consider the sensitivity of different test 
measures in particular task conditions, and what it is these test measures reflect in 
their interpretation of learning and decision effects. Discrete outcome choice may 
provide a more sensitive measure of small differences in associative strength, 
specifically in situations where there is learned evidence supporting more than one 
outcome. This kind of test phase requires participants to weigh evidence in favour of 
one outcome over alternative outcomes, and may therefore be more useful in 
detecting small effect sizes, which might otherwise be difficult to observe reliably in 
ratings, where participants can rate multiple outcomes. On the other hand, ratings may 
provide a better reflection of reasoning processes, as they may be more flexibly 
adapted based on, say, reasoning about causation. The use of rating scales therefore 
requires careful consideration of the phrasing of test questions, as different questions 
might tap into different aspects of what is learned, which can also be seen in past 
research observing differences in responses to causal ratings and memory questions 
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008, Don & Livesey, 2015), or based on the direction of 
cause-effect relationships described in the test question (Matute, Arcediano & Miller, 
1996). Overall these findings suggest that different test formats might reveal quite 
different fundamental aspects of complex decisions. 
The inverse base-rate effect is not the only learning phenomenon in which 
biased judgements arise from the erroneous use of base-rate information. Base-rate 
neglect occurs in trial-by-trial learning in a number of experimental contexts. For 
example, the formation of illusory causation between a cue and an outcome when 
there is zero contingency (i.e., when the probability of the outcome is the same when 
the cue is present and when the cue is absent) is assumed to be the result of failing to 
adequately consider the base-rates of the outcome when the cue is absent (e.g., Matute 
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et al., 2015). This illusory causation is also greater when the outcome is experienced 
frequently (Blanco, Matute & Vadillo, 2013). It is possible that these effects are 
stronger in trial-by-trial learning conditions than when participants are made-
explicitly aware of the base-rates. Indeed, when participants are pre-trained to expect 
a high base-rate of the outcome, illusory causation is reduced (Blanco & Matute, 
2017, September). This may have a similar effect to providing participants with a 
summary of the base-rates, as in Johansen, Fouquet & Shanks (2007). It remains to be 
seen whether these errors of judgements are the consequence of the same cognitive 
mechanisms, but at the very least, they seem to arise in similar procedures. 
Curiously, the conditions in which the inverse base-rate effect is most reliable 
are also the conditions in which participants display the greatest learning of base-rates 
in other ways. For instance, rare biases on conflicting trials are stronger when there 
are greater common responses to the imperfect predictor (Shanks, 1992). Indeed in 
this thesis, significant inverse base-rate effects were accompanied by strong base-rate 
consistent responses on imperfect trials. When there is no global outcome base-rate 
difference (the balanced condition), or when participants do not show a rare bias (the 
equal-trial condition), they also tend to show weaker common biases on other trials. 
The effect therefore does not appear to be a result of failing to learn base-rate 
information, but is instead a consequence of learning the base-rates well. Perhaps 
above all else, the effect highlights that efficient learning mechanisms can lead to 
faulty decisions. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The base-rates of events provide an important source of information when 
making decisions based on ambiguous information. Yet, people are often poor at 
making rational choices when they involve a consideration of base-rates. The purpose 
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of this thesis was to further understand the processes involved in the neglect of base-
rate information in the inverse base-rate effect. Studying these effects in trial-and-
error learning can provide an insight into what information people do rely on when 
they fail to make rational judgments. Despite previous suggestions that trial-by-trial 
learning may encourage rational use of base-rates (e.g., Beach, 1982; Christensen-
Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981; Manis et al., 1980; Butt, 1988), this is clearly not the 
case in all situations. The results of this thesis highlight the role of learning and 
attention in determining when learning base-rate information may lead to rational and 
irrational choices.  
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APPENDIX A 
Bayes Factor Analysis 
I used a Bayes Factor test for two purposes concerning the presence of the inverse base-
rate effect; to examine evidence for an inverse base-rate effect in individual groups, and 
to compare the strength of the effect between groups. To do this I assumed a very 
simple two-parameter model of response tendencies. The first parameter describes the 
probability of choosing either of the outcomes that were relevant to the set of 
conflicting cues; 𝑎 = p(relevant choice). The second parameter describes the bias to 
choose the rare outcome over the common outcome when a relevant choice is made; 𝑏 = 
p(rare choice | relevant choice). Hence, considering the probabilities of the three types 
of choice that participants can make, relevant rare, relevant common, and irrelevant: 
 
Equation S1: 
p(rare relevant choice) = 𝑎 × 𝑏 
 
Equation S2: 
p(common relevant choice) = 𝑎 × (1−𝑏) 
 
Equation S3: 
p(irrelevant choice) = 1 – 𝑎   
 
We considered a parameter space for combinations of 𝑎 and 𝑏, with the assumption that 
0 < 𝑎 < 1 and 0 < 𝑏 < 1. For combinations of 𝑎 and 𝑏 within these ranges we calculated 
a log likelihood function using each observation from each participant. The inverse 
base-rate effect is mainly concerned with the values of 𝑏, such that an effect occurs 
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when 𝑏 > 0.5. The 𝑎  parameter was effectively removed from the other analyses 
reported in the manuscript because the t tests were run on proportions of relevant 
choices. Thus, having calculated these likelihoods, I collapsed across values of a to give 
a likelihood function for the 𝑏 parameter. This computed function was used to compare 
the probability of the data assuming two hypotheses (thus yielding a Bayes Factor).  
To determine evidence for an effect in each group, we compared the null 
hypothesis that participants were equally likely to choose the relevant common outcome 
and relevant rare outcome to the alternative hypothesis that participants were more 
likely to choose the relevant rare outcome than the relevant common outcome. To do 
this, we assumed a null prior that 𝑏 = 0.5 and an alternative prior consisting of a 
rectangular probability distribution weighting equally the probabilities in the range 0.5 
<= 𝑏 < 1 (see Figure A1).  
For group comparisons, we compared the null hypothesis that the bias towards 
choosing the relevant rare outcome over the relevant common outcome in the 
experimental condition (e.g. the balanced group in Experiment 3.2) was the same as the 
bias in the control condition (e.g. standard group in Experiments 3.2) to an alternative 
hypothesis that the bias towards rare choice was weaker in the experimental condition 
than in the control condition. Thus we assumed a null prior that 𝑏experimental = 𝑏control to an 
alternative prior consisting of a rectangular probability distribution weighting equally 
the probabilities in the range 0.5 <= 𝑏experimental < 𝑏control. Note that this alternative prior 
assumes that the experimental manipulation will weaken but not reverse the bias. We 
took the convolution of these priors and the likelihood function for values of 𝑏 in the 
control condition to calculate the final null and alternative priors. A full explanation of 
this approach can be found in Gallistel (2009) and is illustrated in Figure A2. 
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For each test, we report BF01 where the evidence favours the null hypothesis and 
BF10 where the evidence favours the alternative hypothesis. A BF greater than 3 is 
conventionally viewed as convincing evidence in favour of one hypothesis over the 
other. 
 
 
Figure A1. An example (from Experiment 3.3) of the hypotheses used in the Bayes 
Factor analyses to determine the evidence for an inverse base-rate effect. H0 reflects the 
null hypothesis that participants were equally likely to choose the relevant common 
outcome and relevant rare outcome (𝑏 = 0.5). H1 reflects the alternative hypothesis that 
participants were more likely to choose the relevant rare outcome than the relevant 
common outcome (0.5 <= 𝑏 < 1). Lk is the normalised likelihood function of 𝑏 for the 
shared-outcome group.  
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Figure A2. An example (from Experiment 3.3) of the hypotheses used in the Bayes 
Factor analyses reported for the group comparisons. H0 reflects the normalised 
likelihood function for values of 𝑏 in the control group, indicating the null hypothesis 
that the bias in the experimental group is the same as the bias in the control group. H1 
reflects the hypothesis that the bias in the experimental group is reduced compared to 
the control group, such that 𝑏 in the experimental group is between 0.5 and 𝑏 in the 
control group. Lk is the normalised likelihood function of 𝑏 for the experimental group.  
 
 BF tests for the ratings conditions in Chapter 6 used a similar analysis 
comparing the null hypothesis that participants would rate both relevant outcomes 
equally to the alternative hypothesis that participants would rate the rare outcome as 
more likely than the common outcome. The 𝑏 parameter was therefore the difference 
score between the rating for the relevant rare outcome and the rating for the relevant 
common outcome. This parameter ranged from -99 to 99 with higher scores indicating a 
greater rare rating bias. This analysis compared a null prior that 𝑏 = 0, with an 
alternative prior with a rectangular distribution ranging from 0 <= 𝑏 < 99.  
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APPENDIX B 
Post-experimental questionnaire used in Experiment 3.4  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
During the experiment, the following pattern was true for all combinations of symptoms 
and diseases: 
 
Patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM B always had DISEASE 1 
 
Patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM C always had DISEASE 2 
 
DISEASE 1 occurred three times more often than DISEASE 2 
That is, patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM B that had DISEASE 1 were seen 
three times more often than patients with SYMPTOM A + SYMPTOM C that had 
DISEASE 2. 
 
Based on this information, please answer the following questions: 
 
During the final phase of the experiment (when you did not receive feedback), you saw 
patients with SYMPTOM B + SYMPTOM C 
 
1. Which disease did you tend to diagnose for these patients? (Please tick one box 
only) 
 
£ DISEASE 1    
 
£ DISEASE 2 
 
2. Why did you choose this disease? Briefly explain the reason for your choice: 
 
Once you have completed this questionnaire, please return it to the experimenter.  
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APPENDIX C 
Three-block version of outcome frequency effect 
In Experiment 4.2, attention transfer is compared after three and seven blocks of 
training. We know that the inverse base-rate effect is reliably observed after seven 
blocks of training, and that a difference in the strength of the effect in the standard and 
balanced group occurs after seven blocks of training. However it is unclear whether 
these effects also emerge after only three blocks of training, before accuracy on rare 
trials tends to reach asymptote. This experiment therefore aimed to compare the effect 
in standard and balanced groups after only three blocks of initial base-rate training. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-nine undergraduate students from the University of Sydney 
participated in return for partial course credit (29 female, mean age = 23.63, SD = 6.98), 
and were randomly allocated to standard (n = 24) and balanced (n = 25) groups. 
Procedure 
The task was run in an identical manner to Experiment 4.1A, but with only three 
blocks of training.  
Results 
Training 
 Response accuracy during training is shown in Figure A3. A 2 x 2 x (3) mixed 
measures ANOVA was run with group (standard vs. balanced) as the between-subjects 
factor and trial type (common vs. rare) and block (1-3) as within-subjects factors. This 
revealed a significant main effect of block, indicating an increase in accuracy across 
training, F(2,94) = 110.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .701. Overall, accuracy was greater on 
common trials than rare trials, F(1,47) = 130.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .735, and common trials 
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were learned faster than rare trials,  F(2,94) = 11.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .192. This 
difference in learning was greater in the balanced group than the standard group, 
F(1,47) = 12.32, p = .001, ηp2 = .208.   
 
 
Figure A3. Response accuracy during training for each trial type in the standard and 
balanced groups. 
 
Test 
The proportion of rare outcome choice on each of the critical trial types is shown 
in Figure A4. There was a significant inverse base-rate effect in the standard group, 
t(23) = 5.06, p < .001, d = 1.03, but not in the balanced group, t(24) = 0.89, p = .38, d = 
0.18. This group difference was significant, t(47) = 4.26, p < .001, d = 1.22.  
Responding on imperfect trials was common-biased in both groups, lowest t(24) 
= 4.09, p < .001, d = 0.82, and there was no significant group difference, t(47) = 1.7, p = 
.096, d = 0.49. Rare responding for combined trials was unbiased in the standard group, 
t(23) = 0.81, p = .426, d = 0.17, but was significantly common-biased in the balanced 
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group, t(24) = 4.94, p < .001, d = 0.99, and this difference was significant, t(47) = 3.13, 
p = .003, d = 0.89.  
 
Figure A4. Proportion of rare choice on imperfect, conflicting and combined transfer 
trials in standard and balanced groups following three blocks of base-rate training.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, there was a similar pattern of choice responding after three blocks of base-rate 
training compared to that typically seen after seven blocks of training. There was a 
significant inverse base-rate effect in the standard group, with greater choice of the rare 
outcome on conflicting trials. This effect was also significantly weaker in the balanced 
group. One notable difference compared to previous experiments is the proportion of 
rare outcome choice on conflicting trials in the balanced group. While we typically 
observe a small rare bias in the balanced group, here outcome choice is numerically 
common-biased, although this did not significantly differ from chance. It therefore 
appears that when learning for rare trials has not yet reached asymptote in the balanced 
group, there are fewer rare responses for BC trials. 
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APPENDIX D 
Additional analysis of fixation time by number of presentations from Experiment 7 
In Experiment 7, fixation time is compared between common and rare trials on a block-
by-block basis. Each block contains six presentations of each common compound and 2 
presentations of each rare compound. It could be argued that on early common trials, 
attention changes in a similar way to rare trials, but any differences disappear after 
repeated presentation. Attention was therefore compared on common and rare trials 
when they were matched by number of presentations. Figure A5 and A6 show fixation 
time during decision and feedback (respectively) for each presentation of each trial type. 
Analyses included only the first 14 presentations of common trials to match the number 
of presentations of rare trials.  
 
Figure A5. Pre-decision fixation time by number of presentations of each trial type in 
Experiment 7.  
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Fixation time prior to prediction  
A 2 x (2) x (2) x (14) ANOVA was run with group as a between subjects factor, 
and cue type (predictive vs. imperfect), trial type (common vs. rare) and number of 
presentations (1-14) as within subjects factors. There was greater overall fixation time 
on predictive cues, F(1,59) = 19.79, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.251, and greater overall fixation 
time on rare trials, F(1,59) = 4.321, p = .042, ηp2 =  .343. There was a significant 
interaction between predictiveness and cue type F(1,59) = 11.14, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.416, 
with a greater difference on rare than common trials. This also interacted with group 
F(1,59) = 5.22, p = .026, ηp2 = .081. Separate ANOVAs were then run for each group. In 
the standard group, there was an interaction between predictiveness and trial type, 
F(1,29) = 17.92, p = <.001, ηp2 = 0.382, such that there was a bias on rare trials, F(1,29) 
= 19.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .404, but not on common trials, F < 1. In the balanced group, 
there was an overall effect of predictiveness, F(1,30) = 8.91, p = .006, ηp2 =  .229, but 
this did not interact with trial type, F < 1, such that there was a bias on both common 
and rare trials, lowest F(1,31) = 5.10, p = .031, ηp2 = .141. This pattern of results 
matches those reported when fixation time was collapsed across block. This suggests 
that the differences in gaze between common and rare trials, and between groups, 
emerge early on in training.  
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Figure A6. Feedback fixation time by number of presentations of each trial type in 
Experiment 7.  
 
 
Feedback 
The same analysis was run for fixation time during feedback, which revealed a 
significant main effect of predictiveness F(1,59) = 21.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.264, and an 
interaction between predictiveness and trial type,  F(1,59) = 18.60, p <.001. ηp2 = 0.24, which 
did not interact with group F < 1. There was a bias towards the rare predictor on rare trials in 
both the standard and balanced groups, lowest F(1,28) = 14.14, p = .001, ηp2 =.335, but no 
bias in either group on common trials, highest F < 1. This pattern of results also matches that 
when fixation time is collapsed across blocks.  
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APPENDIX E 
Comparison of causal model effects in choice and ratings in blocking 
Cue competition effects in human contingency learning appear to be sensitive to the implied 
causal relationship between cues and outcomes. While blocking effects are reliably 
demonstrated in task scenarios where cues are presented as causes of the outcome, some 
studies have failed to find blocking in non-causal and diagnostic scenarios, where cues are 
presented as effects of the outcome (e.g., Waldmann, 2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). 
This makes sense based on the assumption that blocking is based on causal reasoning rather 
than competitive learning (Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009). In a causal scenario, if 
one cue is established as a cause of the outcome, then the causal status of the blocked cue is 
uncertain. In comparison, in a diagnostic scenario, establishing one cue as an effect of the 
outcome does not reduce the likelihood that a second cue may also be an effect of the 
outcome.  
These studies typically measure blocking using continuous causal ratings, which may 
be more susceptible to other influences, such as reasoning about causality, than other 
measures (Mitchell, Lovibond, Minard & Lavis, 2006; Don & Livesey, 2015). This 
experiment therefore aimed to assess the sensitivity of blocking to causal scenarios across 
different test measures. Participants completed a modified allergist task with instructions 
indicating either a causal or non-causal relationship between cues and outcomes, using the 
same cue and outcome stimuli between groups. In the causal scenario, foods were described 
as causes of different diseases, identified by a name (e.g. Marshall’s disease), and the task 
was to determine which foods were causing which disease. In the non-causal scenario, foods 
were described as different people’s meals (e.g. Marshall’s meal), and the task was to 
determine which meal belonged to which person. Learning for cues was then assessed with 
either continuous outcome likelihood ratings, or discrete outcome choice.  
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Table A1  
Experiment design. 
TRAINING  TEST  
Phase 1 Phase 2 Trial type  Cues 
A - 1 AB - 1 Blocked B, D, J, L 
C - 2 CD - 2 Control E, F, G, H, M, N, O, P 
 EF - 1 Negation BM, DO, LF, JH 
 GH - 2   
I - 3 IJ - 3   
K - 4 KL - 4   
 MN - 3   
 OP - 4   
QR - 1 Y - 1 Filler cues Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, α, β 
ST - 2 Z - 2   
UV - 3 α - 3   
WX - 4 β - 4   
    
Note: Letters refer to individual food cues. Numbers refer to different outcomes. Bold 
indicated blocked cues, and italics indicate overshadowing control cues.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-eight students from the University of Sydney (61 female, mean age = 19.41, 
SD = 3.33) participated in the experiment in return for monetary compensation ($15/hr). 
Participants were randomly allocated to each condition (n = 22).  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 The experiment was programmed using PsychToolbox for Matlab (Kleiner, Brainard 
& Pelli, 2007). Participants were tested in individual cubicles up to four at a time. 
Experimental stimuli included 28 300 x 300 pixel images of foods, accompanied by a label in 
blue text. Food cues included apple, avocado, bacon, banana, beef, bread, broccoli, carrots, 
cheese, cherries, chicken, chocolate, coffee, corn, eggs, fish, lemon, mango, milk, mushrooms, 
pasta, peach, peas, peanuts, pineapple, prawns, rice, and strawberries. In both conditions, the 
outcomes were identified by one of four names, Marshall, Scarlet, Florence, and Jakob. 
These names indicated the names of different diseases in the causal scenario (e.g. Scarlet’s 
disease), or the person to whom the meal belonged in the non-causal scenario (e.g. Scarlet’s 
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meal). For each participant, foods and names were randomly allocated to cues A-β and 
outcomes 1-4, respectively. 
Design  
The experiment was a 2 x 2 design with causal scenario (causal vs. non-causal) and 
test measure (ratings vs. discrete choice) as between-subject factors. Training contingencies 
are shown in Table A1. In Phase 1, four pre-trained cues were paired with one of four 
possible outcomes. In the second phase, the pre-trained cues were presented in compound 
with a novel cue (blocked cue), and paired with the same outcome. Four overshadowing 
compound control cues were also presented in this Phase. Compound and single cue filler 
trials were included in Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively, so that participants experienced both 
individual and compound cues in each phase. Overshadowing can then also be assessed by the 
comparison of single and compound control cues in Phase 2. Two different kinds of test trials 
were included. First, participants made outcome likelihood responses for each cue presented 
individually. Here, blocking would be indicated by reduced accuracy in responding for the 
correct outcome for the blocked cues compared to the control cues. Second, four negation 
trials were included, which were composed of one blocked cue and one control cue presented 
in compound, which had each been paired with a different outcome in Phase 2. These trials 
determine which cue has greater control of responding. Thus, blocking is indicated by greater 
responses for the outcome previously paired with the control cue than the outcome previously 
paired with the blocked cue.  
Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, participants were given instructions that outlined the 
causal scenario of the task. In the causal condition, participants were given the following 
instructions: 
	 	 267	
In this task, you are asked to imagine that you work for the food safety industry. You 
have discovered that people are suffering from several different diseases after eating 
certain contaminated foods. Your job is to learn which foods are causing which 
disease by observing a number of meals that have been eaten, and the kind of disease 
that occurs.  
Participants in the non-causal scenario were instructed: 
In this task, you are asked to imagine that you work for a catering company that 
delivers meals to different people. You have been given a number of meals to deliver 
to several regular customers. However, the orders have all been mixed up. Your job is 
to learn which meal belongs to which person, from the food it contains.  
On each trial, two food cues appeared on the upper half of the screen, and participants were 
required to select one of the four outcomes presented in boxes on the lower half of the screen. 
When an outcome was selected, the options disappeared and feedback was provided while the 
food cues remained on the screen. The correct outcome appeared, accompanied by either the 
word “CORRECT” in green, or “INCORRECT” in red, depending on the accuracy of the 
selection. Participants were instructed that at first they would have to guess, but that using the 
feedback provided, their accuracy should improve over time. These trials were identical for 
both causal scenario conditions, with the exception of last word in each of the outcomes, e.g. 
Marshall’s disease vs. Marshall’s meal. There were five blocks of training trials in each 
phase, with each trial type presented twice per block. Trials within a block were presented in 
random order, and the position of compound cues on the screen (left vs. right) was 
counterbalanced within each block. The transition between Phase 1 and Phase 2 occurred 
without a break. 
The test phase began immediately following training. Here, half the participants 
within each causal scenario group completed a rating test phase, while the other half 
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completed a discrete choice test phase. Participants were told they would see a number of 
meals and were asked to use the knowledge they had gained so far to respond. In the ratings 
groups, participants were asked to either rate the likelihood of each disease, given the 
presented meals had been eaten, or rate the likelihood that the meal belonged to each 
customer. On each trial, one or two food cues were presented on the upper half of the screen. 
Four rating scales were presented on the lower half of the screen, one for each outcome, 
positioned in the same order as training. Participants were required to make all four ratings, 
and could adjust their ratings before pressing the space bar to move to the next trial. In the 
choice conditions, participants were asked to select the disease they thought was most likely, 
given the meal had been eaten, or select which customer each meal was most likely to belong 
to, according to causal scenario group. Outcomes appeared on the lower half of the screen in 
the same manner as training. After making a choice, a rating scale would appear below the 
response options, and participants were asked to rate how confident they were that they had 
made the correct choice. The scale ranged from “not at all confident” to “very confident”. 
Participants were also able to adjust their choice and confidence rating before pressing the 
space bar to move to the next trial. No feedback was provided in this phase. Test trials 
included all training cues presented individually in random order, as well as four negation test 
trials.  
Results 
Training 
Accuracy during Phase 1 and Phase 2 of training is shown in Figure A7. 
 Phase 1. A 2 x (5) mixed measures ANOVA with scenario (causal vs. non-causal) as a 
between-subject factor and block (1 – 5) as a within-subjects factor revealed a significant 
main effect of block, F(4,336) = 264.60, p < .001. There was a significant main effect of 
scenario F(1,84) = 8.02, p = .006 and a significant interaction between scenario and block, 
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F(4,336) = 2.93, p = .021, indicating that the participants given the non-causal scenario 
appeared to learn faster overall.   
Phase 2. A 2 x (2) x (5) mixed measures ANOVA, with scenario, block and cue type 
(blocking vs. control) as factors showed a significant main effect of block, F(4,336) = 236.09, 
p <.001.  There was a main effect of cue type, F(1,84) = 167.87, p < .001, indicating greater 
accuracy for blocking compounds compared to control compounds, as well as an interaction 
between block and cue type, F(4,336) =214.40, p < .001, indicating that the rate of learning 
was faster for control compounds than blocking compounds. There was also a significant 
block x scenario interaction, F(4,336) = 3.24, p = .013, suggesting that accuracy in the causal 
scenario caught up to the non-causal scenario over training. In addition, there was a 
significant three-way block x cue type x scenario interaction, F(4,336) = 3.44, p = .009, 
indicating a greater difference in learning rate for the blocking compounds compared to the 
control compounds in the causal scenario than the non-causal scenario. 
 
 
Figure A7. Training accuracy for all trial types in Phase 1 and Phase 2.  
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Figure A8. Accuracy for blocked and control cues presented individually at test. Panel a) 
shows the proportion of correct outcome choice in the choice groups. Panel b) shows the 
average rating for correct outcome minus the average ratings for the incorrect outcomes in the 
rating groups.  
 
Test 
Although it would be ideal to include test measure as a between-subjects factor in the 
test phase analysis, the measures in the rating and choice groups are on different scales, and 
are therefore presented separately.  
Blocking: Accuracy. Figure A8 shows accuracy for blocked and control cues 
presented individually at test. 
Choice. A 2 x (2) mixed measures ANOVA was run with scenario as a between-
subjects factor and cue (blocked vs. control) as a within-subjects factor. There was a 
significant main effect of cue, indicating an overall blocking effect, F(1,42) = 18.49, p < .001, 
but no significant effect of scenario, F(1,42) = 2.65, p = .111, nor interaction, F < 1.  
Ratings. The same analysis for ratings showed a significant main effect of cue F(1,42) 
= 19.91, p < .001, indicating a significant overall blocking effect. There was also a significant 
main effect of scenario group F(1,42) = 4.30, p = .044, indicating greater overall accuracy in 
the non-causal scenario. However this was qualified by a significant cue x scenario interaction 
F(1,42) = 9.21, p = .004, in which there was a stronger blocking effect in the causal than non-
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causal scenario. Further analysis of simple effects revealed a significant blocking effect in the 
causal scenario F(1,21) = 20.06, p < .001, but not in the non-causal scenario, F(1,21) =  1.70, 
p = .207. 
Blocking: Negation. Figure A9 shows responding to negation trials at test. 
Choice. Using the same analysis for negation compounds, there was a significant main 
effect of cue, such that there was greater choice of the outcome paired with the control than 
the blocked cue, F(1,42) =25.40, p < .001. There were no significant effects of scenario, 
highest F(1,42) = 1.08, p = .305.  
Ratings. There was a significant main effect of cue, indicating overall higher ratings 
of the outcome paired with the control cue than the blocked cue, F(1,42) = 10.37, p = .002. 
There were no significant effects of scenario, Fs < 1.  
 
 
 
Figure A9. Responding to negation trials at test. Panel a) shows the proportion of choice of 
the outcome paired with the blocked and control cues. Panel b) shows ratings for the 
outcomes paired with the blocked and control cues.  
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Figure A10. Accuracy for control compounds and individual filler cues to test 
overshadowing. Panel a) shows the proportion of choice of the outcome paired with the 
blocked and control cues. Panel b) shows ratings for the outcomes paired with the blocked 
and control cues.  
 
Overshadowing. Accuracy for control compounds and single cues is shown in Figure 
A10. 
Choice. A 2 x (2) mixed measures ANOVA with scenario and cue (control vs. single 
cue). The same analysis with choice proportions revealed a significant main effect of cue 
type, F(1,42) = 12.33, p = .001, and no interaction with scenario, F < 1. 
Ratings. The same analysis with ratings revealed a significant main effect of cue, 
indicating higher ratings for the single cues than compound control cues overall, F(1,42) = 
55.25, p < .001. There was also a significant cue x scenario interaction, indicating greater 
overshadowing in the causal than non-causal condition, F(1,42) = 5.15, p = .028. Analysis of 
simple effects revealed a significant overshadowing effect in the causal scenario, F(1,21) = 
11.95, p = .002, and no effect in the non-causal scenario, F(1,21) = 1.94, p = .179.  
 
Discussion 
This discussion will simply provide a summary of the results. In this experiment, evidence for 
causal model effects on blocking were dependent on the test measure used. In the causal-
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scenario, blocking and overshadowing were observed across both choice and ratings. 
However in the non-causal group, evidence for effects differed between measures. When 
measuring accuracy for cues presented individually, there was no significant blocking or 
overshadowing effects continuous ratings, but there were significant effects in choice. When 
blocking was measured by negation trials, there were significant effects in both choice and 
ratings, but this effect appeared much stronger in choice. Blocking in non-causal scenarios is 
therefore more likely to be observed in discrete choice measures and negation measures than 
continuous outcome measures.  
